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on Insurance Economics |
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Issue of 2013‒04‒13
thirteen papers chosen by Soumitra K Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management |
| By: | Midori Matsushima (Assistant Professor, Osaka University of Commerce); Hiroyuki Yamada (Assistant Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)) |
| Abstract: | Vietnam is attempting to achieve universal health insurance coverage by 2014. Despite great progress, the country faces some challenges, issues and problems. This paper reviewed official documents, existing reports, and related literature to address: (1) grand design for achieving universal health coverage, (2) current insurance coverage, (3) health insurance premium and subsidies by the government, (4) benefit package and payment rule, and (5) organizational practices. From the review, it became apparent that the insurance system is broadly speaking complex and there are huge ambiguities, which seems hindering universal coverage of health insurance. Also, hidden distorted incentives and lack of financial stability are the main challenges in the current public health insurance system in the country. |
| Keywords: | Health Insurance, universal coverage, Vietnam |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osp:wpaper:13e003&r=ias |
| By: | Salmon, Yves |
| Keywords: | Risk and Uncertainty, |
| Date: | 2013–02–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:usao13:146640&r=ias |
| By: | Lamiraud , Karine (ESSEC Business School) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate the possible presence of switching costs when consumers are offered the opportunity to change their basic health insurance provider. We focus on the specific case of Switzerland which implemented a pure form of competition in basic health insurance markets. We identify several barriers to switching, namely choice overload, status quo bias, the possession of supplementary contracts for enrollees in bad health, firm’s pricing strategies based on providing low price supplementary products, poor regulation of reserves and the limitations of the previous risk-equalization mechanism which left room for risk selection practices. |
| Keywords: | Brand loyalty; Choice overload; Competition among health insurers; Status quo bias; Supplementary health insurance; Switching costs; The Swiss case |
| JEL: | D41 G22 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-13005&r=ias |
| By: | Boone, Jan |
| Abstract: | Consumers, when buying health insurance, do not know the exact value of each treatment that they buy coverage for. This leads them to overvalue some treatments and undervalue others. We show that the insurance market cannot correct these mistakes. This causes research labs to overinvest in treatments that hardly add value compared to current best practice. The government can stimulate R&D in breakthrough treatments by excluding treatments with low value added from health insurance coverage. If the country is rich enough such a government intervention in a private health insurance market raises welfare. |
| Keywords: | cost effectiveness analysis; health insurance; pharmaceutical research and development |
| JEL: | D4 I18 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9420&r=ias |
| By: | Boone, J. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center) |
| Abstract: | Abstract Consumers, when buying health insurance, do not know the exact value of each treatment that they buy coverage for. This leads them to overvalue some treatments and undervalue others. We show that the insurance market cannot correct these mistakes. This causes research labs to overinvest in treatments that hardly add value compared to current best practice. The government can stimulate R&D in breakthrough treatments by excluding treatments with low value added from health insurance coverage. If the country is rich enough such a government intervention in a private health insurance market raises welfare. |
| Keywords: | cost effectiveness analysis;pharmaceutical research and development;health insurance |
| JEL: | I18 D4 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2013008&r=ias |
| By: | Drakeford, John; Benfield, Aon |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness, Agricultural Finance, Risk and Uncertainty, |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:usao13:146639&r=ias |
| By: | Villalobos, Jose Angel |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, |
| Date: | 2013–02–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:usao13:146641&r=ias |
| By: | Shinya Sugawara (Japan Society of Promotion of Science and Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo); Yasuhiro Omori (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a simple microeconometric framework that can separately identify moral hazard and selection problems in insurance markets. Our econometric model is equivalent to the approach that is utilized for entry game analyses. We employ a Bayesian estimation approach that avoids a partial identification problem. Due to the standard identification, we propose a statistical model selection method to detect an information structure that consumers face. Our method is applied to the dental insurance market in the United States. In this market, we find not only standard moral hazard but also advantageous selection, which has an intuitive interpretation in the context of dental insurance. |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2013cf882&r=ias |
| By: | Ed Westerhout; Kees Folmer |
