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on Insurance Economics |
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Issue of 2021‒08‒30
ten papers chosen by Soumitra K. Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management |
| By: | Benjamin R. Handel; Jonathan T. Kolstad |
| Abstract: | The regulated insurance exchanges set up in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) were designed to deliver affordable, efficient health coverage through private insurers. It is crucial to study the complex industrial organization (IO) of these exchanges in order to assess their impacts to date, during the first decade of the ACA, and in order to project their impacts going forward. We revisit the inherent market failures in health care markets that necessitate key ACA exchange regulations and investigate whether they have succeeded in their goals of expanding coverage, creating robust marketplaces, providing product variety, and generating innovation in health care delivery. We discuss empirical IO research to date and also highlight shortcomings in the existing research that can be addressed moving forward. We conclude with a discussion of IO research-based policy lessons for the ACA exchanges and, more generally, for managed competition of private insurance in health care. |
| JEL: | G22 H2 I11 I13 |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29178&r= |
| By: | Zuo Quan Xu |
| Abstract: | This study exams a Pareto optimal insurance problem, where the insured maximizes her rank-dependent utility and the insurer employs the mean-variance premium principle. To eliminate some possible moral hazard issues, we only consider moral-hazard-free insurance contracts that obey the incentive compatibility constraint. The insurance problem is first formulated as a non-concave maximization problem involving Choquet expectation, then turned into a concave quantile optimization problem and finally solved by calculus of variations method. The optimal contract is expressed by a semi-linear second order double-obstacle ordinary differential equation with nonlocal operator. When the probability weighting function has a density, an effective numerical method is proposed to compute the optimal contract. |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2108.06940&r= |
| By: | Eric Bonsang; Joan Costa-Font; Sonja De New; Joan Costa-i-Font |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the relationship between locus of control (LOC) and the demand for supplementary health insurance. Drawing on longitudinal data from Germany, we find robust evidence that individuals having an internal LOC are more likely to take up supplementary private health insurance (SUPP). The increase in the probability to have a SUPP due to one standard deviation increase in the measure of internal LOC is equivalent to an increase in household income by 14 percent. Second, we find that the positive association between self-reported health and SUPP becomes small and insignificant when we control for LOC, suggesting that LOC might be an unobserved individual trait that can explain advantageous selection into SUPP. Third, we find comparable results using data from Australia, which enhances the external validity of our results. |
| Keywords: | private health insurance, health care use, risk aversion, locus of control, positive selection, supplementary insurance, Germany, Australia |
| JEL: | I12 I13 I18 D15 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9257&r= |
| By: | Lee, Daemyung; Rejesus, Roderick M.; Aglasan, Serkan; Connor, Lawson; Dinterman, Robert |
| Keywords: | Agricultural Finance, Risk and Uncertainty, Agricultural and Food Policy |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea21:312731&r= |
| By: | Bonsang, Eric (Université Paris-Dauphine); Costa-Font, Joan (London School of Economics); de New, Sonja C. (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the relationship between locus of control (LOC) and the demand for supplementary health insurance. Drawing on longitudinal data from Germany, we find robust evidence that individuals having an internal LOC are more likely to take up supplementary private health insurance (SUPP). The increase in the probability to have a SUPP due to one standard deviation increase in the measure of internal LOC is equivalent to an increase in household income by 14 percent. Second, we find that the positive association between selfreported health and SUPP becomes small and insignificant when we control for LOC, suggesting that LOC might be an unobserved individual trait that can explain advantageous selection into SUPP. Third, we find comparable results using data from Australia, which enhances the external validity of our results. |
| Keywords: | positive selection, locus of control, risk aversion, health care use, private health insurance, supplementary insurance, Germany, Australia |
| JEL: | I18 D15 |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14633&r= |
| By: | Bizimana, Jean Claude; Bryant, Henry L.; Worqlul, Abeyou W.; Richardson, James W. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, International Development, Risk and Uncertainty |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea21:312815&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | This technical note addresses the following questions: • What are the main ways in which different countries assess and collect personal income tax (PIT) and social insurance contributions (SIC) liabilities (Section I)? • What is the case for transferring responsibility for a country’s SIC collection from its social insurance agency(ies) to its tax authority (Section II)? • What changes does such integration of collection functions involve (Section III)? • Are there any lessons from international experience to guide such reforms (Section IV)? • How to build on these lessons when planning a transfer of collection functions (Section V)? • Are there any beneficial alternatives to full integration of functions (Section VI)? |
