nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2013‒10‒18
29 papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management

  1. Impact of Crop Insurance Indemnity Payments on Cash Rents and Land Values By Langemeier, Michael
  2. Financial Sector Assessment Program Update : Nigeria - Insurance Core Principles By International Monetary Fund; World Bank
  3. Financial Sector Assessment Program Update : India - IAIS Insurance Core Principles By International Monetary Fund; World Bank
  4. Institutional Barries to an Insurance-Based Farm Safety Net By Anderson, John; Young, Robert; Davis, Todd
  5. How Does Retiree Health Insurance Influence Public Sector Employee Saving? By Robert Clark; Olivia S. Mitchell
  6. Index-Based Risk Financing and Development of Natural Disaster Insurance Programs in Developing Asian Countries By Sommarat CHANTARAT; Kirk PANNANGPETCH; Nattapong PUTTANAPONG; Thanasin TANOMPONGHANDH
  7. Does full insurance increase the demand for health care? By Stefan Boes; Michael Gerfin
  8. Managing Specialty Crop Risk in North Carolina: A Working Paper By Robinson, James; Marlow, Scott; Madeley, Michelle
  9. Revenue Risk, Crop Insurance and Forward Contracting By Walters, Cory G.; Preston, Richard
  10. Evaluating the Interaction between Farm Programs with Crop Insurance and Producers' Risk Preferences By Davis, Todd D.; Anderson, John D.; Young, Robert E.
  11. Retiree Health Insurance for Public School Employees: Does it Affect Retirement? By Maria D. Fitzpatrick
  12. The Demand for Crop Insurance: How Important are the Subsidies? By ODonoghue, Erik J.
  13. Analysis of the STAX and SCO Programs for Cotton Producers By Campiche, Jody
  14. Crop Insurance for Energy Grasses By Miao, Ruiqing; Khanna, Madhu
  15. Adjusting Crop Insurance APH Calculation to Accommodate Biomass Production By Dolginow, Joseph; Massey, Raymond; Myers, Brent; Kitchen, Newell
  16. Financial Sector Assessment Program : Malaysia - Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems By International Monetary Fund; World Bank
  17. How Product Standardization Affects Choice: Evidence from the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange By Keith M Marzilli Ericson; Amanda Starc
  18. Soil Matters: How the Federal Crop Insurance Program should be reformed to encourage low-risk farming methods with high-reward environmental outcomes By O'Connor, Claire
  19. Analyzing Federal Farm Program and Crop Insurance Options to Assess Policy Design and Risk Management Implications for Crop Producers By Lubben, Bradley; Stockton, Matthew; Protopop, Iuliia; Jansen, Jim
  20. Understanding Severance Pay By Parsons, Donald O.
  21. Analysis of the Supplemental Coverage Option By Gerlt, Scott; Westhoff, Patrick
  22. Financial Sector Assessment Program Update : India - International Organization of Securities Commission Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation By International Monetary Fund; World Bank
  23. Mergers, Coordinated Effects and Efficiency in the Portuguese Non-Life Insurance Industry By Duarte Brito; Pedro Pereira; Joaquim Ramalho
  24. Accounting for Weather Probabilities in Crop Insurance Rating By Coble, Keith H.; Miller, Mary Frances; Rejesus, Roderick M.; Boyles, Ryan; Goodwin, Barry K.; Knight, Thomas O.
  25. Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection By Theodoros M. Diasakos; Kostas Koufopoulos
  26. Impact of Natural Disasters on Production Networks and Urbanization in New Zealand By Brent LAYTON
  27. Why Do Some Bikers Wear a Helmet and Others Don't? Evidence from Delhi, India By Michael Grimm; Carole Treibich
  28. Examining Contemporaneous Farm and County Losses Using Farm Level Data By Zulauf, Carl R.; Demircan, Vecdi; Scnhitkey, Gary; Barnaby, Art; Ibendahl, Gregg; Herbel, Kevin
  29. Data Analytics in Medicaid: Spotlight on Colorado's Accountable Care Collaborative. By Julia Paradise; Marsha Gold; Winnie Wang

  1. By: Langemeier, Michael
    Abstract: This paper examined the impact of a yield protection crop insurance product on cash rents and land values for a representative Indiana farm. The net return to land and management for scenarios that included and excluded crop insurance were very similar. Predicted cash rents and land values were not impacted by crop insurance indemnity payments.
