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on Insurance Economics |
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Issue of 2011‒02‒12
five papers chosen by Soumitra K Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management |
| By: | Cremer, Helmuth (Toulouse School of Economics); Goulão, Catarina (Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | A wide variety of social protection systems coexist within the EU. Some member states provide social insurance that is of Beveridgean inspiration (with universal and more or less flat benefits), while others offer a system that is mainly Bismarckian (with benefits related to past contributions). Labor mobility raises concerns about the sustainability of the most generous and redistributive (Beveridgean) insurance systems. We address this issue in a two-country setting, where individuals differ in mobility cost (attachment to their native country). A Bismarckian insurance system is not affected by migration while a Beveridgean one is. Our results suggest that the race-to-the-bottom affecting tax rates may be more important under Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck competition. Finally, we study the strategic choice of the type of social protection. We show that Bismarckian governments may find it beneficial to adopt a Beveridgean insurance system. |
| JEL: | H23 H70 |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:24004&r=ias |
| By: | Arvidsson, Sara (VTI) |
| Abstract: | Risky driving behavior is regarded as being one of the best predictors of traffic accidents. Traffic violations certainly signal risky driving behavior, but the analysis of the linkage of traffic violations, individual and vehicle characteristics and annual mileage has so far been hampered by the difficulty of gaining access to appropriate disaggregate data. The contribution of this paper is that it sets out and explores a rich data set in order to study traffic violations, including both accident involved and accident-free individuals. The data set comprises all insurance policies from Sweden’s largest automobile insurance company covering several years, in total 9.3 million observations, as well as information on fines and convictions for traffic violations. This implies that the methodological issues associated with self-reported violations and only accident involved individuals are disused. The first purpose is to establish the role of age and gender in traffic violations. The second purpose is to make a first attempt to establish whether vehicle owners of status brands are more likely to commit traffic violations. The results support previous findings as well as confirm the association between owners of status brands and traffic violations. The main conclusion is that insurance data provides a viable option when studying behavior, but it also raises new methodological issues |
| Keywords: | Insurance; asymmetric information; accidents; traffic violations; automobile brand |
| JEL: | D82 |
| Date: | 2011–02–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:vtiwps:2011_003&r=ias |
| By: | Arvidsson, Sara (VTI) |
| Abstract: | Contract relevant information asymmetries are known to cause inefficiencies in markets. The information asymmetry is largest in the beginning of the customer insurer relationship but reduces over time; the longer a policyholder stays with the insurer the more the insurer learns about the policyholder’s risk. Two important characteristics of the market studied here imply that the information asymmetry may not be reduced for all policyholders. First, insurers do not have access to traffic violations, which are predictors of risk since policyholders with traffic violations are more likely to report a claim. Second, the insurers do not share information, such as previous claims, which means that the policyholder can flee a poor claim record by switching insurer. Hence, there may be a selection of high risk customers who switch insurer more often, such that the information asymmetry in this group is never reduced. To test this, we compare information asymmetries in two groups of policyholders; new customers who stay with the insurer for a period or less (short term), and long-term customers who stay with the insurer for several periods (loyal). The results indicate that departing policyholders are disproportionately high risks that constitute an adverse selection of risks, while loyal policyholders constitute a propitious (favorable) selection of risks. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric information; insurance; accidents; adverse selection; propitious selection |
| JEL: | D82 |
| Date: | 2011–02–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:vtiwps:2011_002&r=ias |
| By: | Xin Huang; Hao Zhou; Haibin Zhu |
| Abstract: | We adopt a systemic risk indicator measured by the price of insurance against systemic financial distress and assess individual banks' marginal contributions to the systemic risk. The methodology is applied using publicly available data to the 19 bank holding companies covered by the U.S. Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), with the systemic risk indicator peaking around $1.1 trillion in March 2009. Our systemic risk contribution measure shows interesting similarity to and divergence from the SCAP expected loss measure. In general, we find that a bank's contribution to the systemic risk is roughly linear in its default probability but highly nonlinear with respect to institution size and asset correlation. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2011-08&r=ias |
| By: | Ministry of Health and Family Welfare |
| Abstract: | The National Programme for the Health Care for the Elderly (NPHCE) is an articulation of the International and national commitments of the Government as envisaged under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), National Policy on Older Persons (NPOP) adopted by the Government of India in 1999 & Section 20 of “The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007†dealing with provisions for medical care of Senior Citizen. |
| Keywords: | health care, elderly, NPHCE, older persons, persons, disabilities, India, senior citizen, welfare, parents, |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3538&r=ias |