nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2020‒03‒09
fifteen papers chosen by
Soumitra K. Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management

  1. Health Insurance as an Income Stabilizer By Michal Grinstein-Weiss; Emily Gallagher; Nathan Blascak; Stephen Roll
  2. The effect of reinsuring a deductible on pharmaceutical spending: A Dutch case study on low-income people By Marielle Non; Rudy Douven; Richard van Kleef; Onno van der Galiën
  3. Beyond the S-curve : Insurance Penetration, Institutional Quality and Financial Market Development By Gine,Xavier; Barboza Ribeiro,Bernardo; Wrede,Peter Friedrich Wilhelm
  4. Stochastic optimization of the Dividend strategy with reinsurance in correlated multiple insurance lines of business By Khaled Masoumifard; Mohammad Zokaei
  5. Les pratiques d'activité réduite et leurs impacts sur les trajectoires professionnelles : une revue de la littérature By Nathalie Havet; Xavier Joutard; Alexis Penot
  6. Productivity of the English National Health Service: 2017/18 update By Adriana Castelli; Martin Chalkley; James Gaughan; Idaira Rodriguez Santana
  7. Million Hearts® Cardiovascular Disease Risk Reduction Model: Evaluation Year 2 Findings at a Glance By Greg Peterson; Linda Barterian; Keith Kranker; Amanda Markovitz; Adam Rose; Rumin Sarwar; Allison Steiner; Leslie Conwell; Jia Pu; Michael Barna; David Magid; Kate Steward; Laura Blue; Dan Kinber; Precious Ogbuefi; Nancy McCall
  8. An analysis of farmers’ preferences for crop insurance: a case of maize farmers in Swaziland By Mbonane, Nobuhle Duduzile
  9. Business Cycle Fluctuations in Mirrlees Economies: The Case of i.i.d. Shocks By Marcelo Veracierto
  10. Evaluation of the Million Hearts® Cardiovascular Disease Risk Reduction Model: Second Annual Report By Greg Peterson; Linda Barterian; Keith Kranker; Amanda Markovitz; Adam Rose; Rumin Sarwar; Allison Steiner; Leslie Conwell; Jia Pu; Michael Barna; David Magid; Kate Steward; Laura Blue; Dan Kinber; Precious Ogbuefi; Nancy McCall
  11. Does managed competition constrain hospitals’ contract prices? Evidence from the Netherlands By Rudy Douven; Monique Burger; Erik Schut
  12. Six-Year Earnings and Disability Benefit Outcomes of Youth Vocational Rehabilitation Applicants By Frank H. Martin; Todd C. Honeycutt; Jeffrey Hemmeter
  13. Mutual or stock insurance: Solidarity in the face of insolvency. By Debora Zaparova
  14. Migration and Jobs : Issues for the 21st Century By Christiaensen,Luc; Gonzalez,Alvaro S.; Robalino,David A.
  15. Selection and moral hazard effects in healthcare By Minke Remmerswaal; Jan Boone; Rudy Douven

  1. By: Michal Grinstein-Weiss; Emily Gallagher; Nathan Blascak; Stephen Roll (Washington University in St Louis)
    Abstract: We evaluate the effect of health insurance on the incidence of negative income shocks using the tax data and survey responses of nearly 14,000 low income households. Us-ing a regression discontinuity (RD) design and variation in the cost of nongroup pri-vate health insurance under the Affordable Care Act, we find that eligibility for sub-sidized Marketplace insurance is associated with a 16% and 9% decline in the rates of unexpected job loss and income loss, respectively. Effects are concentrated among households with past health costs and exist only for “unexpected” forms of earnings variation, suggesting a health-productivity link. Calculations based on our fuzzy RD estimate imply a $256 to $476 per year welfare benefit of health insurance in terms of reduced exposure to job loss.
