nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2006‒07‒28
three papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management
  1. Deposit insurance design and implementation : policy lessons from research and practice By Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Kane, Edward J.; Laeven, Luc
  2. All-pay Auctions with Budget Constraints and Fair Insurance By Uwe Dulleck; Paul Frijters; Konrad Podczeck
  3. The administrative costs of payment by results By Giorgio Marini; Andrew Street
  1. By: Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Kane, Edward J.; Laeven, Luc
    Abstract: This paper illustrates the trends in deposit insurance adoption. It discusses the cross-country differences in design, and synthesizes the policy messages from cross-country empirical work as well as individual country experiences. The paper develops practical lessons from this work and distills the evidence into a set of principles of good design. Cross-country empirical research and individual-country experience confirm that, for at least the time being, officials in many countries would do well to delay the installation of a deposit insurance system.
    Keywords: Banks & Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management & Restructuring,Insurance & Risk Mitigation,Non Bank Financial Institutions
    Date: 2006–07–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3969&r=ias
  2. By: Uwe Dulleck; Paul Frijters; Konrad Podczeck
    Abstract: We study all-pay auctions with budget-constrained bidders who have access to fair insurance before bidding simultaneously over a prize. We characterize a unique equilibrium for the special cases of two bidders and one prize, show existence and a heuristic for finding an equilibrium in the case of multiple bidders and multiple prizes. We end with an example of non-uniqueness of equilibria for the general case of multiple prizes and multiple players.
    JEL: C72 D72 D42
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vie:viennp:0605&r=ias
  3. By: Giorgio Marini (Centre for Health Economics, University of York); Andrew Street (Centre for Health Economics, University of York)
    Abstract: This report was commissioned by the Department of Health to look into more detail into the administrative costs of Payment by Results (PbR). Costs were estimated to have increased by around £100k-£180k in hospital trusts and from £90k to £190k in Primary Care Trusts. Most of the additional expenditure is due to recruitment of additional staff.
    Date: 2006–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chy:respap:rp17&r=ias
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