    Keywords: Yield Protection Crop Insurance, Farm Management, Q12,
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156836&r=ias
  2. By: International Monetary Fund; World Bank
    Keywords: Insurance and Risk Mitigation Law and Development - Insurance Law Private Sector Development - Emerging Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development - Non Bank Financial Institutions Finance and Financial Sector Development - Debt Markets
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:15962&r=ias
  3. By: International Monetary Fund; World Bank
    Keywords: Insurance and Risk Mitigation Law and Development - Insurance Law Private Sector Development - Emerging Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development - Non Bank Financial Institutions Finance and Financial Sector Development - Debt Markets
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:15963&r=ias
  4. By: Anderson, John; Young, Robert; Davis, Todd
    Keywords: Farm Bill, Crop Insurance, Agricultural and Food Policy, Political Economy,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156845&r=ias
  5. By: Robert Clark; Olivia S. Mitchell
    Abstract: Economic theory predicts that employer-provided retiree health insurance benefits crowd-out household wealth accumulation. Nevertheless, there is little research on the impacts of retiree health insurance on wealth accruals, so this paper utilizes a unique data file on three baseline cohorts from the Health and Retirement Study to explore how employer-provided retiree health insurance may influence net household wealth among public sector employees, where retiree healthcare benefits are still quite prevalent. We find that most full-time public sector employees who anticipate receiving employer-provided health insurance coverage in retirement save less than their private sector uncovered counterparts.
    JEL: H75 I11 I18 I30
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19511&r=ias
  6. By: Sommarat CHANTARAT (Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University); Kirk PANNANGPETCH (Faculty of Agriculture, Khon Kaen University, Thailand); Nattapong PUTTANAPONG (Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, Thailand); Thanasin TANOMPONGHANDH (School of Management, Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand)
    Abstract: This paper explores innovations in index-based risk transfer products (IBRTPs) as a means to address important insurance market imperfections that have precluded the emergence and sustainability of formal insurance markets in developing countries, where uninsured natural disaster risk remains a leading impediment of economic development. Using a combination of disaggregated nationwide weather, remote sensing and household livelihood data commonly available in developing countries, the paper provides analytical framework and empirical illustration on showing design nationwide and scalable IBRTP contracts, to analyse hedging effectiveness and welfare impacts at the micro level, and to explore cost effective risk-financing options. Thai rice production is used in our analysis with the goal to extend the methodology and implications to enhance development of national and regional disaster risk management in Asia.
    Keywords: Natural disaster insurance, index insurance, reinsurance, catastrophe bond, rice production, Thailand.
    JEL: Q54 G22 G12 Q11 O53
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:era:wpaper:dp-2013-09&r=ias
  7. By: Stefan Boes; Michael Gerfin
    Abstract: We estimate the causal effect of having full health insurance on health care expenditures. We take advantage of a unique quasi-experimental setup in which deductibles and co- payments were zero in a managed care plan, and non-zero in regular insurance, until a policy change forced all individuals with an active plan to cover a minimum amount of their expenses. Using panel data and a non-linear difference-in-differences strategy, we find a demand elasticity of about -0.14 comparing full insurance with the cost-sharing model, and a significant upward shift in the likelihood to generate costs.
    Keywords: Deductibles; health cost; quasi experiment; changes-in-changes
    JEL: I11 C14
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1305&r=ias
  8. By: Robinson, James; Marlow, Scott; Madeley, Michelle
    Abstract: This paper was submitted to AAEA's 2013 Crop Insurance and the Farm Bill Symposium.
    Keywords: Crop Insurance, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156824&r=ias
  9. By: Walters, Cory G.; Preston, Richard
    Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy, Marketing, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156821&r=ias
  10. By: Davis, Todd D.; Anderson, John D.; Young, Robert E.
    Abstract: A stochastic simulation model is used to simulate crop revenues net of farm policy and crop insurance costs. Certainty equivalent analysis is used to rank farm policy and crop insurance alternatives for varying levels of risk aversion.
