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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Marcel Boyer; Molivann Panot |
| Abstract: | This paper reports CEO compensation data from the SEC as of December 31, 2022, for all S&P 500 firms, regrouped into 10 industries based on the Bloomberg classification. It presents the breakdown of the corresponding CEO's compensation, showing the proportion of incentive components in total amounts, as well as the variety of approaches used to establish compensation. The relative compensation of CEOs is at the heart of discussions on inequality, and whether a given CEO is worth the pay she/he is getting remains an open question. The CEO pay ratio, measured as the CEO's total compensation relative to the median comprehensive pay of a firm’s employees, is the most frequently quoted number in the popular press. For S&P 500 firms, the largest US companies by capitalization, this ratio reached an average value of 292 in 2022. While many observers focus on the CEO pay ratio, other measures may be more informative and relevant for stakeholders, including employees and shareholders. To show how much employees implicitly “contribute” to their CEO's total pay, we propose alternative ratios, such as the CEO pay per employee and the B-ratio, which measures CEO encompassing pay as a percentage of total payroll, thereby giving the employees’ contribution as a percentage of their respective pay. To assess whether such employees’ contributions are worthwhile, one must determine the value of the CEO for the organization, its workers, and stakeholders. Such value rests on the CEOs' role and the practical impact of their leadership in ensuring the company’s success, sustainability, and job security. The way questions are framed influences perceptions by the firm’s stakeholders, highlighting the need for proper analysis using appropriate metrics. |
| Date: | 2025–12–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2025s-33 |
| By: | A. DiLiberto; L. Giua; F. Schivardi; M. Sideri; G. Sulis |
| Abstract: | We study how managerial practices of school principals affect student performance and aspirations. For 2011 and 2015, we merge administrative data on Italian high school students with the management quality indices of their principals, constructed using the World Management Survey methodology. The frequent principals' turnover over this period allows us to causally interpret school-fixed-effect estimates. We find that management quality positively and substantially impacts standardized math and language tests and student desire to attend college. The comparison to pooled-OLS suggests that fixed effects correct for the downward bias arising from selection of better principals into more difficult schools. |
| Keywords: | management;School principals;Student outcomes |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cns:cnscwp:202518 |
| By: | John M. Barrios; Brian C. Fujiy; Petro Lisowsky; Michael Minnis |
| Abstract: | We examine how differences in financial reporting practices shape firm productivity. Leveraging new audit questions in the U.S. Census Bureau's 2021 Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS), and complementary tax return data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and detailed financial records from Sageworks, we find that (i) variation in reporting quality explains 10-20 percent of intra-industry total factor productivity dispersion, and (ii) evidence of complementarity between the effects of financial audits and management practices driving firm productivity. We then examine the underlying mechanisms. First, audits function as a managerial technology, improving the precision of internal information and raising efficiency, with stronger effects in competitive, low-margin industries and among younger firms. Second, exploiting cross-state variation in tax incentives, we show that audits constrain underreporting and mitigate the downward bias in measured productivity. Together, these results highlight the underrated importance of financial reporting quality driving firm productivity. |
| Keywords: | Management, productivity, accounting, auditing |
| JEL: | D24 G3 L2 M2 M40 O33 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:25-72 |
| By: | Xinyue Li (Harvard University); Armando Miano (University of Naples Federico II, CSEF, and CEPR); Sophia Mo (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how coworkers shape job mobility decisions by influencing workersÕ perceptions of their outside options. Using novel survey data from a representative sample of U.S. wage and salaried workers, we identify two distinct channels through which current and former coworkers affect mobility. First, having more current coworkers with prior experience in an industry enhances both the accuracy of workersÕ wage beliefs and their perceived probability of receiving a job offer from that industry. Second, having more past coworkers currently employed in a sector raises the perceived likelihood of receiving an offer from that sector. At the firm level, personal connections increase the perceived probability of receiving an offer from that specific firm, as shown in a survey experiment eliciting subjective job-offer probabilities. We incorporate these findings into a job choice model featuring coworker-based learning and referral effects. Relative to standard models that assume perfect information about wages and job opportunities, our framework demonstrates that coworker networks facilitate labor reallocation and mitigate the welfare losses associated with information frictions. |
| Keywords: | Job Mobility, Job Search, Coworker Networks, Industries, Survey, Subjective Expectations. |
| JEL: | J01 J62 D91 D83 E71 |
| Date: | 2025–12–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:768 |
| By: | Charness, Gary; Cobo-Reyes, Ramon; Garcia-Couto, Santiago; Meraglia, Simone; Sanchez, Angela |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a field experiment to study whether potential anticipation of gender discrimination affects requested wages. People interested in an advertised position can apply using an online portal. After the initial application, participants are randomly allocated to one of three treatments. In the baseline treatment, applicants are asked to fill in a standardized curriculum vitae template, containing information about the applicant’s first name, surname, age, education, and employment. In a gender-blind treatment, applicants complete a curriculum vitae template in which they can only report their initials, so that information about gender is not transmitted. We also conduct a gender-blind treatment in which applicants receive a message emphasizing that the selection is conducted based on merits. In all treatments, applicants request the hourly wage they wish to receive if hired. We find that female applicants ask for just over half the wage requested by male applicants when the full name is revealed. However, when gender is undisclosed this difference in requests decreases by over 50%. Finally, the reinforcing message (third treatment) causes the gap in requested wages to completely disappear. Our results indicate that female workers request much lower wages when the firm clearly knows the applicant’s gender, but that this lower request is dependent on whether they perceive that one’s gender is known to the hiring firm. |
| Date: | 2025–12–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:tswg9_v1 |