    Keywords: Affordable Care Act; income; regression discontinuity; labor supply; subsidies
    JEL: D10 J22 H51 I13
    Date: 2020–01–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpwp:87461&r=all
  2. By: Marielle Non (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis); Rudy Douven (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis); Richard van Kleef (EUR); Onno van der Galiën (Achmea)
    Abstract: The basic health insurance in the Netherlands includes a mandatory deductible of currently 385 euros per adult per year. Several municipalities offer a group contract for low-income people in which the deductible is reinsured, meaning that out-of-pocket spending under the deductible is covered by supplementary insurance. This study examines to what extent such reinsurance leads to higher pharmaceutical spending. We use a unique dataset from a Dutch health insurer with anonymized individual insurance claims for the period 2014-2017. We run a difference-in-difference regression to estimate the effect of reinsurance on pharmaceutical spending. The treatment group consists of enrollees from three municipalities that implemented reinsurance on January 1st 2017. The control group includes enrollees from three municipalities that didn’t implement reinsurance. We find that the introduction of reinsurance led to a statistically significant increase in pharmaceutical spending of 16% in the first quarter of 2017 and 7% in the second quarter. For the second half of 2017 the effect is small and not statistically significant. Conditional on people with low expected spending we find a statistically significant increase in pharmaceutical spending in all four quarters of 2017 varying from 22% to 30% per quarter.
    JEL: I12 I13 C23 D12
    Date: 2018–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:387.rdf&r=all
  3. By: Gine,Xavier; Barboza Ribeiro,Bernardo; Wrede,Peter Friedrich Wilhelm
    Abstract: This paper provides new evidence of factors, other than GDP per capita, that correlate with the development of insurance markets. Based on 20 years of insurance premium data from 180 countries, and a similar wealth of data on institutions and financial market development, the paper presents important correlates of insurance market development. Although the analysis cannot identify which factors directly cause insurance market growth, the results suggest that interventions aimed at stimulating insurance supply and demand should take enabling factors, such as the quality of institutional governance and the degree of financial market development, into consideration.
    Keywords: Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Economic Growth,Industrial Economics,Economic Theory&Research,Pollution Management&Control,Judicial System Reform,Financial Sector Policy
    Date: 2019–06–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8925&r=all
  4. By: Khaled Masoumifard; Mohammad Zokaei
    Abstract: The present paper addresses the issue of the stochastic control of the optimal dynamic reinsurance policy and dynamic dividend strategy, which are state-dependent, for an insurance company that operates under multiple insurance lines of business. The aggregate claims model with a thinning-dependence structure is adopted for the risk process. In the optimization method, the maximum of the cumulative expected discounted dividend payouts with respect to the dividend and reinsurance strategies are considered as value function. This value function is characterized as the smallest super Viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi- Bellman (HJB) equation. The finite difference method (FDM) has been utilized for the numerical solution of the value function and the optimal control strategy and the proof for the convergence of this numerical solution to the value function is provided. The findings of this paper provide insights for the insurance companies as such that based upon the lines in which they are operating, they can choose a vector of the optimal dynamic reinsurance strategies and consequently transfer some part of their risks to several reinsurers.
    Date: 2020–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2002.03295&r=all
  5. By: Nathalie Havet (OFCE Sciences Po); Xavier Joutard (Université Aix Marseille, LEST-UMR7317 CNRS, OFCE); Alexis Penot (Université de Lyon, ENS Lyon, Gate-UMR5824 CNRS)
    Abstract: Le dispositif des activités réduites vise à atténuer les effets désincitatifs du système d’allocation chômage en permettant aux demandeurs d’emploi de combiner activité rémunérée et recherche d’emploi tout en cumulant, au moins partiellement, la rémunération de son activité et ses allocations chômage. Notre revue de la littérature théorique et empirique cherche à savoir si ce dispositif, avec des incitations nécessairement limitées à l’exercice d’une activité temporaire ou à temps partiel, peut favoriser une insertion durable sur le marché du travail. Elle montre que les effets théoriques attendus sur les trajectoires professionnelles des demandeurs d’emploi et sur la qualité des emplois potentiellement retrouvés sont ambigus et méritent d’être tranchés empiriquement. Les études empiriques nationales et internationales mettent alors en évidence qu’il est nécessaire de distinguer les effets à court terme des effets à long terme et qu’il existe une forte hétérogénéité des impacts entre demandeurs d’emploi. Néanmoins, en France, l'activité réduite semble globalement un accélérateur de l'accès à l'emploi durable mais avec des effets relativement modestes. En outre, elle ne semble pas améliorer ni dégrader la qualité de l'emploi retrouvé.
