nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2006‒07‒15
five papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
University Vienna

  1. E-consumers' search and emerging structure of B-to-C coalitions By Jacques Laye
  2. Space-filling Techniques in Visualizing Output from Computer Based Economic Models By Richard Webber
  3. Voice over IP. Competition Policy and Regulation By christoph Engel
  4. Interactions between HQ and Divisions in a MNC - Some Consequences of IT Implementation on Organizing supply Activities By Svend Ole Madsen; Ole Stegmann Mikkelsen
  5. Bootstrapping Neural tests for conditional heteroskedasticity By Carole Siani

  1. By: Jacques Laye (LEF Umr Inra-Engref, Nancy INRA)
    Keywords: B-to-C, coalition formation, multi-agent
    JEL: L11 C63 D83
    Date: 2006–07–04
  2. By: Richard Webber (Faculty of Science and I.T. University of Newcastle, Australia)
    Keywords: User Interfaces, Information visualisation, Minority Game
    Date: 2006–07–04
  3. By: christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
    Abstract: Traditionally, there have been two separate telecommunications networks, one based on switches, the other based on routers. The switched network basically carried voice. The packet switched network basically carried data. Now voice is about to go packet switched too. Ultimately, both networks might merge. If that were to happen, the governance structure of either of these networks would have to change fundamentally. Currently, a large amount of packet switched traffic goes over the public Internet. The Internet is organised as a club good. There is an access fee, but no further fee for its actual use. Volume metering is technically feasible, but typically only bandwidth is controlled. In the switched network, a split price is standard. There is an access fee, plus a separate fee for each call. In a club good, by definition each side pays for part of the traffic. On the Internet, the receiver pays principle is thus applied. In most countries, the switched network is governed by the caller pays principle. Under that principle, there are termination charges. Each operator has a local monopoly over its customers. There is thus the possibility that telephony will in the future be controlled by the same principles. Actually, in that case the only remaining property right would be access to the network. In the opposite case, data traffic might be contaminated by the principles currently governing switched telephony. This would presuppose that operators succeed in introducing artificial property rights for the relationship with their customers, maybe even for the individual instance of communication. Technically, there are two main opportunities for this. In switched telephony, for technical reasons it is natural to give out telephone numbers to operators, not to clients. Through these numbers, they control their customers. Voice over IP operators try to implement the same scheme for packet switched voice traffic, although here the domain name system would be natural. Domains are accorded to end users, not to operators. A second conduit for artificially introducing property rights is technical standards. They are needed for defining addressees, for the management of real-time interaction, and for the digital coding of voice signals. By way of proprietary standards, the operator gains full control. Competition policy should not only see at the establishment of these fundamental governance structures. It should also check the potential for distorting systems competition between switched and packet switched telephony. Incumbents are having a host of potential strategies for creating new barriers to entry, and for distorting actual competition. Most critical are bundling strategies. Diagonally integrated incumbents might offer their clients to carry their traffic over IP where possible, and through their traditional network otherwise. That way they could turn their customer base in the traditional networks into a barrier to entry. Currently, this strategy can fully work for mobile telephony. In fixed telephony it is more difficult to implement as long as IP addressees are not earmarked.
    Keywords: property right, club good, network externality, monopolistic competition, systems competition, packet switched telephony, network access, E. 164 numbers vs. IP addresses, caller pays principle vs. receiver pays principle, sip, codecs
    JEL: D D43 H41 K21 K23 L13 L15 L43 L86
    Date: 2005–12
  4. By: Svend Ole Madsen (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark); Ole Stegmann Mikkelsen (Danfoss A/S, Denmark)
    Abstract: This article focuses partly on the interaction between a company headquarter and the divisions and partly on how new IT technologies can influence this process. Specifically, the influence of a newly developed Data Warehouse sys-tem organization of supply is investigated. Based on earlier perspectives, such as core competence and portfolio perspectives, the interactions are examined, and a third perspective, in which elements of the two are coordinated and inte-grated, is introduced. Based on a single case study of Danfoss A/S, the new IT opportunities are then used to illustrate the implications on the organisation of purchasing activities.
    Keywords: Strategic purchasing, multinational companies (MNCs), Informa-tion, Communication and Technology (ICT), organisational development
    Date: 2004–08
  5. By: Carole Siani (University of Lyon 1)
    Keywords: Bootstrap, Artificial Neural Networks, ARCH models, inference tests
    JEL: C14 C15 C45
    Date: 2006–07–04

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