| Abstract: | Most health insurance schemes use some sort of cost sharing to curb the moral hazard that is inherent to insurance. It is common to limit this cost sharing, by applying a deductible or a stop loss, for example. This can be motivated from an insurance perspective: without a cap, coinsurance payments might be unacceptably high for people with high medical costs. This paper shows that introducing a cap on coinsurance payments may actually <em>hurt</em> people with high medical costs. This is not due to moral hazard that comes along with the extra insurance. Instead, it is because the introduction of a cap makes health spending below the cap more price elastic, thereby inducing the health insurer to raise the coinsurance rate. <span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: medium;">Keywords: </span>Moral Hazard, Deductibles, Co-Payment Schemes in Health Care, Idiosyncratic Health Shocks |
| JEL: | D60 H21 I18 |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:239&r=ias |
| By: | Panda, P.; Chakraborty, A.; Dror, D.M.; Bedi, A.S. |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses insurance uptake in three community based health insurance (CBHI) schemes located in rural parts of two of India’s poorest states and offered through women’s self-help groups (SHGs). We examine what drives uptake, the degree of inclusive practices of the schemes, and the influence of health status on enrollment. The most important finding is that a household’s socio-economic status does not appear to substantially inhibit uptake. In some cases Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) households are more likely to enroll. Second, households with greater financial liabilities find insurance more attractive. Third, access to the hospital insurance scheme (RSBY) does not dampen CBHI uptake, suggesting that the potential for greater development of insurance markets and products beyond existing ones would respond to a need. Fourth, recent episodes of illness and selfassessed health status do not influence uptake. Fifth, insurance coverage is prioritized within households, with the household head, the spouse of the household head and both male and female children of the household head, more likely to be insured as compared to other relatives. Sixth, offering insurance through women’s SHGs appears to mitigate concerns about the inclusiveness and sustainability of CBHI schemes. Given the pan-Indian spread of SHGs, offering insurance through such groups offers the potential to scale-up CBHI. |
| Keywords: | community-based health insurance;Bihar;enrollment;Uttar Pradesh;health microinsurance;rural India;self-help groups |
| Date: | 2013–03–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:euriss:555&r=ias |
| By: | Mondher bellalah; Shirley Mardonez; Omar Masood (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise; Researcher of The Externado, University of Colombia; Royal Business School, University of East London) |
| Abstract: | The world is experiencing the development of new financial instruments to cope with natural catastrophes economic losses, this paper contributes to the forward movement of the discussion about the sustainability of one of these instruments known as non-life insurance linked securities. It shows a deep analysis of Mexico CAT bonds issuances and the application of a case event model that evaluates the correlation between the overall Mexican stock market and catastrophes in Mexico. |
| Keywords: | Sovereign risk; Natural disasters; Catastrophe cover; Public finance; Financial risk; Management; Insurance; Catastrophe bond. |
| JEL: | G22 G23 G30 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-18&r=ias |
| By: | Döhrmann, David; Gürtler, Marc; Hibbeln, Martin |
| Abstract: | In case of a natural catastrophe there is an increased demand for skilled labor and materials which in turn leads to significant price increases that should be taken into account in the forecast of catastrophe losses. Such price effects are referred to as Demand Surge effects. The paper at hand presents an extensive econometric analysis and modeling of the Demand Surge effect. We find that Demand Surge is positively influenced by the total amount of repair work, by alternative catastrophes in the same region in close temporal proximity, and by a higher amount of insurance claims per event. Furthermore, the Demand Surge effect is more pronounced if the construction sector is in a growth stage. In contrast, a higher capacity of the construction sector has a restraining effect on Demand Surge. In addition, if we restrict the data to very severe catastrophes, we observe a saturation effect according to which a wage increase for building services before a catastrophe reduces the Demand Surge effect. -- |
| Keywords: | demand surge,natural disasters,empirical analysis,insurance |
| JEL: | D45 J2 J31 Q54 R15 R23 R32 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tbsifw:if44v1&r=ias |
| By: | Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Propper, Carol |
| Abstract: | In this paper we focus on the implications of consumer heterogeneity for whether competition will improve outcomes in health care markets. We show that competition generally favours the majority group as higher quality for the majority is an effective way to increase the quality signal and attract patients. A regulator who is concerned about equity may protect the minority group by not introducing competition. Alternatively, if the minority group is favoured by the providers under monopoly, competition can improve equity by forcing the providers to increase quality for the majority group. |
| Keywords: | competition; equity; hospitals; quality |
| JEL: | D63 H11 I11 I14 L31 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9325&r=ias |