    Keywords: Unemployment duration, unemployment insurance, segmented labor markets, temporary jobs, job transitions
    JEL: J42 J64 J65
    Date: 2018–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fce:doctra:1841&r=all
  6. By: Adriana Castelli (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK); Martin Chalkley (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK); James Gaughan (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK); Idaira Rodriguez Santana (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK)
    Abstract: This report updates the Centre for Health Economics’ time-series of National Health Service (NHS) productivity growth for the period 2016/17 to 2017/18. NHS productivity growth is measured by comparing the growth in outputs produced by the NHS to the growth in inputs used to produce them. NHS outputs include all the activities undertaken for NHS patients wherever they are treated in England. It also accounts for changes in the quality of care provided to those patients. NHS inputs include the number of doctors, nurses and support staff providing care, the equipment and clinical supplies used, and the facilities of hospitals and other premises where care is provided.
    Date: 2020–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chy:respap:171cherp&r=all
  7. By: Greg Peterson; Linda Barterian; Keith Kranker; Amanda Markovitz; Adam Rose; Rumin Sarwar; Allison Steiner; Leslie Conwell; Jia Pu; Michael Barna; David Magid; Kate Steward; Laura Blue; Dan Kinber; Precious Ogbuefi; Nancy McCall
    Abstract: The Million Hearts Cardiovascular Disease (CVD) Risk Reduction Model (Million Hearts Model) tests whether providing targeted incentives to health care providers to reduce CVD risk lowers the incidence of first-time heart attacks and strokes among Medicare beneficiaries (ages 40-79 who have not had a previous heart attack or stroke).
    Keywords: Million Hearts Cardiovascular Disease Risk Reduction Model, Million Hearts Model, Million Hearts evaluation report, Cardiovascular disease, High-risk Medicare beneficiaries, Risk stratification, Care management, Pay for performance, Pay for prevention
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:416f3270354c485da4ef002dc74687bb&r=all
  8. By: Mbonane, Nobuhle Duduzile
    Keywords: Farm Management
    Date: 2018–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:cmpart:302091&r=all
  9. By: Marcelo Veracierto (Federal Reserve Bank; Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)
    Abstract: I consider a real business cycle model in which agents have private information about the i.i.d. realizations of their value of leisure. For the case of logarithmic preferences I provide an analytical characterization of the solution to the associated mechanism design problem. Moreover, I show a striking irrelevance result: That the stationary behavior of all aggregate variables are exactly the same in the private information economy as in the full information case. Numerical simulations indicate that the irrelevance result approximately holds for more general CRRA preferences.
    Keywords: heterogenous agent; business cycles; private information; social insurance; RBC model; Log consumption; optimal contracts
    JEL: F44 E60 F41
    Date: 2019–12–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedhwp:87508&r=all
  10. By: Greg Peterson; Linda Barterian; Keith Kranker; Amanda Markovitz; Adam Rose; Rumin Sarwar; Allison Steiner; Leslie Conwell; Jia Pu; Michael Barna; David Magid; Kate Steward; Laura Blue; Dan Kinber; Precious Ogbuefi; Nancy McCall
    Abstract: Evaluation findings from year two of the Million Hearts Cardiovascular Disease Risk Reduction Model.
    Keywords: Million Hearts Cardiovascular Disease Risk Reduction Model, Million Hearts Model, Million Hearts evaluation report, Cardiovascular disease, High-risk Medicare beneficiaries, Risk stratification, Care management, Pay for performance, Pay for prevention
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:632a9404b1ce4f8996f890018ff4c5d1&r=all
  11. By: Rudy Douven (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis); Monique Burger; Erik Schut
    Abstract: In the Dutch health care system health insurers negotiate with hospitals about the pricing of hospital products in a managed competition framework. In this paper, we study these contract prices that became for the first time publicly available in 2016.