    Keywords: farm management, risk management, Farm Management, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156753&r=ias
  11. By: Maria D. Fitzpatrick
    Abstract: Despite the widespread provision of retiree health insurance for public sector workers, little attention has been paid to its effects on employee retirement. This is in contrast to the large literature on health-insurance-induced “job-lock” in the private sector. I use the introduction of retiree health insurance for public school employees in combination with administrative data on their retirement to identify the effects of retiree health insurance. As expected, the availability of retiree health insurance for older workers allows employees to retire earlier. These behavioral changes have budgetary implications, likely making the programs self-financing rather than costly to taxpayers.
    JEL: H75 I21 I22 J26
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19524&r=ias
  12. By: ODonoghue, Erik J.
    Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:157282&r=ias
  13. By: Campiche, Jody
    Abstract: Both the House and Senate farm bills include changes to Title I commodity programs and crop insurance programs, including a new shallow loss revenue protection program, a price protection program, and two supplemental crop insurance programs. A key change in the new farm bill is that the Title I shallow loss revenue protection and price protection programs would not be available to cotton producers. Instead, cotton producers would have the option to enroll in either the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) or the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX). Both products are similar to the Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) crop insurance policy and would cover county-wide losses. The products are designed to complement a producers’ individual insurance policy. Understanding the differences in payments from Title I programs as compared to potential payments from the STAX or SCO programs will be important for cotton producers. For this study, average direct payments and counter-cyclical payments over the 2002–2011 time period were compared to potential STAX and SCO payments for several Oklahoma and Texas counties.
    Keywords: STAX, SCO, Farm Bill, crop insurance, Agricultural and Food Policy, Farm Management, Q18,
    Date: 2013–09–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156826&r=ias
  14. By: Miao, Ruiqing; Khanna, Madhu
    Abstract: This study compares the efficiency of three policy instruments (i.e., crop insurance, establishment cost share, and biomass price subsidy) in promoting energy crop production. The efficiency is measured by energy crop acreage increased due to the policy instrument for a given amount of government expenditure supporting the instrument. Based on a unique dataset of county-level miscanthus yield over 1979-2010 across the rainfed region of the United States, our results show that if there is no credit constraint in financing establishment costs then crop insurance is most efficient and biomass price subsidy is least efficient among the three policy instruments. If there is credit constraint in financing establishment costs, however, then crop insurance is more (respectively, less) efficient than establishment cost share for small (respectively, large) expenditure. Geographical distributions of energy crop acreage under different policy instruments are studied as well.
    Keywords: crop insurance, energy crops, establishment costs, miscanthus, yield, Land Economics/Use, Production Economics, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty, Q15, Q16, Q28,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156936&r=ias
  15. By: Dolginow, Joseph; Massey, Raymond; Myers, Brent; Kitchen, Newell
    Abstract: The United States federal government currently subsidizes crop insurance to provide a safety-net to insured farmers. Agricultural economists have debated indirect impacts of the subsidized crop insurance program on producer behavior. One of those debates surrounds the issue of extensiveness, or if crop insurance encourages the production of certain crops for which insurance is more readily available. The federal government is also fostering an emerging cellulosic bioenergy industry with subsidies for planting perennial grass crops like switchgrass and miscanthus. This article analyzes how the current method for calculating actual production history (APH) may deter producers from planting perennial grasses and penalizes those producers who convert some of their row crop land to perennial grasses. An alternative APH calculation method suggested here would continue to provide a safety-net to producers, reduce indemnity payments by insurance companies, and reduce an impediment to planting perennial grasses. The conclusions are based on a utility-maximizing stochastic budgeting model with actual grain yields and FAPRI baseline prices for a representative farm in northeastern Missouri.
    Keywords: Crop Insurance, Bioenergy, Perennial Grasses, Agricultural and Food Policy, Crop Production/Industries, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, D81, Q16, Q18, C15,
    Date: 2013–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156945&r=ias
  16. By: International Monetary Fund; World Bank
    Keywords: Finance and Financial Sector Development - Deposit Insurance Finance and Financial Sector Development - Debt Markets Banks and Banking Reform Private Sector Development - Emerging Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development - Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress
    Date: 2013–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:16021&r=ias
  17. By: Keith M Marzilli Ericson; Amanda Starc
    Abstract: Standardization of complex products is touted as improving consumer decisions and intensifying price competition, but evidence on standardization is limited. We examine a natural experiment: the standardization of health insurance plans on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange. Pre-standardization, firms had wide latitude to design plans. A regulatory change then required firms to standardize the cost-sharing parameters of plans and offer seven defined options; plans remained differentiated on network, brand, and price. Standardization led consumers on the HIX to choose more generous health insurance plans and led to substantial shifts in brands' market shares. We decompose the sources of this shift into three effects: price, product availability, and valuation. A discrete choice model shows that standardization changed the weights consumers attach to plan attributes (a valuation effect), increasing the salience of tier. The availability effect explains the bulk of the brand shifts. Standardization increased consumer welfare in our models, but firms captured some of the surplus by reoptimizing premiums. We use hypothetical choice experiments to replicate the effect of standardization and conduct alternative counterfactuals.
