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on Insurance Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒08‒30
25 papers chosen by Soumitra K. Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management |
| By: | Misnaniarti, Misnaniarti; Ayuningtyas, Dumilah |
| Abstract: | Indonesia is not the only country that will lead to universal coverage. Several countries took an initiative to develop social security, through Universal Health Coverage (UHC) to achieve health insurance and welfare for all residents. Even, some countries have already reached universal health coverage since a few years ago. The purpose of this paper is to assess the achievement of universal coverage of the health insurance implementation in several countries. In general, some countries require considerable time to achieve universal coverage. Mechanisms and stages that need attention is on the univeral registration aspects that cover the entire population, progressive and continuous funding sources, comprehensive benefits package, the expansion of gradual coverage for diseases that can cause catastrophic expenditure, increasing capacity and mobilizing supporting resource. National Health Insurance policy in some countries can improve access to care, utilization and quality of quality health services to all citizens. Indonesia is expected to learn from the experience of other countries to achieve UHC, so that the projection of the entire population of Indonesia to have health insurance in 2019 will be reached soon. |
| Keywords: | Social Health Insurance, Health Policy, Universal Coverage |
| JEL: | H30 |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:65915&r=all |
| By: | Marcus Dillender (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper identifies the effect of health insurance on workers' compensation (WC) filing for young adults by implementing a regression discontinuity design using WC medical claims data from Texas. The results suggest health insurance factors into the decision to have WC pay for discretionary care. The implied instrumental variables estimates suggest a 10 percentage point decrease in health insurance coverage increases WC bills by 15.3 percent. Despite the large impact of health insurance on the number of WC bills, the additional cost to WC at age 26 appears to be small as most of the increase comes from small bills. |
| Keywords: | Workers’ compensation, Moral hazard, Health insurance, Affordable Care Act |
| JEL: | I13 J32 J38 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upj:weupjo:15-232&r=all |
| By: | Ramirez, Octavio A. |
| Abstract: | This appendix is comprised of two sections. The first section entitled “Yield Variability and Premium Estimation Error” establishes a range of plausible levels of crop insurance premium estimation error corresponding to typical corn production scenarios in the Midwestern US. The second section entitled “Distribution of Crop Insurance Subsidies” assesses the potential impact of such levels of premium estimation error on the distribution of the Crop Insurance subsidies across participating corn producers. |
| Keywords: | Financial Economics, |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aepapa:162318&r=all |
| By: | Gong, Xiaodong (NATSEM, University of Canberra); Gao, Jiti (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | This paper is motivated by our attempt to answer an empirical question: how is private health insurance take-up in Australia affected by the income threshold at which the Medicare Levy Surcharge (MLS) kicks in? We propose a new difference de-convolution kernel estimator for the location and size of regression discontinuities. We also propose a bootstrapping procedure for estimating confidence bands for the estimated discontinuity. Performance of the estimator is evaluated by Monte Carlo simulations before it is applied to estimating the effect of the income threshold of Medicare Levy Surcharge on the take-up of private health insurance in Australia using contaminated data. |
| Keywords: | de-convolution kernel estimator, regression discontinuity, error-in-variables, demand for private health insurance |
| JEL: | C13 C14 C29 I13 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9265&r=all |
| By: | Catherine McLaughlin Adam Swinburn |
| Abstract: | Employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) is the dominant source of coverage for nonelderly adults in the United States. Virtually all businesses with 200 or more workers offer coverage to at least some of their employees, whereas many small businesses do not offer it to any. An important reason employers say they offer coverage is so they can recruit and retain workers with the desired skills and experience; the most common reason for not offering it is the cost. |
| Keywords: | Health Insurance, Employees, Small Businesses, Health |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2014–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:d55aa21eed274b85b32c385e89e0205d&r=all |
| By: | Léa Toulemon (ECON - Département d'économie - Sciences Po); Laurent Davezies (ECON - Département d'économie - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the impact of reimbursement rates on health expenditures, using a natural experiment. For historical reasons, reimbursement rates of public health insurance are higher in the French region Alsace Moselle than in other French regions. For both systems, affiliation is compulsory. Individuals moving between Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France undergo an exogenous change in reimbursement rates. We use a difference-in-difference method on a panel datasets of individuals. Our treatment group consists of individuals changing systems, our control group consists of individuals who move between other French regions. We study the impact of reimbursement rates on a broad range of health care expenditures: for dentist and doctor visits, drug consumption, and sickness absenteeism. We find heterogeneous impacts of reimbursement rates on those items. Overall, higher public reimbursement rates do not lead to an increase in spending for medical care. |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01121272&r=all |
