nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2008‒12‒01
four papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
University Vienna

  1. The Impact of Individual and Social Attitude in Business Information Technology Knowledge Sharing By JOSE MANUEL ESTEVES
  2. Labor Demand and Information Technologies: Evidence for Spain, 1980-2005 By Manuel A. Hidalgo Pérez; Jesús Rodríguez López; José María O´Kean Alonso
  3. Endogenous efforts on communication networks under strategic complementarity By Mohamed Belhaj; Frédéric Deroïan
  4. Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications By Behringer, Stefan

  1. By: JOSE MANUEL ESTEVES (Instituto de Empresa)
    Abstract: This exploratory study attempts to analyze the way women and men perceive talking about information and communication technology, and its impact in knowledge sharing. Based in 14 focus groups we have defined a conceptual model to interpret this impact in ICT knowledge sharing. Our research findings show that there are differences between men and women, thus gender is a critical factor in ICT knowledge sharing. Also, social, cultural and educational factors have a strong negative impact in their behaviour. Furthermore, we posit that the attitude predisposes a favourable (men) and unfavourable (women) reaction to talk about ICT and this affects ICT knowledge sharing.
    Keywords: Focus group, Gender, Knowledge
    Date: 2008–10
  2. By: Manuel A. Hidalgo Pérez (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide); Jesús Rodríguez López (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide); José María O´Kean Alonso (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)
    Abstract: Using the EU KLEMS dataset we test the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis in a cross-section of sectors in Spain between 1980 and 2005. We analyze three groups of workers, who are classed according to skill level: high, medium and low. Capital assets have been broken down into ICT (information and communication technologies) assets and non-ICT assets. Acquisition and usage costs of ICT assets declined throughout the period studied, both in absolute terms and relative to the other capital assets and workers. Our principal finding is that the substitutibility between workers and ICT assets falls as worker skill level rises. In fact, the ICT assets were strongly complement with highly skilled workers and were not substitutive with them. Throughout the period analyzed, the fraction of employed medium- and high-skill workers rose by 21% and 12%, respectively, to the disadvantage of low-skill workers. After decomposing these changes, we found that the latter were dominated by an ajustment within sectors more than by a composition effect or adjustment between sectors. These adjustments may be explained by reference to the estimated elasticities of substitution.
    Keywords: capital-skill complementarity, ICT, translog cost function, elasticity of substitution.
    JEL: E22 J24 J31 O33
    Date: 2008–11
  3. By: Mohamed Belhaj (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579); Frédéric Deroïan (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579)
    Abstract: This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first characterize both dominant and dominated equilibria. Second, we examine the issue of social coordination in order to reduce the social dilemma.
    Keywords: Communication Network, Endogenous Efforts, Strategic Complements
    Date: 2008–11–17
  4. By: Behringer, Stefan
    Abstract: This paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level.
    Keywords: Asymmetric Networks; Access Pricing; Interconnection; Competition Policy; Telecommunications.
    JEL: L96 L51 L41 K21 D40
    Date: 2008–11–27

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