    JEL: D14 D80 H31 I11 L15
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19527&r=ias
  18. By: O'Connor, Claire
    Abstract: Although significant research has been done on managing farmers’ financial risk through federal programs such as federal crop insurance, to date, little attention has been paid to the ability of on-farm management’s potential to mitigate agricultural risk. Federal crop insurance could empower farmers to use their farm management skills to become more resilient to extreme weather conditions. This paper proposes a federal crop insurance pilot program that reduces premium rates for farmers who lower their risk of crop loss by investing in technically sound management practices that both reduce the risk of loss in the near-term and build soil health and increase productive capacity in the long-term. For example, soil moisture management practices, such as conservation tillage, cover cropping, and improved irrigation scheduling, reduce weather-related risks, such as droughts and floods. In the short-term, encouraging practices that increase soil moisture and water infiltration, as well as combat pest pressures, will help decrease yield fluctuation due to unfavorable weather in a given year. In the long-term, farmers who invest in soil health will increase their fields’ yield potential and be better prepared to face the challenge of a changing climate, in which extreme weather events are predicted to be more frequent and intense. Because these practices reduce the risk of crop loss, federal crop insurance can and should encourage them through an actuarially sound premium reduction pilot program.
    Keywords: crop insurance, no-till, cover crop, Agricultural and Food Policy, Crop Production/Industries, Environmental Economics and Policy, Farm Management, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156789&r=ias
  19. By: Lubben, Bradley; Stockton, Matthew; Protopop, Iuliia; Jansen, Jim
    Abstract: Recent changes in federal farm programs and contemporary farm program proposals highlight an evolving shift in farm policy from income support to risk management. A mix of price- and revenue-based commodity programs as well as yield- and revenue-based insurance products provide crop producers a complex portfolio of risk management tools and choices. To make effective risk management decisions, crop producers must integrate farm programs and crop insurance alternatives in a comprehensive risk management decision-making framework. This work assesses the risk management performance and complementarity or substitutability of farm program and crop insurance options. A novel representative farm model for Nebraska is used that incorporates national, state, district, county, and farm-level yield variables along with national and state-level price variables to accurately assess multiple farm program and crop insurance alternatives. The four-stage simulation model simultaneously estimates all necessary yield and price variables in a statistically-distributed and correlated framework. This allows for a consistent and complete analysis of alternative farm program and crop insurance choices and designs. The simulation produces crop revenue, farm program, and crop insurance results for eight representative farms indicative of the crop mix and productivity levels in each of the eight agricultural statistics districts in Nebraska. The results demonstrate the risk management performance of alternative farm program and crop insurance choices for the eight representative farms in Nebraska. The analysis demonstrates the complementarity of farm programs with some crop insurance products and protection levels while showing potential substitutability or overlap with other products and protection levels. The results provide insight for more effective policy design, farm program participation, and farm-level risk management decision-making.
    Keywords: farm bill, farm programs, crop insurance, risk management, Agricultural and Food Policy, Farm Management, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013–10–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:157827&r=ias
  20. By: Parsons, Donald O. (George Washington University)
    Abstract: Severance pay, a fixed-sum payment to workers at job separation, has been the focus of intense policy concern for the last several decades, but much of this concern is unearned. The design of the ideal separation package is outlined and severance pay emerges as a natural component of job displacement insurance packages, serving both as scheduled reemployment wage insurance and, if search moral hazard is a problem, as scheduled UI. Like any firm-financed separation expenditure, severance pay can induce excessive job retention, but such distortions do not appear to be of practical significance at benefit levels typically mandated in the industrialized world. Moreover there is no evidence that firms attempt to avoid these firing cost distortions by substituting severance savings plans, which have zero firing costs. Indeed severance insurance plans similar to those mandated are often offered voluntarily in the U.S. The appropriate role of government in the market for severance pay is briefly considered.
