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on Insurance Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒04‒11
eight papers chosen by Soumitra K. Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management |
| By: | Yvonne Wang?i Machira |
| Keywords: | Communities and Human Settlements - Housing & Human Habitats Governance - Governance Indicators Governance - Local Government Governance - National Governance Governance - Politics and Government Health, Nutrition and Population - Health Economics & Finance Health, Nutrition and Population - Health Monitoring & Evaluation Health, Nutrition and Population - Health Systems Development & Reform Public Sector Development - Decentralization Social Development - Social Accountability |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:21666&r=ias |
| By: | Orazio Attanasio; Costas Meghir; Corina Mommaerts |
| Abstract: | We investigate partial insurance and group risk sharing in extended family networks. Our approach is based on decomposing income shocks into group aggregate and idiosyncratic components, allowing us to measure the extent to which each is insured, having accounted for public insurance programs. We apply our framework to extended family networks in the United States by exploiting the unique intergenerational structure of the PSID. We find that over 60% of shocks to household income are potentially insurable within family networks. However, we find little evidence that the extended family provides insurance for such idiosyncratic shocks. |
| JEL: | D12 D31 D91 E21 E24 H31 |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21059&r=ias |
| By: | Overseas Development Institute; World Bank Group |
| Keywords: | Conflict and Development - Disaster Management Environment - Environmental Disasters & Degradation Environment - Natural Disasters Agriculture - Commodity Risk Management Finance and Financial Sector Development - Insurance & Risk Mitigation Social Development - Social Risk Management Urban Development - Hazard Risk Management |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:21612&r=ias |
| By: | Orazio Attanasio (University College London & Institute for Fiscal Studies); Corina Mommaerts (Dept. of Economics, Yale University); Costas Meghir (Cowles Foundation, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate partial insurance and group risk sharing in extended family networks. Our approach is based on decomposing income shocks into group aggregate and idiosyncratic components, allowing us to measure the extent to which each is insured, having accounted for public insurance programs. We apply our framework to extended family networks in the United States by exploiting the unique intergenerational structure of the PSID. We find that over 60% of shocks to household income are potentially insurable within family networks. However, we find little evidence that the extended family provides insurance for such idiosyncratic shocks. |
| Keywords: | Incomplete markets, Partial Insurance, Consumption smoothing, Extended Family Networks, Savings, Intergenerational transfers, Stochastic income processes |
| JEL: | D12 D31 D91 E21 E24 H31 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1996&r=ias |
| By: | Arni, Patrick (IZA); Schiprowski, Amelie (IZA) |
| Abstract: | Job search requirements constrain the effort choice of unemployment insurance recipients by enforcing a minimum number of monthly applications. This paper is the first to assess how individual search effort, job finding and job stability react to this constraint. Standard job search theory predicts that requirements affect each job seeker relative to her unconstrained effort choice. Therefore, the behavioral treatment intensity of interest is the incremental effort necessary to comply with the requirement. Using novel Swiss register data, we measure this intensity as the difference between the individual requirement threshold and the search effort provided just before requirement imposition. Our econometric approach exploits that – conditional on a broad set of choice fixed effects – the match between the job seeker's unconstrained effort choice and the caseworker's requirement setting behavior is arbitrary. Therefore, it provides exogenous variation in the treatment assignment. We find that binding search requirements that exceed the job seeker's unconstrained effort choice, increase job finding in a substantial way. These effects are highly heterogeneous with respect to the job seeker's characteristics. They come at the cost of increased non-compliance and sanction imposition rates. Moreover, binding requirements have striking negative effects on job stability. Finally, we find that non-binding requirements can also affect search outcomes. This suggests that requirements can operate as signals, thereby generating behavioral effects that are not predicted by standard job search theory. |
| Keywords: | job search behavior, unemployment insurance, incentive effects |
| JEL: | J64 J65 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8951&r=ias |
| By: | Yonatan Ben-Shalom |