    JEL: I00 I11 L11 L51
    Date: 2018–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:378.rdf&r=all
  12. By: Frank H. Martin; Todd C. Honeycutt; Jeffrey Hemmeter
    Abstract: The authors document the earnings in the sixth calendar year after youths’ vocational rehabilitation (VR) applications and Social Security Administration (SSA) benefit outcomes during the six years after their VR applications.
    Keywords: Career/vocational counseling, transition, program evaluation, rehabilitation
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:3bb3c16684e84497bd938ae663396e86&r=all
  13. By: Debora Zaparova
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the choice of the insurer, mutual or stock, for a heterogeneous population aware of insurers’ probability of insolvency. The stock insurer sets individualized premiums and manages his probability of insolvency by means of a premium loading, in contrast to the mutual insurer who sets an average premium and allows a possibility to adjust the premium level ex-post. We show that under some conditions mutual insurer is optimally preferred by the entire population of high and low risk agents. The existence of pooling equilibrium depends on the relative weight of each group of risks in the population, and on the size of the risk loading. For a sufficiently small group of low risk agents, an increase in the risk loading provides an incentive to pool their risk with the high-risk agents through the mutual agreement.
    Keywords: mutualization, risk loading, insolvency, symmetrical information, high risks.
    JEL: D81 G22 G28
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2020-06&r=all
  14. By: Christiaensen,Luc; Gonzalez,Alvaro S.; Robalino,David A.
    Abstract: With an estimated 724 million extreme poor people living in developing countries, and the world's demographics bifurcating into an older North and a younger South, there are substantial economic incentives and benefits for people to migrate. There are also important market and regulatory failures that constrain mobility and reduce the net benefits of migration. This paper reviews the recent literature and proposes a conceptual framework for better integration and coordination of policies that can address the different market and regulatory failures. The paper advances five types of interventions in need of particular attention in design, implementation, and evaluation; namely, (1) active labor market programs that serve local, regional, and foreign markets; (2) remittances and investment subsidies to promote job creation and labor productivity growth; (3) social insurance programs that cover all jobs and facilitate labor mobility; (4) labor taxes to internalize the social costs of migration in receiving regions; and (5) more flexible private sector driven schemes to regulate the flow of migrants and minimize irregular migration.
    Keywords: Labor Markets,Rural Labor Markets,Educational Sciences
    Date: 2019–05–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8867&r=all
  15. By: Minke Remmerswaal (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis); Jan Boone (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis); Rudy Douven (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
    Abstract: In the Netherlands, average healthcare expenditures of persons without a voluntary deductible are twice as high as average healthcare expenditures of persons with a voluntary deductible. When assessing the effects of voluntary cost-sharing in healthcare on healthcare expenditures, it is important to disentangle moral hazard from selection: are healthcare expenditures low because people pay (a bigger share of) their healthcare expenditures out-of-pocket? Or are people with higher cost-sharing levels healthier? In this study, we separate selection from moral hazard for the combined mandatory and voluntary deductible in the Netherlands. We use proprietary claims data from Dutch health insurers and exploit with a panel regression discontinuity design that we can observe healthcare expenditures before and after the deductibles kick in for 18 year olds. Our study shows that selection, not moral hazard, is the main effect explaining the difference in healthcare expenditures between persons with and without a voluntary deductible. Furthermore, we find that 18 year olds who never chose a voluntary deductible reduce their healthcare spending by 26 euros (on average) in response to a 100 euro increase in the (mandatory) deductible. However, for 18 year olds who chose a voluntary deductible (on top of the mandatory) we find that this choice does not result in a further reduction in healthcare spending.
    JEL: I11 I13 H51
    Date: 2019–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:393.rdf&r=all

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