    Keywords: severance pay, job displacement, firing costs, unemployment insurance, moral hazard
    JEL: J65 J41 J33 J08
    Date: 2013–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7641&r=ias
  21. By: Gerlt, Scott; Westhoff, Patrick
    Abstract: The proposed Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) crop insurance program is included in both the House and Senate farm bills. We develop a county level model to analyze program indemnities. The FAPRI-MU stochastic U.S. model is used to estimate market effects of the program. We find the net 10-year fiscal cost of SCO to be about $9.8 billion and $5.8 billion for the House and Senate bills, respectively. While corn and peanuts have the largest absolute payments per acre, wheat and peanuts have the highest relative effects in area and farm price. However, the market impacts of SCO are quite small.
    Keywords: Crop insurance, farm bill, price analysis, crop production, Agricultural and Food Policy, Demand and Price Analysis, Production Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156704&r=ias
  22. By: International Monetary Fund; World Bank
    Keywords: Insurance and Risk Mitigation Finance and Financial Sector Development - Debt Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development - Mutual Funds Private Sector Development - Emerging Markets Finance and Financial Sector Development - Financial Intermediation
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:15960&r=ias
  23. By: Duarte Brito (Universidade Nova de Lisboa and CEFAGE-UE); Pedro Pereira (Autoridade da Concorrência and CEFAGE-UE); Joaquim Ramalho (CEFAGE-UE)
    Abstract: We evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three Portuguese non-life insurance markets. We specify and estimate, with a panel of firmlevel data, a structural model which includes: preferences, technology, and a market equilibrium condition. Firms’ demand curves are not very elastic. Firms’ technologies exhibit scale and scope economies and high cost efficiency scores. We find that, for the period following the mergers, there is no evidence of: (i) an increase in market power through coordinated behavior, or (ii) changes in cost efficiency levels. In addition, social welfare increased.
    Keywords: Mergers; Market Power; Efficiency; Non-Life Insurance.
    JEL: D43 K21 L13
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfe:wpcefa:2013_18&r=ias
  24. By: Coble, Keith H.; Miller, Mary Frances; Rejesus, Roderick M.; Boyles, Ryan; Goodwin, Barry K.; Knight, Thomas O.
    Abstract: The US crop insurance program previously used a simple average of equally weighted historical loss cost data to serve as the backbone for estimating crop insurance premium rates. This article develops a procedure for weighting the historical loss cost experience based on longer time-series weather information and improve statistical validity of estimated premium rates. It was determined that the best weather data to account for weather probabilities in crop insurance premium rating is the National Climatic Data Center’s Time Bias Corrected Divisional Temperature-Precipitation-Drought Index data, also called the Climate Division Data. Using fractional logit and out-of-sample competitions, weather variables can be selected to construct an index that would allow proper assessment of the relative probability of weather events that drive production losses and to construct proper “weather weights” that can be applied when averaging historical loss cost data to calculate rates. A variable width binning approach with equal probabilities was determined as the best approach for classifying each year in the shorter historical loss cost data used for rating. When the weather weighting approach described above is applied, we find that for apples, barley, cotton, potatoes, rice, and spring/winter wheat, the weather weighted average loss costs at the national level tend to be smaller than the calculated average loss costs without weather weighting. However, for corn, cotton, sorghum, and soybeans, the weather weighted average loss costs at the national level tend to be larger. Around 51% of the counties have weather weighted average loss costs lower than the average loss costs without weather weighting
    Keywords: Crop Insurance, Premium Rating, Weather Weighting, Agricultural and Food Policy, Risk and Uncertainty, G22, Q10, Q18,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:156825&r=ias
  25. By: Theodoros M. Diasakos (University of St Andrews); Kostas Koufopoulos
    Abstract: This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson (ECMA, 1983).
