nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2007‒02‒24
eight papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management

  1. The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensations Insurance. By Jonathan Gruber; Alan B. Krueger
  2. Observations on Employment-Based Government Mandates, With Particular Reference to Health Insurance By Alan Krueger
  3. Worker's Compensation Insurance and the Duration of Workplace Injuries. By Alan B. Krueger
  4. Unemployment Insurance Taxes and the Cyclical Properties of Employment and Unemployment. By David Card; Phillip B. Levine
  5. Wage risk and employment risk over the life cycle By Hamish Low; Costas Meghir; Luigi Pistaferri
  6. Russian banks´ private deposit interest rates and market discipline By Peresetsky, A.A.; Karminsky, A.M.; Golovan, S.V.
  7. Reemployment and Earnings Recovery among Older Unemployment Insurance Claimants By Christopher J. O'Leary; Randall W. Eberts
  8. Imperfect Tagging Revisited By Rehn, Eric

  1. By: Jonathan Gruber; Alan B. Krueger
  2. By: Alan Krueger
  3. By: Alan B. Krueger
  4. By: David Card; Phillip B. Levine
  5. By: Hamish Low (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Trinity College, Cambridge); Costas Meghir (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London); Luigi Pistaferri
    Abstract: This paper decomposes the sources of risk to income that individuals face over their lifetimes. We distinguish productivity risk from employment risk and identify the components of each using the Survey of Income and Program Participation and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Estimates of productivity risk contolling for employment risk and for individual labour supply choices are substantially lower than estimates that attribute all wage variation to productivity risk. We use a partial equilibrium life-cycle model of consumption and labour supply to analyse the choices individuals make in the light of these risks and to measure the welfare cost of the different types of risk. Productivity risk induces a considerably greater welfare loss than employment risk primarily because productivity shocks are more persistent. Reflecting this, the welfare value of government programs such as food stamps which partially insure productivity risk is greater than the value of unemployment insurance which provides (partial) insurance against employment risk and no insurance against persistent shocks.
    Keywords: Uncertainty, life-cycle models, unemployment, precautionary savings
    JEL: D91 H31 J64
    Date: 2006–12
  6. By: Peresetsky, A.A. (BOFIT); Karminsky, A.M. (BOFIT); Golovan, S.V. (BOFIT)
    Abstract: This paper examines the extent to which the observed diversity of private deposit interest rates in Russia is explained by bank financial indicators. We also test for whether the introduction of the bank deposit insurance scheme in 2005 affected deposit interest rates. Our results suggest market discipline in the Russian banking system involves Russian depositors demanding higher deposit interest rates from banks with risky financial policies. This discipline seems stronger than in developed countries. Our study suggests also that the risks taken by banks increased after introducing the deposit insurance.
    Keywords: banking; deposit interest rates; moral hazard; deposit insurance; Russia
    JEL: D43 E53 G21 P34
    Date: 2007–02–20
  7. By: Christopher J. O'Leary (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research); Randall W. Eberts (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research)
    Abstract: The rate of involuntary job loss among older workers has increased in recent years. Previous research has found that after job separation older workers take longer to get back in jobs, and experience bigger earnings declines than younger prime age workers. These studies were based on surveys targeted at older and dislocated workers, which rely on retrospective interviews of strategic samples from the general labor force. Previous studies have not explicitly accounted for the availability of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits between jobs. This paper compares the adjustment to involuntary unemployment of older and younger prime age UI claimants, using a census of UI claimants constructed from records maintained for program administration in a large industrialized mid-western state. We compare subsequent labor market success of older UI claimants aged 50 years and over with younger prime working age claimants aged 30 to 49 following a claim for UI benefits during the major labor market contraction in 2001. We find that relative to their younger prime working age counterparts, older UI claimants return to work at lower rates, are less successful at returning to prior earnings levels, and have lower employment rates in the near term after reemployment. However, older workers who do gain reemployment after a UI claim maintain closer attachment to their new employers. The relative advantage for younger prime working age UI claimants in reemployment, earnings recovery, and subsequent employment is greatest in the first year after the claim for benefits. There is also evidence that both older and younger prime working age claimants who get back to work in the very first quarter after a UI claim have higher near term employment rates than those returning to work only one quarter later. Getting back to work quickly was also estimated to benefit older UI claimants by significantly raising the mean earnings recovery. No comparable earnings recovery was estimated for younger prime working age claimants who quickly returned to work.
    Keywords: unemployment insurance, older workers, claimants, reemployment, o'leary
    JEL: J65 J68 H43
    Date: 2007–02
  8. By: Rehn, Eric (Department of Economics, Lund University)
    Abstract: Revisiting Parsons' 1996 article about disability insurance with imperfect tagging in a two type-economy -- individuals are either able or disabled. Here Parsons' analysis is extended in several directions. The model is generalized to allow for different utility functions over work status. The analysis extends to three different cases of a two-type economy. Finally Parsons' model is extended to three types: able, partially disabled and disabled - adapting the model to disability insurances allowing for more than two degrees of disability. The results are consistent with Parsons', but a complete ranking of the consumption allocations cannot be achieved in the general case.
    Keywords: social insurance; imperfect tagging; partial disability
    JEL: H21 H53
    Date: 2007–02–19

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