|
on Insurance Economics |
|
Issue of 2006‒09‒16
six papers chosen by Soumitra K Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management |
| By: | Bradley Herring; Mark V. Pauly |
| Abstract: | Some states have implemented community rating regulations to limit the extent to which premiums in the individual health insurance market can vary with a person�s health status. Community rating and guaranteed issues laws were passed with hopes of increasing access to affordable insurance for people with high-risk health conditions, but there are concerns that these laws led to adverse selection. In some sense, the extent to which these regulations ultimately affected the individual market depends in large part on the degree of risk segmentation in unregulated states. In this paper, we examine the relationship between expected medical expenses, individual insurance premiums, and the likelihood of obtaining individual insurance using data from both the National Health Interview Survey and the Community Tracking Study Household Survey. We test for differences in these relationships between states with both community rating and guaranteed issue and states with no such regulations. While we find that people living in unregulated states with higher expected expense due to chronic health conditions pay modestly higher premiums and are somewhat less likely to obtain coverage, the variation between premiums and risk in unregulated individual insurance markets is far from proportional; there is considerable pooling. In regulated states, we find that there is no effect of having higher expected expense due to chronic health conditions on neither premiums nor coverage. Overall, our results suggest that the effect of regulation is to produce a slight increase in the proportion uninsured, as increases in low risk uninsureds more than offset decreases in high risk uninsureds. Community rating and guaranteed issue regulations produce only small changes in risk pooling because the extent of pooling in the absence of regulation is substantial. |
| JEL: | I11 I18 I19 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12504&r=ias |
| By: | Reimund Schwarze; Gert G. Wagner |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the politico-economic reasons for the refusal of a proposed compulsory flood insurance scheme in Germany. It provides the rationale for such scheme and outlines the basic features of a market-orientated design. The main reasons for the political down-turn of this proposal were the misperceived costs of a state guarantee, legal objections against a compulsory insurance, distributional conflicts between the federal government and the Ger-man states (Länder) on the implied administrative costs, and the well-known charity hazard of ad-hoc disaster relief. The focus on pure market solutions proved to be an ineffective strategy for policy advice in this field. |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp620&r=ias |
| By: | Howard Kunreuther; Mark Pauly |
| Abstract: | This paper explores options for programs to be put in place prior to a disaster to avoid large and often poorly-managed expenditures following a catastrophe and to provide appropriate protection against the risk of those large losses which do occur. The lack of interest in insurance protection and mitigation by property owners and by public sector agencies prior to a disaster often creates major problems following a catastrophic event for victims and the government. Property owners who suffer severe damage may not have the financial resources easily at hand to rebuild their property and hence will demand relief. The government is then likely to respond with costly but poorly targeted disaster assistance. To avoid these large and often uneven ex post expenditures, we consider the option of mandatory comprehensive private disaster insurance with risk based rates. It may be more efficient to have an ex ante public program to ensure coverage of catastrophic losses and to subsidize low income residents who cannot afford coverage rather than the current largely ex post public disaster relief program. |
| JEL: | G22 H23 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12503&r=ias |
| By: | Howard Kunreuther |
| Abstract: | The devastation caused by hurricanes during the 2004 and 2005 seasons has been unprecedented and is forcing the insurance industry to reevaluate the role that it can play in dealing with future natural disasters in the United States. As shown in Table 1 the four hurricanes that hit Florida in the fall of 2004 -- Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne---and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 comprised half of the top 12 disasters with respect to insured losses between 1970 and 2005. On a related note, 18 of the 20 most costly disasters occurred between 1990 and 2005 and 10 occurred in the 21st Century. This context is totally different than the scale of economic loss the country has suffered from natural disasters and other extreme events in the 20th century. The first section of the paper addresses the first question by outlining two principles on which a disaster insurance program should be based. Section 3 then focuses on the second question by analyzing the insurability of a risk and examining the challenges facing the private sector in providing coverage against natural disasters. Section 4 turns to the third question and delineates the opportunities and challenges of a comprehensive disaster insurance program. Section 5 poses a set of open issues that are currently being addressed by a research project on disaster insurance undertaken by the Wharton Risk Center in conjunction with the Insurance Information Institute and Georgia State University. The concluding section summarizes the key issues associated with providing disaster insurance in the 21st century. |
| JEL: | G22 H23 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12449&r=ias |
| By: | Konstantinos Tatsiramos (IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | The empirical literature on unemployment insurance has focused on its direct effect on unemployment duration, while the potential indirect effect on employment stability through a more efficient matching process, as the unemployed can search for a longer period, has attracted much less attention. In the European context this is surprising as reform proposals of the unemployment insurance system aiming at reducing high European unemployment rates should consider both effects. This paper provides evidence on the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment and employment duration in Europe, using individual data from the European Community Household Panel for eight countries. Country specific estimates based on a multivariate discrete proportional hazard model, controlling for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity, suggest that even if receiving benefits has a direct negative effect increasing the duration of unemployment spells, there is also a positive indirect effect of benefits on subsequent employment duration. This indirect effect is pronounced in countries with relatively generous benefit systems, and for recipients who have remained unemployed for at least six months. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, recipients remain employed on average two to four months longer than non-recipients. This represents a ten to twenty per cent increase relative to the average employment duration, compensating for the additional time spent in unemployment. These findings are in line with theories suggesting a matching effect of unemployment insurance. |
| Keywords: | unemployment insurance, unemployment duration, employment stability |
| JEL: | J64 J65 C41 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2280&r=ias |
| By: | Adasme, Osvaldo; Majnoni, Giovanni; Uribe, Myriam |
| Abstract: | This paper documents the link between risk, stability, and access to credit markets in an emerging economy. It presents annual credit loss distributions of Chilean banks for the period 1999-2005, providing the first empirical evidence of the cyclical pattern of expected losses and unexpected losses of bank loan portfolios in emerging countries. The paper provides three main contributions to the debate on bank solvency and access to credit markets. First, it derives nonparametric estimators of expected losses and unexpected losses, free from model error and, in particular, from distributional restrictions. Second, it shows how the distribution of credit losses for portfolios of retail and commercial loans is affected by the lumpiness of bank loans. Finally, it shows that the shape of credit loss distributions helps select appropriate policies to promote broader and sounder access to bank credit for the poor and the unbanked. |
| Keywords: | Banks & Banking Reform,Investment and Investment Climate,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory & Research,Insurance & Risk Mitigation |
| Date: | 2006–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4003&r=ias |