nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2009‒04‒25
three papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management

  1. Equity of health care financing in Iran By Hajizadeh, Mohammad; Connelly, Luke B
  2. Exclusivity as Inefficient Insurance By Argenton, C.; Willems, B.R.R.
  3. Asymptotic behavior of the finite-time expected time-integrated negative part of some risk processes By Romain Biard; Stéphane Loisel; Claudio Macci; Noel Veraverbeke

  1. By: Hajizadeh, Mohammad; Connelly, Luke B
    Abstract: This study presents the rst analyses of the equity of health care financing in Iran. Kakwani Progressivity Indices (KPIs) and concentration indices (CIs) are estimated using ten national household expenditure surveys, which were conducted in Iran from 1995/96 to 2004/05. The indices are used to analyze the progressivity of two sources of health care financing: health insurance premium payments and consumer co-payments (and the sum of these), for Iran as a whole, and for rural and urban areas of Iran, separately. The results suggest that health insurance premium payments became more progressive over the study period; however the KPIs for consumer co-payments suggest that these are still mildly regressive or slightly progressive, depending upon whether household income or expenditure data are used to generate the indices. Interestingly, the Urban Inpatient Insurance Scheme (UIIS), which was introduced by the Iranian government in 2000 to extend insurance to uninsured urban dwellers, appears to have had a regressive impact on health care nancing, which is contrary to expectations. This result sounds a cautionary note about the potential for public programs to crowd out private sector, charitable activity, which was prevalent in Iran prior to the introduction of the UIIS.
    Keywords: Equity; Health care nancing; Kakwani progressivity index; Iran.
    JEL: D31 D63 P43 I18
    Date: 2009–03
  2. By: Argenton, C.; Willems, B.R.R. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: It is well established that an incumbent firm may use exclusivity contracts so as to monopolize an industry or deter entry. Such an anticompetitive practice could be tolerated if it were associated with sufficiently large efficiency gains, e.g. insuring buyers against price volatility. In this paper we study the trade-off between positive effects (risk sharing) and negative effects (exclusion) of exclusivity contracts. We revisit the seminal model of Aghion and Bolton (1987) under risk-aversion and show that although exclusivity contracts induce optimal risk-sharing, they can be used not only to deter the entry of a more efficient rival on the product market but also to crowd out financial investors willing to insure the buyer at competitive rates. We further show that in a world without financial investors, purely financial bilateral instruments, such as forward contracts, achieve optimal risk sharing without distorting product market outcomes. Thus, there is no room for an insurance defense of exclusivity contracts.
    Keywords: exclusivity;contracts;monopolization;risk-aversion;risk-sharing;damages
    JEL: D43 D86 K21 L12 L42
    Date: 2009
  3. By: Romain Biard (SAF - EA2429 - Laboratoire de Science Actuarielle et Financière - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I); Stéphane Loisel (SAF - EA2429 - Laboratoire de Science Actuarielle et Financière - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I); Claudio Macci (Dipartimento di Matematica - Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"); Noel Veraverbeke (Center for Statistics - Hasselt University)
    Abstract: In the renewal risk model, we study the asymptotic behavior of the expected time-integrated negative part of the process. This risk measure has been introduced by Loisel (2005). Both heavy-tailed and light-tailed claim amount distributions are investigated. The time horizon may be finite or infinite. We apply the results to an optimal allocation problem with two lines of business of an insurance company. The asymptotic behavior of the two optimal initial reserves are computed.
    Keywords: Ruin theory; heavy-tailed and light-tailed claim size distribution; risk measure; optimal reserve allocation
    Date: 2009–03–31

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