nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2007‒10‒06
three papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
University Vienna

  1. Teaching Digital Piracy By Michael R. Ward
  2. Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections By Sourav Bhattacharya
  3. Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study By Randolph Sloof; C. Mirjam van Praag

  1. By: Michael R. Ward (Department of Economics, University of Texas at Arlington)
    Abstract: US education policy encourages the use of computers and the Internet at both the college and high school levels. As a consequence, students have had better access to technologies to illicitly share copyrighted music, causing a decline in sales from the traditional music store retail channel. Using a panel of counties over the 1994-2004 period, I find evidence that the number of music stores fell when high schools received subsidies for Internet connections and it fell faster where college enrollment was higher. This intervention in education policy could have contributed greatly to the decline in the music industry.
    Keywords: Music, Internet, Education, Illicit Behavior
    JEL: L82 O34 H3
    Date: 2007–07
  2. By: Sourav Bhattacharya
    Date: 2006–05
  3. By: Randolph Sloof (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); C. Mirjam van Praag (University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute and IZA)
    Abstract: Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower effort levels for noisier performance measures. We conduct a real effort laboratory experiment and find that effort levels are invariant to changes in the distribution of the noise term, i.e. to expectancy. This suggests that enriching the economic (linear agency) model commonly applied within this area by including an expectancy parameter is not needed.
    Keywords: performance measurement, expectancy theory, real effort experiments, agency theory, personnel economics
    JEL: C91 J33
    Date: 2007–09

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