nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2021‒10‒18
eight papers chosen by
Soumitra K. Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management

  1. Long-Term Care Partnership Effects on Medicaid and Private Insurance By Joan Costa-i-Font; Nilesh Raut
  2. Medicaid Expansion and the Mental Health of Spousal Caregivers By Joan Costa-i-Font; Nilesh Raut; Courtney Harold Van Houtven
  3. Quantifying Climate Risk Using Crop Insurance Data: The Case of Spring Frost Damage in Korean Apple Orchards By Hwang, Jeong Ha; Kim, Seung Min; Han, Ji Wan; Kim, Kwansoo
  4. Implications of WTP-AFP Discrepancy, Premium Subsidy Reduction and Program Changes in U.S. Crop Insurance By Du, Xiaodong; Feng, Hongli; Hennessy, David A.
  5. Risk Preferences over Correlated and Uncorrelated Risks: Insights on Demand for Index Insurance from a Lab Experiment in Ghana By Shenoy, Ashish; Gallenstein, Richard; Flatnes, Jon Einar
  6. Formal insurance and altruism networks By Tizié Bene; Yann Bramoullé; Frédéric Deroïan
  7. The Effect of Job Loss and Unemployment Insurance on Crime in Brazil By Diogo Britto; Paolo Pinotti; Breno Sampaio
  8. Job Displacement, Unemployment Benefits and Domestic Violence By Sonia Bhalotra; Diogo Britto; Paolo Pinotti; Breno Sampaio

  1. By: Joan Costa-i-Font; Nilesh Raut
    Abstract: Can the expansion of Medicaid, a means-tested health and long-term care insurance, be slowed down by incentivising the purchase of private long-term care insurance (LTCI)? We study the implementation of the long-term care insurance partnership (LTCIP) program, a joint federal and state-level program that intended to promote LTCI coverage. Drawing on a difference-in-differences (DD) design we study the effect of the rollout of the LTCIP program between 2005 and 2016 on both LTCI uptake and Medicaid eligibility, and we estimate the effect on Medicaid savings. Drawing on a difference-in-differences (DD) design, we find that, unlike previous estimates, the introduction of the LTCIP does significantly increase LTCI coverage and reduce the uptake of Medicaid. The effects are driven by the introduction of LTCIP in states after 2010. We estimate that the adoption of LTCIP has given rise to an average Medicaid saving of $36 for every 65-year-old. This suggests scope for LTCI arrangements to reduce Medicaid spending.
    Keywords: long-term care partnerships, long-term care insurance, Medicaid, United States, difference-in-differences
    JEL: I18 H11 H24
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9335&r=
  2. By: Joan Costa-i-Font; Nilesh Raut; Courtney Harold Van Houtven
    Abstract: Health insurance expansions can exert wellbeing effects on individuals who provide informal care to their loved ones, reducing their experience of depression. This study exploits evidence from the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Medicaid expansion to examine the effects on the mental wellbeing of informal caregivers. Drawing on an event study and a Difference-in-Differences (DID) design we investigate the policy impact of ACA Medicaid expansion using longitudinal evidence (from the Health and Retirement Study, HRS) for 2010 to 2018 for low-income individuals aged 64 or below. We find that ACA’s Medicaid expansion reduced depressive symptoms among caregivers, and specifically we estimate that exposure to ACA Medicaid expansion gives rise to a 0.38 points (equivalent to 4-5%) reduction in the CESD score (a negative scale in which the lowest scale indicates the best mental wellbeing). We also find that ACA Medicaid causes a spillover effect at the household level, improving the well-being of the spouse care recipient. Our results are robust to various specifications, and we identify several potential driving mechanisms for the findings: reductions in out of -pocket expenses and labor supply and, as expected, increased Medicaid uptake. The evidence from falsification tests confirms that the estimated effects are purely due to ACA’s Medicaid expansion and no other phenomena.
    Keywords: insurance expansion, Medicaid, mental wellbeing, ACA, spousal mental health, informal care
    JEL: I18
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9330&r=
  3. By: Hwang, Jeong Ha; Kim, Seung Min; Han, Ji Wan; Kim, Kwansoo
    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty, International Development, Environmental Economics and Policy
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea21:313937&r=
  4. By: Du, Xiaodong; Feng, Hongli; Hennessy, David A.
    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty, Agricultural and Food Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea21:313881&r=
  5. By: Shenoy, Ashish; Gallenstein, Richard; Flatnes, Jon Einar
    Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Development, Research Methods/Statistical Methods
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea21:313919&r=
  6. By: Tizié Bene (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université); Yann Bramoullé (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université); Frédéric Deroïan (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université)
    Abstract: We study how altruism networks affect the adoption of formal insurance. Agents have private CARA utilities and are embedded in a network of altruistic relationships. Incomes are subject to both a common shock and a large idiosyncratic shock. Agents can adopt formal insurance to cover the common shock. We show that ex-post altruistic transfers induce interdependence in ex-ante adoption decisions. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the insurance adoption game. We show that adoption decisions are substitutes and that the number of adopters is unique in equilibrium. The demand for formal insurance is lower with altruism than without at low prices, but higher at high prices. Remarkably, individual incentives are aligned with social welfare. We extend our analysis to CRRA utilities and to a fixed utility cost of adoption.
    Keywords: Formal Insurance,Informal Transfers,Altruism Networks
    Date: 2021–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03355219&r=
  7. By: Diogo Britto (Diogo Britto); Paolo Pinotti (Paolo Pinotti); Breno Sampaio (Breno Sampaio)
    Abstract: We investigate the effect of job loss and unemployment benefits on crime, exploiting unique individual-level data on the universe of workers and criminal cases in Brazil over the 2009-2017 period. We find that the probability of criminal prosecution increases on average by 23% for workers displaced upon mass layoffs, and by slightly less for their cohabiting sons. Using causal forests, we show that the effect is driven entirely by young and low tenure workers, while there is no heterogeneity by education and income. Regression discontinuity estimates indicate that unemployment benefit eligibility completely offsets potential crime increases upon job loss, but this effect completely vanishes immediately after benefit expiration. Our findings point at liquidity constraints and psychological stress as main drivers of criminal behavior upon job loss, while substitution between time on the job and leisure does not seem to play an important role.
    Keywords: unemployment, crime, unemployment insurance, registry data
    JEL: K42 J63 J65
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2128&r=
  8. By: Sonia Bhalotra (Sonia Bhalotra); Diogo Britto (Diogo Britto); Paolo Pinotti (Paolo Pinotti); Breno Sampaio (Breno Sampaio)
    Abstract: We estimate impacts of male job loss, female job loss, and male unemployment benefits on domestic violence in Brazil. We merge employer-employee and social welfare registers with administrative data on domestic violence cases brought to criminal courts, use of public shelters by victims, and mandatory notifications of domestic violence by health providers. Leveraging mass layoffs for identification, we first show that both male and female job loss, independently, lead to large and pervasive increases in domestic violence. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design, we then show that unemployment benefits do not reduce domestic violence while benefits are being paid, and that they lead to higher domestic violence once benefits expire. These findings can be explained by the negative income shock brought by job loss and by increased exposure of victims to perpetrators, as partners tend to spend more time together after displacement. Although unemployment benefits partially offset the income drop following job loss, they reinforce the exposure shock as they increase unemployment duration.
    Keywords: : domestic violence, unemployment, mass layoffs, unemployment insurance, income shock, exposure, Brazil
    Date: 2021–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2127&r=

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