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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Lawrence Choo; Senran Lin; Liangfo Zhao |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the reaction of workers to employer-sponsored general training that provides skills useful not only in the incumbent employer but also in other firms in the industry. While previous research has focused primarily on workers' responses to wage renegotiation, our work extends this understanding by exploring an additional dimension -- workers' discretionary effort beyond their job duties, which is not verifiable. We conduct a laboratory experiment to observe workers' responses in such an effort to different training intensities. We find that workers generally increase their discretionary effort in response to general training, regardless of whether it is employer-sponsored or mandated. Moreover, the employer's intention behind offering training influences both effort and workers' renegotiation responses. Additionally, when workers can penalize employers, they do so, although higher employer-determined training intensities mitigate this behavior. |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2503.20560 |
| By: | Astghik Mavisakalyan (Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre, Faculty of Business and Law, Curtin University, Australia, and Global Labor Organization); Michael Palmer (Department of Economics, University of Western Australia Business School); Silvia Salazar (r Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre, Faculty of Business and Law, Curtin University, Australia) |
| Abstract: | Self-promotion plays a crucial role in shaping performance evaluations across various domains, yet its effects remain difficult to quantify. This paper examines how strategic self-promotion influences subjective performance assessments in high-stakes, competitive sports environments. We leverage the unique setting of professional surfing, where athletes can engage in nonverbal self-promotion by claiming a wave before receiving their score from a panel of judges. Using data from over 5, 500 waves in the World Surf League, we show that claiming significantly improves judged performance evaluations, increasing wave scores by 0.78–1.08 standard deviations (1.6–2 points on a 10 point scale). Female surfers are far less likely than their male counterparts to engage in claiming, yet they receive comparable rewards when they do. These findings provide evidence on the role of self-promotion as a strategic tool for influencing subjective evaluations of performance, and highlight gender disparities in the adoption of such behaviors, in high-stakes competitive environments. |
| Keywords: | Self-promotion, Performance evaluation, Professional surfing, Gender differences, Instrumental variables |
| JEL: | J24 J16 Z22 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uwa:wpaper:25-04 |
| By: | Naomi Hausman; Oren Rigbi; Sarit Weisburd |
| Abstract: | Student use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in higher education is reshaping learning and redefining the skills of future workers. Using student-course data from a top Israeli university, we examine the impact of generative AI tools on academic performance. Comparisons across more and less AI-compatible courses before and after ChatGPT’s introduction show that AI availability raises grades, especially for lower-performing students, and compresses the grade distribution, eroding the signal value of grades for employers. Evidence suggests gains in AI-specific human capital but possible losses in traditional human capital, highlighting benefits and costs AI may impose on future workforce productivity. |
| Keywords: | generative AI, student achievement, worker productivity, higher education, human capital. |
| JEL: | I23 J24 O33 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11843 |
| By: | Rebecca Dizon-Ross; Ariel D. Zucker |
| Abstract: | Personalizing policies can theoretically increase their effectiveness. However, personalization is difficult when individual types are unobservable and the preferences of policymakers and individuals are not aligned, which could cause individuals to misreport their type. Mechanism design offers a strategy to overcome this issue: offer an “incentive-compatible” menu of policy choices designed to induce participants to select the variant intended for their type. Using a field experiment that personalized incentives for exercise among 6, 800 adults with diabetes and hypertension in urban India, we show that personalizing with an incentive-compatible choice menu substantially improves program performance, increasing the treatment effect of incentives on exercise by 80% without increasing program costs relative to a one-size-fits-all benchmark. Mechanism design achieves similar performance to personalizing with an extensive set of observable variables, but without the high data requirements or the risk that participants might manipulate their observables. |
| JEL: | D82 I12 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33624 |
| By: | Josh Lerner; Markus Lithell; Gordon M. Phillips |
| Abstract: | Impact investors claim to distinguish themselves from traditional venture capital and growth equity investors by also pursuing ESG objectives. Whether they successfully do so in practice is unclear. We use confidential Census Bureau microdata to assess worker outcomes across portfolio companies. Consistent with earlier studies, impact investors are more likely than other private equity firms to fund businesses in economically disadvantaged areas, and the performance of these companies lags behind those held by traditional private investors. We show that postfunding impact-backed firms are more likely to hire minorities, unskilled workers, and individuals with lower historical earnings, perhaps reflecting the higher representation of minorities in top positions. They also allocate wage increases more favorably to minorities and rank-and-file workers than VC-backed firms. Our results are consistent with impact investors and their portfolio companies acting according to non-pecuniary social goals. |
| JEL: | G20 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33611 |
| By: | Fang, Dawei (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Ke, Changxia (School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology); Kubitz, Greg (School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology); Liu, Yang (Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Melbourne); Noe, Thomas (Saıd Business School & Balliol College, University of Oxford); Page, Lionel (School of Economics, University of Queensland) |
| Abstract: | Risk-taking spurred by rank-based contest rewards can have enormous consequences, from breakthrough innovations in research competitions to hedge fund collapses engendered by risky bets aimed at raising league-table rankings. This paper provides a novel theoretical and experimental framework of rank-motivated risk-taking that both allows for complex prize structures and permits participants to make arbitrary mean-preserving changes to their random performance. As predicted by our theory, participants choose positively skewed performance under highly convex prize schedules and negatively skewed performance under concave ones. Convexifying the prize schedule or increasing competition for identical winner prizes induces riskier and more skewed performance. |
| Keywords: | rank incentives; risk taking; skewness; contest structure |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D74 D81 |
| Date: | 2025–05–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0855 |