nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2005‒10‒04
two papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management

  1. Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market monitoring By Reint Gropp; Jukka Vesala
  2. Insurance policies for monetary policy in the euro area By Keith Küster; Volker Wieland

  1. By: Reint Gropp (European Central Bank, Directorate General Research); Jukka Vesala (Finnish Financial Supervision Authority, Prudential Supervision)
    Abstract: The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks’ liabilities.
    Keywords: Banking, Moral Hazard, Market Monitoring, Deposit Insurance.
    JEL: G21 G28
    Date: 2004–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20040302&r=ias
  2. By: Keith Küster (Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe Universität, Mertonstrasse 17, D-60325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany); Volker Wieland (Professur für Geldtheorie und -politik, Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe Universität, Mertonstrasse 17, D-60325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany)
    Abstract: In this paper, we examine the cost of insurance against model uncertainty for the Euro area considering four alternative reference models, all of which are used for policy-analysis at the ECB. We find that maximal insurance across this model range in terms of a Minimax policy comes at moderate costs in terms of lower expected performance. We extract priors that would rationalize the Minimax policy from a Bayesian perspective. These priors indicate that full insurance is strongly oriented towards the model with highest baseline losses. Furthermore, this policy is not as tolerant towards small perturbations of policy parameters as the Bayesian policy rule. We propose to strike a compromise and use preferences for policy design that allow for intermediate degrees of ambiguity-aversion. These preferences allow the specification of priors but also give extra weight to the worst uncertain outcomes in a given context.
    Keywords: Model uncertainty; robustness; monetary policy rules; minimax; euro area.
    JEL: E52 E58 E61
    Date: 2005–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20050480&r=ias

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