nep-ict 2009-05-09 papers

on Information and Communication Technologies

Issue of 2009‒05‒09
one paper chosen by
Walter Frisch
University Vienna

On the Consumer Problem under an Informational Externality By Marc Santugini

On the Consumer Problem under an Informational Externality

By:	Marc Santugini (IEA, HEC Montréal)
Abstract:	We use the Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) framework to study the consumer problem under an informational externality. The informational externality arises when each consumer of a social network is endowed with private information regarding the quality of a good. In such situations, the past purchasing decisions of the consumers are informative and, thus, are used as partially revealing signals of private information. Asymmetric information and the observability of actions render the consumer problem dynamic and strategic because the purchasing decision of a consumer affects the other consumers' future payoffs through the learning process. We show that there exists a unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The informational externality increases the likelihood for a consumer to refrain from purchasing the good immediately in order to make a more informed decision in the future.
Keywords:	consumer problem; dynamic game; informational externality, learning
JEL:	D0 D8
Date:	2009–04
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iea:carech:0904&r=ict

This nep-ict issue is ©2009 by Walter Frisch. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.

General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.

NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.