| By: |
Sang-Hyop Lee (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa);
Gerard Russo (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa);
Lawrence H. Nitz (Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii at Manoa);
Abdul Jabbar (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa) |
| Abstract: |
Using data from the Current Population Surveys, we examine the impact of
Hawaii’s mandatory employer-sponsored insurance on health insurance coverage
and employment structure in Hawaii. We find empirical evidence of three
phenomena. First, private employer-sponsored insurance coverage for full-time
workers (more than 20 hours per week) is more prevalent in Hawaii, other
things held constant, than in other states and the U.S. as a whole. Second,
there is avoidance of the employer-mandate in Hawaii by skirting the 20 hour
rule, which changes the both the distribution of employment and the
distribution of employment-based insurance coverage by hours worked. Third,
Hawaii workers who match with part-time jobs without employer-sponsored health
insurance obtain publicly provided health insurance or military coverage with
higher probability than their counterparts elsewhere in the U.S. These results
suggest that employer mandates induce both higher rates of coverage and labor
market sorting. |
| Keywords: |
health insurance, employee sponsored insurance, Hawaii's labor market |
| JEL: |
I18 J32 |
| Date: |
2005 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:200512&r=ias |