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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Schouwer, Thimo De; Gsottbauer, Elisabeth; Kesternich, Iris; Schumacher, Heiner |
| Abstract: | Work meaning can be an important driver of labor supply. Since, by definition, work meaning is associated with benefits for others, it also has an important fairness dimension. In a theoretical model, we show that workers’ willingness to pay for work meaning can be positive or negative, depending on the relative strength of fairness concerns and meaning preferences. To examine the importance of these behavioral motives for labor supply, we conduct a survey experiment with representative samples from The Netherlands and Germany in which we vary within-subject the benefits that a job creates for others. We find that only a minority of workers are actually willing to sacrifice wage for work meaning. The average willingness to pay for work meaning is positive, but substantially lower than the willingness to pay for job flexibility. There is a strong negative relationship between fairness concerns and willingness to pay for work meaning. Thus, individuals who prioritize fairness are less likely to accept lower wages for meaningful work. |
| Keywords: | work meaning; labor supply; fairness preferences |
| JEL: | C90 M52 |
| Date: | 2025–12–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:129675 |
| By: | Jakob Beuschlein; Jósef Sigurdsson; Horng Chern Wong |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of corporate acquisitions on workers using Swedish administrative data and document substantial, persistent earnings losses following acquisitions. These losses reflect both displacement and wage cuts among stayers from target firms. We find no evidence that increased monopsony power accounts for these wage cuts. Instead, they are concentrated in acquisitions where the acquiring-firm CEO sat on the board of the target prior to the transaction. Such acquisitions increase acquiring-firm profits and CEO pay, without affecting total employment or revenue, consistent with rent redistribution. Overall, acquisitions reduce wages and disrupt employment, with profit gains partly extracted from workers. |
| Keywords: | mergers and acquisitions, wages, layoffs, monopsony, firm performance, managers |
| JEL: | G34 J23 J31 J42 J63 L25 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12162 |
| By: | Gopal, Bhargav; Li, Xiangru; Rawling, Luke |
| Abstract: | While non-compete agreements (NCs) are prevalent, the incentives driving their use and their causal effects on workers remain poorly understood. We develop a model with asymmetric information to show that NCs shift the nature of allocative inefficiency by reducing inefficient quits and increasing inefficient retention, while mitigating the canonical hold-up problem. The model predicts that NCs are more likely to be used in industries with high returns on industry-specific investments, and that signers have longer job tenures, higher wages, and receive more firm-provided investment than similar workers without such agreements. To test these predictions, we use panel data from the NLSY97 and a difference-in-differences research design to estimate the causal impact of signing an NC. We find that NCs raise job tenures by 6% and lead to an immediate wage increase of 10%. Six years after signing, the wage premium falls to 5%. There is also substantial heterogeneity across worker demographics, with non-White, non-college and lower-wage workers experiencing lower wage-growth after signing an NC. While the theory links NCs to firm investment, we find no evidence of increased investment in formal training, suggesting investments prompted by the agreement are likely informal. Our findings caution against blanket bans on NC usage, favoring a more targeted approach focusing on lower-wage workers. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:clefwp:327119 |
| By: | Natee Amornsiripanitch; Paul Gompers; George Hu; Will Levinson; Vladimir Mukharlyamov; Sachin Srivastava |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a non-pecuniary measure of career achievement, seniority. Based on a database of over 150 million resumes, this metric exploits the variation in how long it takes workers to attain job titles. A person’s seniority is defined as the number of years it takes the median individual—within the same industry and firm size category—to achieve that person’s job title. Seniority aligns with standard markers of success—it is positively correlated with both wages and educational attainment. To demonstrate its value as a measure of career progression, we show that individuals with higher seniority levels in the public sector are more likely to transition to higher-paying positions in the private sector. When non-monetary factors influence career choice, evaluating labor market outcomes using non-wage measures, such as seniority, offers significant advantages. |
| JEL: | J0 J01 J3 J30 J32 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34292 |
| By: | Daelen, Anna L. M. |
| Abstract: | This paper provides evidence of costly perseverance in the field. In a setting where consultants select and pursue projects autonomously, I show that perseverance is related with fewer successfully completed projects as well as lower sales and commissions. Using rich firm data on individual job activity, I shed light on the task-specific behavioral mechanisms. Overall, perseverant consultants start fewer projects. In fast markets, the lower number of projects started is the main channel of costly perseverance; in slower markets, costs primarily arise from pursuing projects in a more isolated and uninformed way, as shown by an inefficient allocation of effort between stakeholders. The survey questions driving costly perseverance point to the consultants’ failure to incorporate negative signals and opportunity costs into their effort allocation. Using heterogeneity within and between consultants’ task assignment, I show that perseverance is more costly in exploration tasks as opposed to well-defined tasks characterized by mere exploitation. |
| Keywords: | grit, job performance, productivity, tenacity, motivation |
| JEL: | M51 J24 J63 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc25:325451.2 |