nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2007‒12‒19
four papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
University Vienna

  1. Les nouvelles facettes de la propriété intellectuelle : stratégies, attaques et menaces By Isabelle Liotard
  2. On Platforms, Incomplete Contracts, and Open Source Software By Andras Niedermayer
  3. Imperfect Legal Unbundling of Monopolistic Bottlenecks By Felix Höffler; Sebastian Kranz
  4. Knowledge Engineering Technique for Cluster Development By Pradorn Sureephong; Nopasit Chakpitak; Yacine Ouzrout; Gilles Neubert; Abdelaziz Bouras

  1. By: Isabelle Liotard (CEPN - Centre d'économie de l'Université de Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7115 - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII)
    Abstract: L’objectif de cet article est de soulever les nouvelles questions qui se posent en matière de propriété intellectuelle à la lumière des Technologies de l’ Information et de la Communication et de montrer que les droits de propriété intellectuelle servent non seulement à protéger une innovation mais plus encore, à être offensif vis-à-vis des concurrents. Nous explorons notamment les effets de la recrudescence des brevets dans les TIC à travers deux réflexions : d’une part, nous portons notre attention sur le rôle stratégique des brevets et les nouveaux comportements de firmes en matière de standardisation et de normalisation et montrons que ces comportements sont similaires pour les standards mis en place aujourd’hui dans le cadre d’Internet. D’autre part, nous mettons l’accent sur des conduites déviantes autour de la propriété intellectuelle en matière d’innovation ainsi que sur la montée en puissance des litiges et des procès, moyen de pression sur les concurrents.
    Keywords: Propriété intellectuelle, standard, norme, Internet, logiciel, méthodes commerciales, innovation.
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:hal-00196848_v1&r=ict
  2. By: Andras Niedermayer
    Abstract: We consider a firm A initially owning a software platform (e.g. operating system) and an application for this platform. The specific knowledge of another firm B is needed to make the platform successful by creating a further application. When B’s application is completed, A has incentives to expropriate the rents. Netscape claimed e.g. that this was the case with its browser running on MS Windows. We will argue that open sourcing or standardizing the platform is a warranty for B against expropriation of rents. The different pieces of software are considered as assets in the sense of the property rights literature (see Hart and Moore (Journal of Political Economy, 1990)). Two cases of joint ownership are considered beyond the standard cases of integration and non-integration: platform standardization (both parties can veto changes) and open source (no veto rights). In line with the literature, the more important a party’s specific investments the more rights it should have. In contrast to Hart and Moore, however, joint ownership can be optimal in our setting. Open source is optimal if investments in the applications are more important than in the platform. The results are driven by the fact that in our model firms invest in physical (and not in human) capital and that there is non-rivalry in consumption for software.
    Keywords: Platforms; open source; standardization; incomplete contracts; property rights; joint ownership
    JEL: C70 D23 L13 L22 L86
    Date: 2007–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0707&r=ict
  3. By: Felix Höffler; Sebastian Kranz
    Abstract: We study an industry with a monopolistic bottleneck (e.g. a transmission network) supplying an essential input to several downstream firms. Under legal unbundling the bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream firm, which may be partly or fully owned by an incumbent active in downstream markets. Access prices are regulated but the upstream firm can perform non-tariff discrimination. Under perfect legal unbundling the upstream firm maximizes only own profits; with imperfections it considers to some extend also the profits of its downstream mother. We find that reducing imperfections in legal unbundling (keeping ownership fixed) generally increases total output. Increasing the incumbent's ownership share increases total output if imperfections are sufficiently small, otherwise the effects are ambiguous. Surprisingly, higher ownership shares of the downstream incumbent may sometimes lead to lower degrees of imperfections. Our analysis suggests that consumers may benefit most from legal unbundling with strong regulation and parts of ownership given to a minority outside shareholder.
    Keywords: Network industries, regulation, vertical relations, ownership, corruption, sabotage
    JEL: D2 D4 L1 L42 L43 L51
    Date: 2007–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse16_2007&r=ict
  4. By: Pradorn Sureephong (LIESP - Laboratoire d'Informatique pour l'Entreprise et les Systèmes de Production - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Lyon, CAMT - College of Arts, Media and Technology - Chiang Mai University); Nopasit Chakpitak (CAMT - College of Arts, Media and Technology - Chiang Mai University); Yacine Ouzrout (LIESP - Laboratoire d'Informatique pour l'Entreprise et les Systèmes de Production - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Lyon); Gilles Neubert (LIESP - Laboratoire d'Informatique pour l'Entreprise et les Systèmes de Production - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Lyon); Abdelaziz Bouras (LIESP - Laboratoire d'Informatique pour l'Entreprise et les Systèmes de Production - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Lyon)
    Abstract: After the concept of industry cluster was tangibly applied in many countries, SMEs trended to link to each other to maintain their competitiveness in the market. The major key success factors of the cluster are knowledge sharing and collaboration between partners. This knowledge is collected in form of tacit and explicit knowledge from experts and institutions within the cluster. The objective of this study is about enhancing the industry cluster with knowledge management by using knowledge engineering which is one of the most important method for managing knowledge. This work analyzed three well known knowledge engineering methods, i.e. MOKA, SPEDE and CommonKADS, and compares the capability to be implemented in the cluster context. Then, we selected one method and proposed the adapted methodology. At the end of this paper, we validated and demonstrated the proposed methodology with some primary result by using case study of handicraft cluster in Thailand.
    Keywords: Knowledge Engineering; Industry Cluster; CommonKADS; Knowledge Management System
    Date: 2007–11–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:hal-00196472_v1&r=ict

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