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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Andrew Leal |
| Abstract: | Employers are concerned not only with a prospective worker's ability, but also their propensity to avoid shirking. This paper proposes a new experimental framework to study how Principals trade-off measures of ability and prosocial behavior when ranking Agents for independent jobs. Subjects participate in a simulated, incentivized job market. In an initial session, subjects are Workers and generate a database of signals and job results. Managers in subsequent sessions observe the signals of Worker behavior and ability and job details before a rank-and-value task, ranking and reporting a value for each Worker for two distinct jobs. Results highlight Managers' preference for ability over prosocial behavior on average, especially for Managers in STEM fields. There is evidence of homophily: the relative value of prosocial behavior is higher for highly prosocial Managers, compensating for ability or even surpassing it in value. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.27625 |
| By: | Salomons, Anna (Tilburg University); vom Baur, Cäcilia (ifo Institute, University of Munich); Zierahn-Weilage, Ulrich (Utrecht School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Does educational content respond to technological advances, enabling workers to acquire new expertise? We study how digital technology transforms skill acquisition and impacts workers' careers. We construct a novel database of legally binding vocational training curricula in Germany over 5 decades, and link curriculum updates to breakthrough technologies using Natural Language Processing. Technological change spurs curriculum updates, shifting training content toward digital and social skills while reducing routine-intensive task content, predominantly through new skill emergence. Curriculum updates account for two-thirds of deroutinization in vocational skill supply over this period. Using administrative employer-employee data and a stacked DiD design, we show curriculum updates help workers adapt: new-skilled workers earn higher wages, with increases up to 5.5\% for technology-exposed occupations. In contrast, older incumbents experience wage declines, indicating skill obsolescence. Firms increase capital investments when exposed to workers with updated skills, consistent with capital-skill complementarity. These findings highlight within-occupation skill supply adjustments' central role in meeting evolving labor market demands. |
| Keywords: | vocational training, skill obsolescence, skill updating, technological change, educational content |
| JEL: | J23 J24 J31 O33 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18248 |
| By: | Filippo Boeri; Riccardo Crescenzi; Davide Rigo |
| Abstract: | Using administrative firm-level data covering the universe of remote workers in Italy, and leveraging exogenous pre-pandemic variation in firm-specific access to fibre broadband as an instrument, this paper investigates the impact of post-pandemic adoption of work from home (WFH) on firm productivity. We find that WFH had a large negative impact on productivity during the pandemic. However, larger firms and those with prior ICT investments mitigated these losses. In the longer term, the impact of WFH is no longer significant. Yet, we find suggestive evidence that firms employing highly qualified workers experienced productivity gains. |
| Keywords: | work from home, firms, productivity |
| JEL: | D22 J21 J24 L25 O33 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12253 |
| By: | Heywood, John S.; Nießen, Anna |
| Abstract: | Using German survey data, we estimate the determinants of employee quits examining the roles of performance appraisal and performance pay. We show that employees subject to performance appraisals are less likely to quit. Yet, this influence depends upon the financial consequences that flow from the appraisals. If there are no financial consequences or if the consequences are short term such as under piece rates, commissions or bonuses, quits are lower. If there are only long-term consequences such as permanent changes in base pay or promotion, there is no reduction in quits. We explore this difference suggesting that the long-term consequences create rigidity while the procyclical nature of short-run performance pay creates flexibility. |
| Keywords: | Performance Appraisal, Performance Pay, Voluntary Job Quits, German Socio-Economic Panel |
| JEL: | C23 M50 M52 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1687 |
| By: | Masaya Nishihata |
| Abstract: | Superstars often dominate key tasks because of their exceptional abilities, but this concentration of responsibility may unintentionally limit on-the-job learning opportunities for others. Using panel data from Major League Baseball (MLB), this study examines how superstar presence affects teammates' opportunities and career outcomes. To address potential endogeneity in team composition, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in superstar availability caused by injuries. When a superstar is active in the same team-position unit, non-star teammates play significantly less. These short-term reductions in playing time extend to longer horizons: players who begin their careers alongside a superstar who remains active for a full season (i.e., not on the injured list) are about 1.7 times more likely to exit MLB earlier than comparable peers. A key mechanism is reduced skill development -- limited playing opportunities hinder subsequent growth in offensive performance. At the team level, greater dependence on superstars raises immediate productivity but magnifies performance declines after their departure, indicating a trade-off between short-term success and long-term adaptability. Overall, the findings suggest that while concentrating key roles in top performers boosts output in the short run, it can restrict others' development and retention. Similar dynamics may arise in other organizations that rely heavily on a few exceptional individuals. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.07218 |
| By: | Agarwal, Vikas; Gómez, Juan-Pedro; Hosseini, Kasra; Jha, Manish |
| Abstract: | We model firm executives' compensation incentives when ESG metrics are added to their performance-vested contracts. Drawing on multitasking theory, we predict that incentives tied to standard accounting or financial metrics are reduced after introducing ESG metrics to induce executives to reallocate effort toward ESG goals. Empirically, the expected pay-performance sensitivity of standard metrics decreases by about 20% after ESG adoption, especially when ESG metrics are more numerous, less complementary, or less measurable. The tradeoff is associated with improved ESG ratings, consistent with efficient incentive design under multitasking that optimally balances effort across financial and ESG objectives. |
| Keywords: | ESG pay, multitasking, pay-performance sensitivity, dollar delta, incentives, executive compensation, metrics |
| JEL: | J33 M12 M14 G34 G32 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:330666 |