nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2007‒07‒20
two papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management

  1. How Did SCHIP Affect the Insurance Coverage of Immigrant Children? By Thomas Buchmueller; Anthony Lo Sasso; Kathleen Wong
  2. A Mean-Variance Portfolio Analysis of the Demand and Supply of a Potentially Infectious Service By Levy, Amnon

  1. By: Thomas Buchmueller; Anthony Lo Sasso; Kathleen Wong
    Abstract: The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) significantly expanded public insurance eligibility and coverage for children in "working poor" families. Despite this success, it is estimated that over 6 million children who are eligible for public insurance remain uninsured. An important first step for designing strategies to increase enrollment of eligible but uninsured children is to determine how the take-up of public coverage varies within the population. Because of their low rates of insurance coverage and unique enrollment barriers, children of immigrants are an especially important group to consider. We compare the effect of SCHIP eligibility on the insurance coverage of children of foreign-born and native-born parents. In contrast to research on the earlier Medicaid expansions, we find similar take-up rates for the two groups. This suggests that state outreach strategies were not only effective at increasing take-up overall, but were successful in reducing disparities in access to coverage.
    JEL: I1 I18
    Date: 2007–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13261&r=ias
  2. By: Levy, Amnon (University of Wollongong)
    Abstract: A health-risking illegal personal service is transacted when the expected extra satisfaction rate exceeds the ratio of the expected extra cost to the legal service price. Its prevalence decreases with the costs of risk bearing for the providers and clients. Law-enforcement effort lowers (raises) the equilibrium price of the illegal and hazardous service when the ratio of the providers’ and the clients’ degrees of absolute risk aversion is greater (smaller) than the ratio of the law-enforcement elasticities of their cost bearing.
    Keywords: Unsafe service; Health risk; Legal risk; Law enforcement
    JEL: D4 D8 I1 K4
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uow:depec1:wp07-02&r=ias

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