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on Information and Communication Technologies |
| By: | Roberto Serrano; Rajiv Vohra |
| Abstract: | A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra [4] and the core proposed by Myerson [11] as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting |
| Date: | 2005–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we055726&r=ict |
| By: | Jeffrey Grogger |
| Abstract: | Forecasting welfare caseloads, particularly turning points, has become more important than ever. Since welfare reform, welfare has been funded via a block grant, which means that unforeseen changes in caseloads can have important fiscal implications for states. In this paper I develop forecasts based on the theory of Markov chains. Since today's caseload is a function of the past caseload, the caseload exhibits inertia. The method exploits that inertia, basing forecasts of the future caseload on past functions of entry and exit rates. In an application to California welfare data, the method accurately predicted the late-2003 turning point roughly one year in advance. |
| JEL: | I3 |
| Date: | 2005–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11682&r=ict |