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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Weidmann, Ben; Vecci, Joseph; Said, Farah; Bhalotra, Sonia; Adhvaryu, Achyuta; Nyshadham, Anant; Tamayo, Jorge; Deming, David |
| Abstract: | We introduce and validate a novel approach to identifying good managers. In a preregistered lab experiment, we causally identify managerial contributions by randomly assigning managers to teams and controlling for individual skill. We find that manager contributions are crucial for team success, and that people who self-select into management roles perform worse than randomly assigned managers. Managerial performance is strongly predicted by economic decision-making skill but not by demographic characteristics. Two validation studies support our experimental results. Participants who succeed in the lab receive more real-world promotions and, in a separate study of retail store managers, skill measures strongly predict store sales. A one standard deviation increase in manager quality increases annual per store sales by US$4.1 million (25% increase). Selecting managers on skills rather than demographic characteristics or the desire to lead could substantially improve organizational performance. |
| Keywords: | management; treamwork; skills; measurement; experiment |
| JEL: | M54 J24 C90 C92 |
| Date: | 2026–05–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:137018 |
| By: | Afroza Alam; André Diegmann |
| Abstract: | This paper provides new causal evidence on how patent allowances affect firms and their employees based on quasi-random assignment of patent applications to examiners. Exploiting employer–employee records with newly linked German firm data and web-scraped patent documents, we show that patent-induced shocks reduce firm exit, improve productivity, and increase wages, with rent-sharing elasticities between 0.10 and 0.21. Wage gains are broadly observed across occupational tasks, with high heterogeneity: managers benefit disproportionately in publicly traded firms, whereas broader wage increases accrue to workers in non-traded firms. Our findings highlight the role of institutional features and firm organization in shaping how rents are shared. |
| Keywords: | innovation, firm performance, worker compensation, rent sharing |
| JEL: | O31 O34 J31 D22 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12666 |
| By: | Cass, Leanne; Frattini, Federico Fabio; Saussay, Aurélien; Sato, Misato; Vona, Francesco |
| Abstract: | There is growing evidence that green jobs have higher skill requirements, but whether they offer sufficient wage incentives to encourage workers to acquire those skills remains unclear. We study the green wage premium and its drivers to isolate the average return to green tasks using online job vacancy (OJV) data for EU countries over the period 2018-2023. We develop a transparent LLM-based approach to classify job vacancies as green when they list at least one green task. Green jobs pay a premium of 5.5% relative to comparable postings within the same occupation, and this estimate is little changed when controlling for nonmonetary job attributes making these jobs more attractive. Roughly half of this premium is explained by firm fixed effects, consistent with an important role for firm rents. An Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition shows that the higher skill complexity explains a further one tenth of the premium, leaving a residual return to green tasks of around 2%. The green wage premium is higher outside the manufacturing sector, and for low-carbon roles. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change, Environmental Economics and Policy, Sustainability |
| Date: | 2026–05–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:feemwp:401248 |