| By: | Norma B. Coe; Gopi Shah Goda; Courtney Harold Van Houtven |
| Abstract: | We examine how long-term care insurance (LTCI) affects family outcomes expected to be sensitive to LTCI, including utilization of informal care and spillover effects on children. An instrumental variables approach allows us to address the endogeneity of LTCI coverage. LTCI coverage induces less informal caregiving, suggesting the presence of intra-family moral hazard. We also find that children are less likely to co-reside or live nearby parents with LTCI and more likely to work full-time, suggesting that significant economic gains from private LTCI could accrue to the younger generation. |
| JEL: | H5 H75 I13 J12 J14 J22 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21483&r=all |
| By: | Petri Böckerman (Turku School of Economics, Labor Institute for Economic Research and IZA); Ohto Kanninen (Labour Institute for Economic Research); Ilpo Suoniemi (Labour Institute for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | We examine the effect of the replacement rule of a social insurance system on sickness absence. The elasticity of absence with respect to the benefit level is a critical parameter in defining the optimal sickness insurance scheme. A pre-determined, piecewise linear policy rule in which the replacement rate is determined by past earnings allows identification of the causal effect using a regression kink design. Using a large administrative dataset, we find a substantial and robust behavioral response. The statistically significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to the replacement rate in a social insurance system is on the order of 1. |
| Keywords: | Sick pay, labor supply, sickness absence, paid sick leave, regression kink design |
| JEL: | C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp97&r=all |
| By: | Ben Ammar, Semir; Eling, Martin; Milidonis, Andreas |
| Abstract: | Insurance companies are important financial institutions exposed to natural and man-made disasters. We conduct a comprehensive examination of existing asset pricing models in the US insurance universe (1988-2013) and propose an insurance-specific asset pricing model. We find that extant asset pricing models fail to explain the cross-section of insurance stock returns. Instead, we provide evidence that the factors of the insurance-specific model (book-to-market ratio, short-term reversal, illiquidity, and cashflow volatility) are priced in the cross-section of property/liability insurance stocks. Our model takes into account both insurance-specific anomalies primarily related to the insurance business cycle and externalities imposed by catastrophe risk. |
| Keywords: | Asset Pricing; Insurance Stocks; Multifactor Models; Anomalies; Cross-Section; Risk Factors |
| JEL: | G12 G22 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:sfwpfi:2015:16&r=all |
| By: | Martin Halla; Susanne Pech; Martina Zweimüller |
| Abstract: | Social insurance programs typically comprise sick leave insurance. An important policy parameter is how the cost of sick leave are shared between workers, firms, and the social security system. We show that this sharing rule affects not only absence behavior, but also workers’ subsequent health. To inform our empirical analysis we propose a simple model, where workers’ absence decision is taken conditional on the sharing rule, health, and a dismissal probability. Our empirical analysis is based on high-quality administrative data sources from Austria. Identification is guaranteed by idiosyncratic variation in the sharing rule (caused by different policy reforms and sharp discontinuities at certain tenure levels and firm sizes). An increase in either the workers’ or the firms’ cost share (both at the public expense) decrease the number of sick leave days. Variations in the workers’ cost are quantitatively more important (by a factor of about two). Policy-induced variation in sick leave has a significant effect on subsequent health (care cost). The average worker in our sample is in the domain of presenteeism, i. e. an increase in sick leave (due to reductions in the workers’ or the firms’ cost share) would reduce health care cost. |
| Keywords: | Statutory sick-pay regulations, sick leave, presenteeism, absenteeism, moral hazard, health care cost. |
| JEL: | I18 J22 J38 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:cdlwps:wp1504&r=all |
| By: | Alicia H. Munnell |
| Abstract: | The timing of the release of the Social Security Trustees Report is becoming more unpredictable. It used to come out in the spring, but in the last two years it has been released in late July. It is hard to know whether the delay reflects internal controversy or simply the inability to get six people (the Social Security Commissioner, the Secretaries of Treasury, of Health and Human Services, and of Labor, and two public trustees) in a room at the same time to sign the document. One logical reason for the delay this year is the time required to incorporate the important Medicare legislation passed in April and the desire to release the Social Security and Medicare reports at the same time. While the release date has become more unpredictable, the message has not. The program faces a 75-year deficit, the Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program trust funds are scheduled for exhaustion in the early 2030s, and the Disability Insurance trust fund will run out of money next year. The specifics for 2015 show a little improvement: the 75-year deficit declined from 2.88 percent in 2014 to 2.68 percent in 2015 and the date of trust fund exhaustion moved from 2033 to 2034. But the story remains unchanged: the trust funds are going to run out of money, forcing substantial benefit cuts. Congress needs to act both to restore confidence in the nation’s major social insurance program and to give people time to adjust to needed changes. This brief updates the numbers and puts the current report in perspective. It also discusses the projected exhaustion of the Disability Insurance Trust Fund in 2016 and replacement rate data that remain missing from the Trustees Report. |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:issbrf:ib2015-12&r=all |
