nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2015‒05‒09
six papers chosen by
Soumitra K. Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management

  1. Does Government Health Insurance Reduce Job Lock and Job Push? By Barkowski, Scott
  2. Автоматизация деятельности страховой компании By Meshcherjakova, Natalya; Lisizina, Uliya; Lichachenko, Victoriya
  3. Unemployment Accounts - A Finnish Application By Määttänen, Niku; Salminen, Tomi
  4. The Impact of Ambiguity Prudence on Insurance and Prevention By Loïc Berger
  5. Does Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve Job Quality? By Nekoei, Arash; Weber, Andrea
  6. Counting Processes for Retail Default Modeling By Nicholas M. Kiefer; C. Erik Larson

  1. By: Barkowski, Scott
    Abstract: I study job lock and job push, the twin phenomena believed to be caused by employment-contingent health insurance (ECHI). Using variation in Medicaid eligibility among household members of male workers as a proxy for shifts in workers’ dependence on employment for health insurance, I estimate large job lock and job push effects. For married workers, Medicaid eligibility for one household member results in an increase in the likelihood of a voluntary job exit over a four-month period by approximately 34%. For job push, the transition rate into jobs with ECHI among all workers falls on average by 26%.
    Keywords: Job Lock; Job Push; Medicaid; Job Mobility
    JEL: I13 J6
    Date: 2015–04–01
  2. By: Meshcherjakova, Natalya; Lisizina, Uliya; Lichachenko, Victoriya
    Abstract: In the article the questions of automation of the insurance company. Emphasized the use of information technology to the field of insurance. Described created using MS Access database
    Keywords: автоматизация страхования, проектирование базы данных, СУБД MS Access, функции АИС страхования
    JEL: C63 C88
    Date: 2015–04–05
  3. By: Määttänen, Niku; Salminen, Tomi
    Abstract: We consider a reform that would replace the current Finnish unemployment insurance (UI) scheme with individual unemployment accounts. The reform would provide additional pensions for individuals who end up with a positive account balance at retirement age without restricting unemployment benefits relative to the current system. At the same time, the reform is likely to improve labour supply incentives, at least for some individuals. The question is whether such a reform would be self-financing. The fiscal effects of the reform depend crucially on the distribution of lifetime unemployment and the extent to which the reform would increase labour supply. We use a micro panel comprising a representative sample of 1/3 of the Finnish population and covering the period 1988-2010 to estimate the distribution of lifetime unemployment and to simulate how the unemployment accounts would evolve. We assume that the reform improves labour supply incentives only via the extensive margin and find that it is likely to be self-financing if the labour supply elasticity at the extensive margin is about 0.16 or higher. We also experiment with integrating UI with the pension system.
    Keywords: unemployment insurance, unemployment accounts, lifetime unemployment
    JEL: H53 H55 J65
  4. By: Loïc Berger (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC))
    Abstract: Most decisions concerning (self-)insurance and self-protection have to be taken in situations in which a) the effort exerted precedes the moment uncertainty realises, and b) the probabilities of future states of the world are not perfectly known. By integrating these two characteristics in a simple theoretical framework, this paper derives plausible conditions under which ambiguity aversion raises the demand for (self-)insurance and self-protection. In particular, it is shown that in most usual situations where the level of ambiguity does not increase with the level of effort, a simple condition of ambiguity prudence known as decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion (DAAA) is sufficient to give a clear and positive answer to the question: Does ambiguity aversion raise the optimal level of effort?
    Keywords: Non-expected Utility, Self-protection, Self-insurance, Ambiguity Prudence
    JEL: D61 D81 D91 G11
    Date: 2015–02
  5. By: Nekoei, Arash; Weber, Andrea
    Abstract: Contrary to standard search model predictions, prior studies failed to estimate a positive effect of unemployment insurance (UI) on reemployment wages. This paper estimates a positive UI wage effect exploiting an age-based regression discontinuity in Austrian administrative data. A search model incorporating duration dependence determines the UI wage effect as the balance between two offsetting forces: UI causes agents to seek higher-wage jobs, but also reduces wages by lengthening unemployment. This implies a negative relationship between the UI unemployment duration and wage effects, which holds empirically both in our sample and across studies, reconciling disparate wage-effect estimates. Empirically, UI raises wages by improving reemployment firms’ quality and attenuating wage drops.
    Keywords: job search; regression discontinuity design; unemployment insurance; wages
    JEL: H5 J3 J6
    Date: 2015–05
  6. By: Nicholas M. Kiefer (Cornell University, Ithaca, and CREATES); C. Erik Larson (Promontory Financial Group, LLC)
    Abstract: Counting processes provide a very flexible framework for modeling discrete events occurring over time. Estimation and interpretation is easy, and links to more familiar approaches are at hand. The key is to think of data as "event histories," a record of times of switching between states in a discrete state space. In a simple case, the states could be default/non-default; in other models relevant for credit modeling the states could be credit scores or payment status (30 dpd, 60 dpd, etc.). Here we focus on the use of stochastic counting processes for mortgage default modeling, using data on high LTV mortgages. Borrowers seeking to finance more than 80% of a house's value with a mortgage usually either purchase mortgage insurance, allowing a first mortgage greater than 80% from many lenders, or use second mortgages. Are there differences in performance between loans financed by these different methods? We address this question in the counting process framework. In fact, MI is associated with lower default rates for both fixed rate and adjustable rate first mortgages.
    Keywords: Econometrics, Aalen Estimator, Duration Modeling, Mortgage Insurance, Loan-to-Value
    JEL: C51 C52 C58 C33 C35
    Date: 2015–04–28

This nep-ias issue is ©2015 by Soumitra K. Mallick. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.