nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2010‒12‒18
four papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management
  1. Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets By Cheng Wang
  2. Are Married Spouses Insured by their Partners’ Social Insurance? By Olsson, Martin; Skogman Thoursie, Peter
  3. Out-of-Pocket Maximum Rules under a Compulsatory Health Care Insurance Scheme: A Choice between Equality and Equity By Thierry Debrand; Christine Sorasith
  4. Figuring out the impact of hidden savings on optimal unemployment insuranc By Narayana Kocherlakota
  1. By: Cheng Wang
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:2064&r=ias
  2. By: Olsson, Martin (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University); Skogman Thoursie, Peter (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)
    Abstract: We use a Swedish sickness insurance reform to show that among married couples a partner’s benefit level affects spousal labour supply. The spousal elasticity of sick days with respect to the partner’s benefit is estimated to be 0.4, which is about one-fourth of the own labor supply elasticity. It is argued the main part of this effect is an insurance income effect.
    Keywords: Spousal labor supply; spill-over; social insurance programs
    JEL: D10 J12 J22
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2010_0027&r=ias
  3. By: Thierry Debrand (IRDES institut for research and information in health economics); Christine Sorasith (IRDES institut for research and information in health economics)
    Abstract: Using the microsimulation model ARAMMIS, this study attempts to measure the impacts of introducing an out-of-pocket (OOP) maximum threshold, or a safety net threshold, on consumer copayments for health care financed by the abolition of the Long-term Illness Regime (ALD) in France. The analysis is based on a comparison of different safety net threshold rules and their redistributive effects on patients’ OOP payments. We attach particular importance to indicators that bring to light changes in OOP payment levels and measure their impact on the equity of OOP distribution. The first section outlines the French National Health System to provide a better understanding of the stakes involved in reforming the health care reimbursement rules under the Compulsory Health Care Insurance scheme. In the second section, we describe the hypotheses retained, the database and the microsimulation model. The final section presents key findings, measuring the impact of the reform at both individual and system levels.
    Keywords: Microsimulation, Health expenditure, Out-of-pocket payment.
    JEL: I18 H51 D63
    Date: 2010–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irh:wpaper:dt34&r=ias
  4. By: Narayana Kocherlakota
    Date: 2010–12–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000291&r=ias
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