| By: | Grace Anglin; Ian Hill; Ashley Palmer; Margo Wilkinson; Arnav Shah |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from Colorado’s experience in the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | Colorado, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:3786d1e31053456e9e62ae70484567ee&r=all |
| By: | Pierre Picard (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS - Polytechnique - X); Kili WANG (Tamkang University) |
| Abstract: | We analyze, from theoretical and empirical standpoints, how insurance distribution channels may a§ect fraud when policyholders and service providers collude. The empirical analysis focuses on the Taiwan automobile insurance market. Striking forms of claims manipulation exist in this market: opportunistic policyholders tend to manipulate claim dates to reduce the burden of deductibles and to take advantage of the bonus-malus mechanism. We focus our attention on the role of dealer-owned agents (DOAs), since they have informational and bargaining advantages when faced with insurers and may be tempted to encourage collusion between their car repairers and policyholders. We develop an optimal contract model with claim auditing, where contracts are sold either through DOAs or through standard independent agents, and where policyholders and car repairers may collude to manipulate claims. We also use a database from the largest Taiwanese insurance company to test for the relevance of theoretical predictions. In particular, we verify that fraud occurs through the postponing of claims to the end of the policy year, possibly by Öling one single claim for several events, and we show that the fraud rate is larger among policyholders who purchase insurance through the DOA channel than among other policyholders. |
| Date: | 2015–04–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01140590&r=all |
| By: | Grace Anglin; Adam Swinburn |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from Georgia's experience during the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | Georgia, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:5b75b166d5d341b78da2e3901c863aed&r=all |
| By: | Grace Anglin; Adam Swinburn |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from Maryland's experience during the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | Maryland, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:9360a98c0fdd4d52a52a4859a1c14de0&r=all |
| By: | Grace Anglin; Ian Hill; Ashley Palmer; Margo Wilkinson; Arnav Shah |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from New Mexico's experience in the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | New Mexico, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:60761267633f4ba7a9efcabce8b9eb90&r=all |
| By: | Grace Anglin; Kelly Devers; Rachel Burton; Emily Lawton; Amanda Napoles |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from Maine's experience during the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | Maine, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:ee2e4379a88b4ce2967ea883fc7a669e&r=all |
| By: | Grace Anglin; Kelly Devers; Rebecca Peters; Vanessa Forsberg; Emily Lawton |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from Vermont’s experience during the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | Vermont, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:0fe0d819e6b54c329691f304fd252b72&r=all |
| By: | Dana Petersen; Lisa Schottenfeld |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from Idaho's experience during the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | Idaho, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:d0832a8cfb704bd99b5212e3a3e4af75&r=all |
| By: | Dana Petersen; Christal Ramos; Emily Lawton; Amanda Napoles |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from South Carolina’s experience during the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | South Carolina, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:0bc2341471774504b62ee7ce2afb6524&r=all |
| By: | Mynti Hossain; Grace Anglin; Embry Howell; Ashley Palmer; Vanessa Forsberg; Elena Zarabozo |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from West Virginia’s experience during the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | West Virginia, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:38cbb59915c64272be1bd2970cbb47ba&r=all |
| By: | Grace Anglin; Leslie Foster; Mynti Hossain |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from Pennsylvania’s experience during the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | Pennsylvania, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:9a7c1811c3974c7aa90d9befa338b7ab&r=all |
| By: | Dana Petersen; Mynti Hossain; Rachel Burton; Christal Ramos |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from North Carolina's experience in the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | North Carolina, CHIPRA, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:e06c4528be76490caa59285f62f61b24&r=all |
| By: | Grace Anglin; Ian Hill; Ashley Palmer; Margo Wilkinson; Arnav Shah |
| Abstract: | This brief highlights the major strategies, lessons learned, and outcomes from Alaska’s experience in the first 5 years of the quality demonstration funded by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA). |
| Keywords: | CHIPRA, Alaska, Quality Demonstration Grant Program |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:e0dd9d090f61491382908031312455a8&r=all |
| By: | Mathias Lé (ACPR - Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution - Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper empirically investigates the bank leverage adjustments after deposit insurance adoption. Banks are found to increase significantly their leverage after the introduction of deposit insurance. However, the banks’ responses appear to be heterogenous. The magnitude of the change in bank leverage decreases with (i) the size, (ii) the systemicity and (iii) the initial capitalisation of banks so that the most systemic and the most highly leveraged banks are unresponsive to deposit insurance. As a result, implementing a deposit insurance scheme could have important competitive effects. |
| Date: | 2014–10–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01074956&r=all |