nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2009‒08‒22
six papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management

  1. Health Insurance Coverage Estimates for Iowa By Eathington, Liesl
  2. Hurricane Insurance in Florida By Mario Jametti; Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg
  3. Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market By Fernando Álvarez-Parra; Juan M. Sanchez
  4. Policy Evaluation of Public Insurance Institutions from the view points of flow of funds By Manabe Masashi
  5. Optimal Size and Intensity of Job Search Assistance Programs By Evelyn Ribi
  6. Administrative Data from Germanys Statutory Health Insurances for Social, Economic and Medical Research By Günther Heller

  1. By: Eathington, Liesl
    Abstract: This report describes characteristics of the population without health insurance in Iowa, including estimates by age, income level, race and ethnicity, and county of residence.
    JEL: I1 J1 R0
    Date: 2009–08–14
  2. By: Mario Jametti (University of Lugano); Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg (Université de Lausanne)
    Abstract: This paper studies the evolution of hurricane insurance in Florida over the last decades. Hurricanes (and other natural catastrophes) are typically referred to as “uninsurable” risks. The more exposed property owners find it difficult to obtain insurance cover from the private market and/or can do so only at premiums that substantially exceed their expected claims costs. The state of Florida has reacted to the incapacity of the private sector to insure hurricane risks at reasonable premium levels with the creation of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (an insurer of last resort) and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. Their existence has resulted in substantial premium reductions for the Florida property owners. Both institutions have the possibility of spreading the costs of a major hurricane over a (very) large number of policy holders through after the event compulsory assessments. The risk borne by each individual property owner is thus reasonably small, with substantial benefits for consumers as a group. Looking forward the challenge to the policy maker will be to fine-tune the operation (premium structure) of these two institutions so as to increase their political acceptance. To this end it will be necessary to limit the implicit subsidy of the “bad risks” through the “good risks”.
    Keywords: Hurricane, Catastrophe Insurance, Regulation, Market Failure, Florida
    JEL: G22 L51 L33
    Date: 2009
  3. By: Fernando Álvarez-Parra; Juan M. Sanchez
    Abstract: This paper considers the problem of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in a repeated moral hazard framework. Unlike existing literature, unemployed individuals can secretly participate in a hidden labor market. This extension modifies the standard problem in three dimensions. First, it imposes an endogenous lower bound for the lifetime utility that a contract can deliver. Second, it breaks the identity between unemployment payments and consumption. And third, it hardens the encouragement of search effort. The optimal unemployment insurance system in an economy with a hidden labor market is simple, with an initial phase in which payments are relatively flat during unemployment and with no payments for long-term unemployed individuals. This scheme differs substantially from the one prescribed without a hidden labor market and resembles unemployment protection programs in many countries.
    Date: 2009
  4. By: Manabe Masashi (Graduate School of Medicine, Osaka university)
    Abstract: Insurance institutions which are operated by public sector have two characters; one is as redistribution institution, and the other is as financial institution which manage large amount of funds. The fact that public insurance institutions (PuII) invest large amount of funds means that the activity of PuII seriously affects macro economy through flow of funds. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the performance of PuII with the model in which inter-institutional flow of funds matrix is linked to production function. With the investment return, the efficiency of funds management at PuII itself is only evaluated. Whereas, with the effect on GDP calculated from the model which we developed, the efficiency of funds distribution in macro economy can be evaluated. We calculated and compared the effect of PuII and Private insurance institutions (PrII). The main result of this paper is the effect of PuII is smaller than that of PrII through the period of our analysis, however the difference between PuII and PrII is becoming small. Therefore approximating portfolio of PuII to that of PrII is effective in macro economy, with consideration about the implication of managing by public sector.
    Keywords: Flow of funds, Public Insurance, Public pension system
    JEL: G11 G18 H55
    Date: 2009–08
  5. By: Evelyn Ribi
    Abstract: This paper derives the welfare optimal size and intensity of job search assistance programs in a general equilibrium model where the labor market is affected by search frictions. Both instruments have a priori ambiguous fiscal implications: their direct employment stimulating effects broaden the base of the labor income tax and increase revenues, while also incurring direct costs. At optimal levels, the policy instruments trade off the positive effects on the participants against a marginal increase in taxes, which distorts employment decisions and potentially labor market tightness. We find that the higher unemployment insurance benefits, the lower is the optimal program intensity. Further, the introduction of a job search assistance program is more likely to raise welfare if it is highly effective at improving participants' job search skills, direct program costs are low and if the general level of taxation in the economy and thus the labor market participation tax are high.
    Keywords: Job search assistance, optimal size, optimal intensity, unemployment insurance
    JEL: J64 J68
    Date: 2009–08
  6. By: Günther Heller
    Abstract: This article gives a short description of administrative data sources from Germany’s statutory health insurances which are of potential interest for social, economic and medical research. After an introduction, the underlying legal regulations as well as the structure and contents for the most interesting databases are shortly described. Current and future accessibility of this data sources are discussed in the context of legal and data privacy protection issues. Aspects of data validity and completeness are provided for the different data sources. Additionally an up-to-date example from health care research using administrative data is given. Finally potentials and limitations of research using administrative data medical data from Germanys Statutory Health Insurances are put into perspective
    Keywords: Administrative Data, Claims Data, Health Service Research
    Date: 2009

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