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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Okuyama, Yoko (Uppsala University); Murooka, Takeshi (Osaka University); Yamaguchi, Shintaro (University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the child penalty using detailed personnel records that enable decomposition into distinct pay components. Our analysis reveals that the penalty is initially driven by reductions in time-based pay following childbirth. However, job-rank-based pay becomes increasingly significant over time, emerging as the dominant factor by the 15-year mark. These effects are interconnected: reduced working hours lead to lower performance evaluations, which subsequently limit promotion opportunities. Our theoretical model demonstrates that current promotion practices, which reward extended hours at entry-level positions, can generate production ineffciency. This finding suggests that addressing promotion practices could simultaneously reduce gender inequality and improve talent allocation, making a compelling business case for organizational reform. |
| Keywords: | child penalty, promotion, management practice, personnel economics, internal labor markets, gender pay gap, career progression |
| JEL: | J13 J16 J24 J31 M51 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17673 |
| By: | Forth, John (City St George's, University of London); Jones, Melanie K. (Cardiff University) |
| Abstract: | We assess the extent to which the UK disability pay gap is a consequence of the distribution of workers across firms and within-firm disability pay gaps. We do so by applying decomposition methods to newly-linked data which matches high quality information from employer payroll records to Census data on disability. Our findings indicate that the distribution of disabled and non-disabled employees across firms acts to reinforce within-firm disability-related pay inequality in England and Wales. However, both the disability pay gap and unexplained disability pay gap predominately exist within rather than between firms, supporting the introduction of employer disability pay gap reporting in the UK. |
| Keywords: | disability pay gap, wage discrimination, linked employer-employee data |
| JEL: | J31 J71 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17679 |
| By: | Bertheau, Antoine (Norwegian School of Economics); Kudlyak, Marianna (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco); Larsen, Birthe (Copenhagen Business School); Bennedsen, Morten (University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We use a novel large-scale survey of firms, implemented in Denmark in 2021 and linked to administrative data, to study why firms lay off workers instead of cutting wages. Our questions on layoffs, wage cuts, and the link between them provide new insights into firms' strategies for adjusting labor in response to adverse shocks. We find that layoffs are more prevalent than wage cuts, but wage cuts are not rare in firms experiencing revenue reduction and were used by 15% of such firms. Employers are hesitant to cut wages in many instances because they see wage cuts as a poor substitute for layoffs. First, firms report that lowering wages triggers costs through the impact on morale and quits. Comparing these costs with potential savings from wage cuts, most employers in the survey agree that a wage reduction would not have saved jobs. Second, firms report that a crisis is an opportune time for layoffs because of lower opportunity costs of restructuring and because layoffs during a crisis are perceived by workers as more fair. We find that firms that report such opportunistic layoffs are less likely to implement wage cuts. |
| Keywords: | wage rigidity, layoffs |
| JEL: | D22 J30 J63 J23 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17704 |
| By: | Portugal, Pedro (Banco de Portugal); Reis, Hugo (Banco de Portugal); Guimaraes, Paulo (Banco de Portugal); Cardoso, Ana Rute (IAE Barcelona (CSIC)) |
| Abstract: | We employ a regression model with spillover effects to show that the impact of peer quality on wages is quite large. We estimate that a 10 percent increase in peer quality implies a 2.1 percent increase in an individual's wage. In addition, we estimate the external returns to education using a novel identification strategy, which is strictly based on the peer effect channel, netting out the role of homophily and labor market sorting. We show that a one-year increase in the co-workers' education leads to a 0.58 percent increase in wages. We also show that both effects fade smoothly over time. |
| Keywords: | wage distribution, human capital spillovers, external returns to education, peer effects, linked employer-employee data, high-dimensional fixed effects, workplace, job and occupation |
| JEL: | J31 J24 I26 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17690 |
| By: | Buser, Thomas (University of Amsterdam); Sangi, Sahar (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Competitive environments often leave room for "dirty" practices such as sabotage, retaliation, or dishonesty. We use an online experiment to document aggregate levels and individual differences in the willingness to engage in dirty competition and in the willingness to enter competitions where the opponent may play dirty. We then use the experimental data to validate a set of survey questions that capture willingness to engage in dirty competition above general willingness to compete. We elicit these questions in a representative survey panel and show that willingness to engage in dirty competition is a strong predictor of holding a management or supervisory position and of working in the private – versus the public – sector, but also of worse self-esteem, worse social relationships, and increased feelings of guilt and shame. Men, younger people, and lower-educated people are on average more willing to engage in dirty competition. |
| Keywords: | preferences, personaility, career choice |
| JEL: | D91 J24 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17676 |