nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2016‒04‒23
eight papers chosen by
Soumitra K. Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management
  1. The Simple Analytics of Job Displacement Insurance By Parsons, Donald O.
  2. Life Insurance Holdings and Well-Being of Surviving Spouses By Harris, Timothy; Yelowitz, Aaron
  3. Beyond Job Lock: Impacts of Public Health Insurance on Occupational and Industrial Mobility By Ammar Farooq; Adriana Kugler
  4. COST-SHARING AND USE OF HEALTH SERVICES IN ITALY: EVIDENCE FROM A FUZZY REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN By Michela Ponzo; Vincenzo Scoppa
  5. Absenteeism and productivity: the experience rating applied to employer contributions to health insurance By Sébastien Ménard; Coralia Quintero
  6. Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Corporate Insurance Market: Evidence from the 2011 Thailand floods By ADACHI Daisuke; NAKATA Hiroyuki; SAWADA Yasusyuki; SEKIGUCHI Kunio
  7. Transnational Health Insurance Schemes: A New Avenue for Congolese Immigrants in Belgium to Care for Their Relatives' Health from Abroad? By Jean-Michel Lafleur; Olivier Lizin
  8. State Variation in School-Based Disability Services Financed by Medicaid By Julia B. Baller; Colleen L. Barry
  1. By: Parsons, Donald O. (George Washington University)
    Abstract: Job displacement in the U.S. is a serious threat to the earnings of long-tenured workers, through both (i) unemployment spells and (ii) reduced reemployment wages. Although full insurance requires both unemployment benefits and wage insurance, supply difficulties limit actual-loss insurance, and separation packages typically include partial unemployment insurance and scheduled (fixed sum) severance pay. The design of this two dimensional package requires a systems approach as well as a generalized replacement ratio measure of adequacy). Job search moral hazard and layoff moral hazard (firing costs), individually and in combination, introduce potentially serious contracting concerns. Economic theory provides a practical guide to the integration of these insurance instruments in this complex planning environment. One important implication: given the structure of earnings losses at displacement in the U.S., severance pay should increase with length of service in the firm ("tenure"), which is common, and unemployment insurance benefit levels should fall, which is not.
    Keywords: job displacement, unemployment insurance, wage insurance, severance pay, moral hazard, insurance adequacy, replacement rate
    JEL: J65 J41 J33 J08
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9823&r=ias
  2. By: Harris, Timothy; Yelowitz, Aaron
    Abstract: Premature death of a breadwinner can have devastating financial consequences on surviving dependents. This study investigates the role of life insurance in mitigating the long-run �financial consequences of spousal mortality. Using the Health and Retirement Study, we examine individuals whose spouses died during or soon after his or her peak earnings years. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that lump-sum life insurance payouts do not significantly influence spousal well-being.
    Keywords: Life Insurance, Poverty, Ageing
    JEL: D31 G22 I31 J32 J33 J38
    Date: 2016–03–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:70334&r=ias
  3. By: Ammar Farooq; Adriana Kugler
    Abstract: We examine whether greater Medicaid generosity encourages mobility towards riskier but better jobs in higher paid occupations and industries. We use Current Population Survey Data and exploit variation in Medicaid thresholds across states and over time through the 1990s and 2000s. We find that moving from a state in the 10th to the 90th percentile in terms of Medicaid income thresholds increases occupational and industrial mobility by 7.6% and 7.8%. We also find that higher income Medicaid thresholds increase mobility towards occupations and industries with greater wage spreads and higher separation probabilities, but with higher wages and higher educational requirements.
    JEL: I13 J6
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22118&r=ias
  4. By: Michela Ponzo; Vincenzo Scoppa (Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza, Università della Calabria)
    Abstract: We use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to evaluate the impact of cost-sharing on the use of health services. In the Italian health system, individuals reaching age 65 and earning low incomes are given total exemption from cost-sharing for health services consumption. Since the probability of exemption changes discontinuously at age 65, we use a Fuzzy RDD in which the age threshold is used as an instrument for exemption. We find that prescription drug consumption, specialist visits and diagnostic checks remarkably increase with exemption. However, using several measures of health outcomes we do not find any change in individual health.
    Keywords: Health Insurance, Healthcare Demand, Cost-Sharing, Moral Hazard, Health Outcomes, Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design, Instrumental Variables
    JEL: I10 I13 I11 I18 C26
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clb:wpaper:201604&r=ias
  5. By: Sébastien Ménard (TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Université du Maine); Coralia Quintero (Universidad de Guanajuato)
    Abstract: In this paper we analyze the effects of introducing experience rating on the employer contributions to health insurance. Generally, theoretical literature explains absenteeism by the workers’ behavior. However, working conditions also has an effect on the use of sick leaves. As a result, Firms proposing good working conditions support the costs generated by the other firms. This implies a reduction of the good quality jobs on the benefit of the bad quality jobs. In this paper, we propose to introduce a modulation of employer contributions to health insurance based on historical rates of absenteeism. We show that the experience rating improves the productivity of the economy and welfare, when the unemployed are able to direct their research towards the good-quality jobs
    Keywords: productivity,Health Insurance, experience rating
    Date: 2015–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01292111&r=ias
  6. By: ADACHI Daisuke; NAKATA Hiroyuki; SAWADA Yasusyuki; SEKIGUCHI Kunio
    Abstract: We examine the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard in the corporate insurance market empirically. While natural disasters hit households and firms alike, corporate insurance against disasters have been under-investigated in the literature. To bridge this gap, we employ a unique firm dataset on the 2011 Thailand floods exclusively collected for this study. We aim to uncover how insurance subscription is geographically diversified before and after the floods and how insurance subscription and payment are associated with firms' production and employment levels after the floods. We find that the property insurance subscription before the floods was systematically higher amongst firms located in the areas directly affected by the floods than amongst others, indicating adverse selection, while the market is missing after the floods. Also, both insurance subscription and payment of business interruption insurance are negatively associated with firms' production and employment after the floods, suggesting the existence of moral hazard.
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:16025&r=ias
  7. By: Jean-Michel Lafleur (Université de Liège); Olivier Lizin (Université de Liège)
    Keywords: Congo, Belgium
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cmgdev:15-01d&r=ias
  8. By: Julia B. Baller; Colleen L. Barry
    Abstract: To understand the role of Medicaid in financing health services delivered through special education, program characteristics and covered services were compared from all 50 states and Washington, D.C.
    Keywords: Medicare, Medicaid, school reform, restructuring, policy, finance
    JEL: I J
    Date: 2016–03–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:5680f6767d344a89bc2cef8ce7232fab&r=ias
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