nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2013‒10‒02
five papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management

  1. Belgium: Detailed Assessment of Observance of Insurance Core Principles By International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
  2. Who Pays the High Health Costs of Older Workers? Evidence from Prostate Cancer Screening Mandates By James Bailey
  3. Belgium: Technical Note on Crisis Management and Bank Resolution Framework By International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
  4. Are there gains in employment stability by reducing unemployment benefit entitlement length? The case of Spain By Yolanda F. Rebollo-Sanz; José Ignacio García-Pérez
  5. Striking While the Iron is Hot: The Effect of Vocational Rehabilitation Service Wait Times on Employment Outcomes for Applicants Receiving Social Security Disability Benefits. By Todd Honeycutt; David Stapleton

  1. By: International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
    Keywords: Insurance;Insurance regulations;Insurance supervision;Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes;Financial Sector Assessment Program;Belgium;
    Date: 2013–05–24
  2. By: James Bailey (Department of Economics, Temple University)
    Abstract: Between 1992 and 2009, 30 US states adopted laws mandating that health insurance plans cover screenings for prostate cancer. Because prostate cancer screenings are used almost exclusively by men over age 50, these mandates raise the cost of insuring older men relative to other groups. This paper uses a triple-difference empirical strategy to take advantage of this quasi-random natural experiment in raising the cost of employing older workers. Using IPUMS data from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey, this paper finds that the increased cost of insuring older workers results in their receiving 2.8% lower hourly wages, being 2% less likely to be employed, and being 0.7% less likely to have employer-sponsored health insurance.
    Keywords: Older Workers, Prostate Cancer Screening, Health Insurance, Mandated Benefits, Triple-Difference
    JEL: J20 J30 I13
    Date: 2013–09
  3. By: International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
    Keywords: Bank resolution;Bank supervision;Banking sector;Deposit insurance;Risk management;Crisis prevention;Financial Sector Assessment Program;Belgium;
    Date: 2013–05–24
  4. By: Yolanda F. Rebollo-Sanz (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide); José Ignacio García-Pérez (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)
    Abstract: Reliable empirical evidence about the effects of unemployment insurance benefits (UIB) on individuals’ labour market paths is crucial for designing appropriate labour market policies. In particular, medium and long-run effects of the UIB system can differ markedly from short-term impact when job stability depends on previous labour market history. This paper addresses the effect of the UIB entitlement length on employment stability by taking into account benefits endogeneity, dynamic selection issues and occurrence dependence. The analysis is undertaken for dual labour market, as the one in Spain, where temporary and permanent workers differ in quite many individual and labour market characteristics. We find that the UIB entitlement period lengthens the unemployment spell of all workers but it also has a positive effect on the quality of subsequent job matches, particularly for temporary workers, and when job entrance takes place by the end of benefits entitlement. We simulate alternative UIB designs and conclude that shortening the benefit entitlement length does not seem to lead to significant gains in overall employment stability which increases by 4.3% at most. But at the same time, we find that job turnover also increases so the overall effect is that workers are employed a bit more but at the expense of suffering more job interruptions.
    Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard Model; Job Turnover; Employment Stability; Employment Dynamics
    JEL: D63 I14
    Date: 2013–09
  5. By: Todd Honeycutt; David Stapleton
    Abstract: State vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies play a significant role in supporting the employment goals of people with disabilities, but delays in the receipt of vocational services could adversely affect employment outcomes of applicants for services. This study explores the effect of waiting for VR services on employment outcomes for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries. Using multivariate models based on agency order of selection characteristics and a measure of the usual wait time for VR services, the study found that longer wait times are associated with lower employment outcomes at VR closure and throughout SSA administrative data.
    Keywords: State Vocational Rehabilitation Agencies, Social Security Disability Insurance, employment, Disability
    JEL: I J
    Date: 2013–09–30

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