nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2005‒12‒20
four papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
University Vienna

  1. Regulation of telecommunication and deployment of broadband By Machiel van Dijk; Machiel Mulder
  2. Wissensmanagement und Controlling: Eine Forschungsperspektive? [Engl.: Knowledge Management and Management Control Systems: A New Research Field?] By Jennifer Kunz; Stefan Linder
  3. Equilibrium Bias of Technology By Daron Acemoglu
  4. The Relationship between Buyer and a B2B e-Marketplace: Cooperation Determinants in an Electronic Market Context By Lancastre, Andrew; Lages, Luis Filipe

  1. By: Machiel van Dijk; Machiel Mulder
    Abstract: This paper explores the question whether regulation in telecommunications encourages or hampers the development of new technologies. <P> Contrary to other network industries, the telecommunications industry is more and more characterized by competing network technologies, such as cable, copper, and wireless. Regulation is, however, still needed as in several components of telecommunications sources of market power remain. The key issue in the regulation of access to a network is the possible trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency. Favourable conditions for access to the network contribute to allocative efficiency and productive efficiency, but can negatively affect incentives for investments in upgrading of existing infrastructures and developing new ones. <P> In the Netherlands, regulation of the telecommunication industry is designed to enhance competition between alternative infrastructures without affecting the technology choice of both incumbents and entrants. In the market for unbundled access to the local loop and the market for high quality wholesale access, a trade-off exists between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency. Regulated access tariffs, which are based on average costs, seem to be a good compromise between static and dynamic efficiency. Tariffs for access to the local loop reflect actual costs of the existing copper infrastructure, giving entrants incentives to make efficient make-or-buy decisions. In addition, the threat of infrastructure competition in the local loop, as well as the service-based competition between providers using different infrastructures, i.e. copper and cable, provide incentives for the incumbent to increase efficiency. <P> Our overall conclusion is that Dutch regulation of the telecommunication industry gives efficient incentives for technological developments such as the deployment of broadband.
    Keywords: telecommunication; telecom; network; network industries; broadband; regulation; market failure
    JEL: L51 O38
    Date: 2005–12
  2. By: Jennifer Kunz (WHU, 56179 Vallendar Germany); Stefan Linder (WHU, 56179 Vallendar Germany)
    Abstract: GERMAN ABSTRACT: Wissensmanagement und Controlling werden seit Jahrzehnten parallel in der betriebswirt-schaftlichen Forschung diskutiert. Bis dato wurden aber kaum Versuche unternommen, die Zusammenhänge zwischen beiden Bereichen aufzudecken und die so identifizierten Schnittstel-len als potenzielles Forschungsfeld herauszuarbeiten. Das vorliegende Arbeitspapier hat zum Ziel, diese Schnittstelle anhand des beiden Bereichen gemeinsamen Forschungsobjektes unternehmensrelevantes Wissen zu identifizieren und bei-spielhaft ein Vorgehen aufzuzeigen, dass für beide Forschungsstränge zum Erkenntnisfort-schritt führen kann. Darüber hinaus wird eine Einschätzung der Erforschungswürdigkeit von einzelnen Themen wie alternativen Vergütungssystemen und Kennzahlensystemen in diesem Schnittstellenbereich vorgenommen. ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Knowledge management and management control have been discussed separately in business literature for many years. This working paper looks at the possibility to achieve a linkage be-tween the two research arenas and the value of such a linkage with respect to progress in eco-nomic thought. It shows that knowledge management and management control, in fact, overlap in their analy-sis of explicit, declarative and procedural knowledge. Consequently, it is possible to link the two research perspectives. And doing so, in fact, seems very promising with respect to the po-tential advancement in knowledge that can be achieved in both of the two research arenas. Fi-nally the paper shows that analysis of alternative payment schemes and modern, financial and non- financial performance measurement systems seem the two most promising areas for re-search linking knowledge management and management control.
    Keywords: Wissensmanagement, Controlling, Knowledge Management, Management Control Systems
    JEL: P Q Z
    Date: 2005–12–14
  3. By: Daron Acemoglu
    Abstract: The study of the bias of new technologies is important both as part of the analysis of the nature of technology adoption and the direction of technological change, and to understand the distributional implications of new technologies. In this paper, I analyze the equilibrium bias of technology. I distinguish between the relative bias of technology, which concerns how the marginal product of a factor changes relative to that of another following the introduction of new technology, and the absolute bias, which looks only at the effect of new technology on the marginal product of a factor. The first part of the paper generalizes a number of existing results in the literature regarding the relative bias of technology. In particular, I show that when the menu of technological possibilities only allows for factor-augmenting technologies, the increase in the supply of a factor always induces technological change (or technology adoption) relatively biased towards that factor. This force can be strong enough to make the relative marginal product of a factor increasing in response to an increase in its supply, thus leading to an upward-sloping relative demand curve. However, I also show that the results about relative bias do not generalize when more general menus of technological possibilities are considered. In the second part of the paper, I show that there are much more general results about absolute bias. I prove that under fairly mild assumptions, an increase in the supply of a factor always induces changes in technology that are absolutely biased towards that factor, and these results hold both for small changes and large changes in supplies. Most importantly, I also determine the conditions under which the induced-technology response will be strong enough so that the price (marginal product) of a factor increases in response to an increase in its supply. These conditions correspond to a form of failure of joint concavity of the aggregate production function of the economy in factors and technology. This type of failure of joint concavity is quite possible in economies where equilibrium factor demands and technologies are decided by different agents.
    JEL: O30 O31 O33 C65
    Date: 2005–12
  4. By: Lancastre, Andrew; Lages, Luis Filipe
    Abstract: In this article, the authors argue that cooperation may be achieved by adding technology dimensions to the core product. Given the growing importance of real time information exchange and interactivity, a better understanding of the use of technology to the establishment and development of the buyer-supplier cooperative relationships is essential for knowledge advancement. Using a sample of nearly 400 SMEs purchasing managers, this paper reveals that in an electronic market context, cooperation is positively affected by termination costs, supplier policies and practices, communication and information exchange, and negatively affected by product prices and opportunistic behavior. Moreover, both relationship commitment and trust play a major role in mediating the relationships between these five determinants and cooperation.
    Keywords: relationship marketing, trust, cooperation, electronic markets, e-commerce
    Date: 2004

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