By: |
Tim Grebe (Gesellschaft für Innovationsforschung und Beratung mbH);
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel (Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin);
Sabine Kröger (Département d'économie, Université LavalPavillon J.A.DeSève) |
Abstract: |
Electronic commerce has grown extraordinarily over the years, with online
auctions being extremely successful forms of trade. Those auctions come in a
variety of different formats, such as the Buy-It-Now auction format on eBay,
that allows sellers to post prices at which buyers can purchase a good prior
to the auction. Even though, buyer behavior is well studied in Buy-It-Now
auctions, as to this point little is known about how sellers set Buy-It-Now
prices. We investigate into this question by analyzing seller behavior in
Buy-It-Now auctions. More precisely, we combine the use of a real online
auction market (the eBay platform and eBay traders) with the techniques of lab
experiments. We find a striking link between the information about agents
provided by the eBay market institution and their behavior. Information about
buyers is correlated with their deviation from true value bidding. Sellers
respond strategically to this information when deciding on their Buy-It-Now
prices. Thus, our results highlight potential economic consequences of
information publicly available in (online) market institutions. |
Keywords: |
electronic markets, experience, online auctions, BIN price, buyout price, single item auction, private value, experiment |
JEL: |
C72 C91 D44 D82 |
Date: |
2010–01 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:294&r=ict |