    Keywords: Insurance Market, Adverse Selection, Incentive Efficiency
    JEL: D86
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:wpecon:1313&r=ias
  26. By: Brent LAYTON (The Electricity Authority, New Zealand)
    Abstract: New Zealand’s history of natural disasters and its vulnerability to various types of disaster are outlined briefly. A summary description of the country’s arrangements for preparing for natural disasters and managing the response to, and recovery from, them is provided. The series of earthquakes that affected Christchurch, New Zealand’s second largest city, between September 2010 and early 2012 is considered as a case study. The direct and indirect tangible costs of the events are estimated as $NZ 30.9 billion (approximately $US24.5billion), or 15.8% of the country’s GDP, on a replacement cost basis. Approximately 78% of this cost will be covered by insurance. On a depreciated replacement cost basis the damage is estimated at $NZ18.7 billion. The significant effects of the events on the population, labor market, reported crime, urbanization and location of businesses and production of the region are also described. The case study suggests that New Zealand’s arrangements for natural disasters worked well in most regards. The case study also highlights the advantage of international co-operation in the response to natural disasters. It also suggests that while high rates and levels of disaster insurance ameliorate the financial impact, they can complicate achieving effective recovery. This is because insurance funds increase the alternatives available to the affected population and investors in respect of reinvestment and rebuilding the damaged region. The lag before insurers will accept new risks can also create delays and impede the momentum to recovery. The final section of the paper draws from New Zealand’s recent disaster experience in Christchurch to present some policy recommendations relevant to New Zealand and the East Asia region.
    Keywords: Natural disasters, Monitoring, rescue, Recovery, Earthquakes, New Zealand,Christchurch earthquakes, Economic impact, Costs, Disaster insurance, East Asian regional co-operation
    JEL: Q54 O52 G22 F42 O56
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:era:wpaper:dp-2013-13&r=ias
  27. By: Michael Grimm (Erasmus University Rotterdam - Erasmus University Rotterdam, Passau University - Passau University, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor); Carole Treibich (Erasmus University Rotterdam - Erasmus University Rotterdam, Paris School of Economics - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - Aix-Marseille Univ. - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM))
    Abstract: In many domains risky health behavior is still only poorly understood. Analysis is often plagued by incomplete data and a general lack of information. In this study; we try to understand the determinants of helmet use among motorcyclists in Delhi; a context in which road safety is very low. We use a very detailed data set collected especially for the purpose of the study. To guide our empirical analysis; we rely on a simple model in which drivers decide on their speed and helmet use. The empirical findings suggest that risk averse individuals are more likely to wear a helmet. We do not find any systematic effect of risk aversion on speed. Both findings are coherent with our theoretical model. Helmet use also increases with education. Drivers who show a higher awareness of road risks; because for instance; they are better informed about Delhi's actual road traffc accident fatality and injury rates; are both more likely to wear a helmet and to speed less. In turn; those drivers who show a high level of unawareness take the highest risks. Controlling for risk awareness; we observe that drivers tend to compensate between speed and helmet use. The most obvious solution to India's road safety problem and the related high social costs that result from it is to enforce the helmet law and speed limits. An alternative strategy; and probably more feasible in the current context; is to design interventions which raise awareness of road risks. Improvements to the road infrastructure are also a possible solution but these measures bear the risk that drivers will react to the improved road safety by either increasing speed or lowering helmet use.
    Keywords: road safety; helmet use; risky health behavior; self-protection; self-insurance; India
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00871749&r=ias
  28. By: Zulauf, Carl R.; Demircan, Vecdi; Scnhitkey, Gary; Barnaby, Art; Ibendahl, Gregg; Herbel, Kevin
    Abstract: Characteristics of farm level yield and revenue loss that is systemic with yield and revenue loss at the county, state, and U.S. level are examined using farm yields from the Illinois and Kansas farm business management associations. The data begins with 1972. Share of yield and revenue loss systemic with the larger geographical areas declines as the level of loss increases, implying a greater share of larger losses is idiosyncratic to an individual farm. Farm loss systemic with the county generally is larger for Kansas than Illinois farms, which calls into question that county-based programs are less effective for plain states due to the larger size of their counties. Last, for the small set of farms that yields for a crop for all years of the analysis, the correlation between a farm and county yield/revenue deviations had limited ability to explain the share of a farm’s loss that is systemic with a county. This finding suggests that only by examining loss experiences for the farm and the county can the value of county risk management programs be ascertained.
    Keywords: systemic crop risk, crop insurance, farm level data, Agricultural and Food Policy, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013–10–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaeaci:157812&r=ias
  29. By: Julia Paradise; Marsha Gold; Winnie Wang
    Keywords: Data Analytics, Medicaid, Colorado, Accountable Care Collaborative
    JEL: I
    Date: 2013–10–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:7912&r=ias

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