| Date: | 2021–08–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imftnm:2021/008&r= |
| By: | Bhalotra, Sonia (University of Warwick, CEPR, IZA, IEA); Britto, Diogo G. C. (Bocconi University, BAFFI-CAREFIN, CLEAN Center for the Economic Analysis of Crime, GAPPE/UFPE, IZA); Pinotti, Paolo (Bocconi University, BAFFI-CAREFIN, CLEAN Center for the Economic Analysis of Crime, CEPR); Sampaio, Breno (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, BAFFI-CAREFIN, CLEAN Center for the Economic Analysis of Crime, GAPPE/UFPE, IZA) |
| Abstract: | We estimate impacts of male job loss, female job loss, and male unemployment benefits on domestic violence in Brazil. We merge employer-employee and social welfare registers with administrative data on domestic violence cases brought to criminal courts, use of public shelters by victims and mandatory notifications of domestic violence by health providers. Leveraging mass layoffs for identification, we find that both male and female job loss, independently, lead to large and pervasive increases in domestic violence. Exploiting a discontinuity in unemployment insurance eligibility, we find that eligible men are not less likely to commit domestic violence while benefits are being paid, and more likely to commit it once benefits expire. Our findings are consistent with job loss increasing domestic violence on account of a negative income shock and an increase in exposure of victims to perpetrators, with unemployment benefits partially offsetting the income shock while reinforcing the exposure shock. |
| Keywords: | domestic violence, unemployment, mass layoffs, unemployment insurance, income shock, exposure, Brazil JEL Classification: |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:573&r= |
| By: | Douglas, Roger (The Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise) |
| Abstract: | All we need is a new welfare system, Superannuation - The miracle of compound interest normally works against ordinary people, now it works for us - Once the savings policies outlined in this paper are fully mature, 95% plus of all New Zealanders will retire with 4-5 million dollars in their super fund accounts. No longer will New Zealanders get less out in pensions than the government takes in taxes. Old age will never be a reason for poverty again. Health - Vets don’t have waiting lists, nor will New Zealanders when every New Zealander has a comprehensive catastrophic health policy ever year of their life. Patients with private insurance rarely have to queue. The policy outlined in this paper, gives you back your tax dollars, in a way that enables you to purchase your own insurance policy. Education - Will once again become the route to advancement, when we cut out the middleman and let parents pay the school direct, then the school will get a dollar for every dollar spent on education. Real equality of opportunity gives the same spending power to everyone- and lets them choose their education. Choice in the educational system will raise our standards of achievement. Choice will give low-income families the same options as everyone else. Housing -Our shared home ownership model of housing will bring home ownership within the reach of everyone who works. Residential section development will be pushed to the maximum extent possible, and at reasonable prices. Out of Work—Being out of work for any reason an accident, being sick or unemployed, will all be covered by the same out of work welfare policy framework, ending any future attempts to fiddle the system. Debt—New Zealand’s one trillion dollars of unfunded welfare debt for health and pensions will disappear over time. Those years of living beyond our means will be behind us and taxes will drop as a consequence. Poverty - The superannuation and health policies outlined in this paper will ensure that old age will never be a cause of poverty in New Zealand again. Far lower taxes allow workers to keep more of what they earn, much better incentives for people to work, better education and health policies will all help to lower poverty and keep it there. Economy—The lowest personal taxes in the world. That makes us one of the most attractive countries in the world. Taken together the policies in this paper will produce a strong and sustainable economic surge in New Zealand, and as a result our opportunities in life will be transformed. |
| Date: | 2021–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:jhisae:0189&r= |
| By: | Tapsoba, Augustin |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how local polygyny norms affect the equilibrium response of marriage markets to short-term changes in aggregate economic conditions. It develops a simple equilibrium marriage market framework with overlapping generations in which polygyny is modeled as a sequential one-to-one matching. The model generates predictions that are tested by revisiting the impact of rainfall shocks on the timing of marriage in Sub-Saharan Africa. Consistent with the model’s predictions, I find that the effect of droughts on child marriage is weaker where polygyny is more commonly practiced. The same shock leads to a large increase in the annual hazard of child marriage in monogamous areas but has no detectable effect in areas with high polygyny levels. In these areas, there is instead an increase in the market shares of young men that are looking for first/unique spouses at the expense of older men that are looking for second spouses. The differences in equilibrium outcomes on the marriage markets translate into differences in fertility onset and long term fertility levels. |
| Keywords: | Marriage market, local norms, polygyny, bride price, income shocks, informal insurance, Africa |
| Date: | 2021–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:125854&r= |