| Abstract: |
We model media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate
information through the media to influence receivers. We show that if there is
only one sender who has a conditional preference for maintaining its
credibility in reporting accurate information and if the receivers face a
coordination situation without information about their opponents' types, the
sender could influence the receivers to make decisions according to the
sender's primary preference by manipulating the information through the media,
which makes the report common knowledge. This is true even when the sender and
the receivers have contradictory primary preferences. This result extends to
the cases in which the sender has imperfect information or in which the
sender's primary preference is to maintain its credibility. In the case of
multiple senders, however, when there is enough media competition or when
simultaneous reporting takes place, the receivers could play their favored
outcome against senders' preferences, which sheds light on a solution to the
media manipulation problem. |