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on Insurance Economics |
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Issue of 2010‒08‒28
five papers chosen by Soumitra K Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management |
| By: | Karas, Alexei (BOFIT); Pyle, William (BOFIT); Schoors, Koen (BOFIT) |
| Abstract: | We explore how the introduction of explicit deposit insurance affects deposit flows into and out of banks of varying risk levels. Using evidence from a natural experiment in Russia, we employ a difference-in-difference estimator to isolate the change in the deposit flows of a newly insured group (households) relative to an uninsured “control” group (firms). This approach improves on earlier studies seeking to identify the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline. We find that the relative sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminished markedly with the introduction of an insurance program covering their deposits. This was not true for firms, however. We then show the finding is not an artifact of the two groups responding differently to a minor banking crisis that arose at roughly the same time. |
| Keywords: | deposit insurance; market discipline |
| JEL: | E65 G21 G28 P34 |
| Date: | 2010–06–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2010_008&r=ias |
| By: | Philip DeCicca (McMaster University) |
| Abstract: | Despite a strong interest in entrepreneurship, economists have devoted little attention to the role of health insurance availability. I investigate the impact of a unique policy experiment—New Jersey’s Individual Health Coverage Plan—on self-employment. Implemented in August 1993, the IHCP included an extensive set of reforms that loosened the historical connection between traditional employment and health insurance by facilitating access to coverage that was not employer-linked. I find evidence that the IHCP increased self-employment among New Jersey residents, relative to various sets of comparison states. Consistent with key policy features, including pure community rating of premiums, I find larger behavioral responses for unmarried, older, and observably less-healthy individuals. |
| Keywords: | Health Insurance, Entrepreneurship, Job Lock |
| JEL: | I18 J32 J62 |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upj:weupjo:10-167&r=ias |
| By: | Hristo S. Sendov; Ying Wang; Ricardas Zitikis |
| Abstract: | The paper is motivated by a problem concerning the monotonicity of insurance premiums with respect to their loading parameter: the larger the parameter, the larger the insurance premium is expected to be. This property, usually called loading monotonicity, is satisfied by premiums that appear in the literature. The increased interest in constructing new insurance premiums has raised a question as to what weight functions would produce loading-monotonic premiums. In this paper we demonstrate a decisive role of log-supermodularity in answering this question. As a consequence, we establish - at a stroke - the loading monotonicity of a number of well-known insurance premiums and offer a host of further weight functions, and consequently of premiums, thus illustrating the power of the herein suggested methodology for constructing loading-monotonic insurance premiums. |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1008.3427&r=ias |
| By: | Dorra Riahi; Louis Lévy-Garboua; Claude Montmarquette |
| Abstract: | We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterized version of the lemons’ model (Akerlof 1970) in the insurance context predicts total crowding out of low-risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to solve this major inefficiency consists of adding a partial insurance contract so as to obtain a self-selection of risks. We test the theoretical predictions of these two well-known models in two experiments. A clean test is obtained by matching the parameters of the two experiments and by controlling for the risk neutrality of insurers and the common risk aversion of their clients by means of the binary lottery procedure. The results reveal a partial crowding out of low risks in the first experiment. Crowding out is not eliminated in the second experiment and it is not even significantly reduced. Finally, instead of the predicted separating equilibrium, we find pooling equilibria. We interpret these results by observing that, in any period, some high risks do not purchase full insurance at lower than fair price and some low risks purchase insurance at a price higher than their induced willingness to pay. These robust findings are inconsistent with expected utility maximization. The observed distortion of probabilities leads to a partial homogenization of perceived risks. <P>Ce travail offre une analyse expérimentale des marchés d’assurance avec anti-sélection. Nous nous intéressons particulièrement aux modèles canoniques d’Akerlof [1970] et de Rothschild et Stiglitz [1976]. Selon Alerlof (1970) l’anti-sélection peut aboutir à une éviction complète des agents les moins risqués. Selon Rothschild et Stiglitz (1976), les contrats de franchise permettent de dépasser cette limite en organisant la sélection des risques : à l’équilibre de marché, les contrats sont spécialisés en fonction des risques individuels. La présente contribution vise à tester ces prédictions théoriques à travers deux expériences de marché d’assurance. Afin de respecter au mieux les hypothèses de base des modèles d’Akerlof et de Rothschild et Stiglitz, nous recourons, dans l’expérimentation, à la technique des loteries binaires. Cette technique génère une neutralité au risque pour les assureurs et une même aversion au risque pour les assurés. Ces expériences sont, à notre connaissance, les premières visant à tester les prédictions des modèles d’assurance avec anti-sélection avec un contrôle des préférences des participants. Les résultats démontrent une éviction partielle des bas risques dans le contexte d’Akerlof (expérience 1). Une éviction qui ne disparaît pas après l’introduction des contrats de franchise (expérience 2). Enfin, à l’opposé de l’équilibre séparateur préconisé par Rothschild et Stiglitz, c’est l’équilibre de pooling qui apparaît (expérience 2). Nous interprétons ces résultats en observant que, dans certaines périodes, certains hauts risques n’achètent pas une assurance complète à un prix inférieur au prix équitable et que certains bas risques achètent une assurance à un prix supérieur à leur volonté induite à payer. Ces résultats robustes sont incompatibles avec la maximisation de l'utilité attendue. La distorsion observée des probabilités conduit à une homogénéisation partielle des risques perçus. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, insurance markets, adverse selection, binary lottery procedure, expected utility , économie expérimentale, marché d’assurance, anti-sélection, loterie binaire |
| JEL: | C91 D82 G22 |
| Date: | 2010–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2010s-34&r=ias |
| By: | Christian E. Weller; Jeffrey Wenger |
| Abstract: | Rising health care costs and declining personal savings rates are nearly synonymous with household medical debt. For some, defined contribution (DC) retirement savings plans provide a ready source of funds to meet these medical debts. We examine whether health status and health insurance coverage predict the likelihood of having a DC loan using data from the Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances from 1989 to 2007. We find that poor health raises the likelihood that a household will borrow from their DC plans, even controlling for other forms of debt, access to credit, and whether households are covered by health insurance. Our estimates of the amount of the DC loan, taking selection effects into account, indicates that DC loan amounts are also influenced by health status; those with poor health borrow more from their DC plans. Apart from health status, once a household decides to borrow from their retirement funds, race and education also influence how much to borrow. We argue that public policy can improve the long-term financial retirement security of households by offering more opportunities to save for medical emergencies, while cautiously maintaining the opportunity to borrow from DC plans.<span> </span><p> </p> |
| Keywords: | Defined contribution retirement savings plans; pension debt; health insurance coverage; health status |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uma:periwp:wp231&r=ias |