| Abstract: | Each year, millions of workers in the United States develop a chronic illness, disability, or other serious medical problem. Many are at risk of exiting the labor force, especially if they do not receive timely and effective return-to-work (RTW) supports. These workers and their families frequently face substantial reductions in their standard of living, and may end up relying on public programs such as Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicare, and Medicaid for income support and health care. |
| Keywords: | employers, return-to-work, disability, onset, cost benefit analysis, Americans with disabilities act, RTW, SSDI, SSI, Medicare, Medicaid, income support, health care |
| JEL: | I J |
| Date: | 2015–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:dce426208434424d91c6012f6def3325&r=ias |
| By: | Alfredo Perazzo; Erik Josephson |
| Abstract: | Verification in results-based financing (RBF) mechanisms is one of the key differentiators between it and related health financing structures such as social health insurance. Verifying that providers have achieved reported performance in RBF mechanisms is considered a crucial part of program implementation and key to maintaining trust through transparency, as well as the viability of the mechanism. Verification is however a process which has thus far been little studied. Information on the methodologies used in different settings (including frequency and sampling methodology), the effectiveness of the verification process, the direct and tangential effects, and the cost is scarce. Plan Nacer employs one of the largest RBF mechanisms in the world and is therefore an excellent case study for the role, methodology and effects of the verification process. This study will give the background to Plan Nacer, detail the major characteristics of the verification process and draw lessons on the process which can inform the design of verification in RBF mechanisms in other countries |
| Keywords: | adolescents, allocation of resources, ambulance, ambulance services, attributes, babies, basic, basic health services, best practices, BOOKMARK, capitation, child health ... See More + child mortality, childbirth, clinics, data sources, deaths, decision making, delivery care, DISSEMINATION, drugs, Early detection, equipment, fee for service, financial management, financial performance, financial support, functionality, geographical areas, Gross Domestic Product, Health Care, Health Care Centers, health expenditure, health facilities, health financing, health indicators, health insurance, Health officials, health outcomes, health providers, Health Results, Health sector, Health Sector Reform, health service, health services, hospital, Human Resources, imaging, Immunization, income, infant, infant mortality, infant mortality rate, infants, information processing, INFORMATION SYSTEM, information systems, Innovation, institution, institutional framework, insurance schemes, integration, international standards, interoperability, intervention, live births, material, maternal deaths, Maternal Mortality, Maternal Mortality Ratio, measles, medical professionals, Medical staff, medical supplies, Millennium Development Goals, Ministry of Health, missing data, morbidity, mortality, mother, Mumps, national government, national level, national resources, neonatal care, newborn, newborn infants, Newborns, Number of births, number of people, Nutrition, patient, perinatal care, pregnancy, pregnant women, prenatal care, Primary Health Care, progress, protocols, provision of services, public health, public health services, public policy, publishing, quality of care, quality of services, registers, registries, registry, regulatory framework, reproductive health, respect, result, RESULTS, Rubella, service delivery, service provision, service quality, social health insurance, Social Security, software packages, SUPERVISION, support staff, surgery, targets, technical assistance, tetanus, transaction, transportation, unique identifier, user, uses, Vaccination, VERIFICATION, verifications, young children |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:hnpdps:95083&r=ias |
| By: | Gilad Sorek |
| Abstract: | I study duopolistic market for differentiated medical products. Medical providers decide whether to sell on the spot market to sick consumers or to sell through competitive insurance market to healthy consumers. While shopping for insurance consumers know only the distribution of possible medical needs they may have if they get sick. Only when getting sick their actual medical need reveals and diagnosed. Hence consumers on the insurance market have lower taste differentiation than the sick consumers who are shopping on the spot market. I find that in equilibrium providers sell only on the insurance market, even though this intensifies competition because of lower taste differentiation. Competition between providers under insurance sales brings premiums low enough to motivate consumers buying insurance for both products. Insurance sales generate efficient horizontal product differentiation, lower prices, and efficiently higher quality. |
| Keywords: | Insurance; Non-linear Pricing; Option Demand; Differentiation |
| JEL: | I11 I13 L1 |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:abn:wpaper:auwp2015-03&r=ias |