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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Artz, Benjamin (University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh); Siemers, Sarinda (University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh); Li, Tianfang (University of Kentucky) |
| Abstract: | This study explores preferences for work-from-home (WFH) among U.S. wage and salaried workers in the post-COVID era with a focus on gender and managerial heterogeneity. Using data from the Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes collected between April 2023 and January 2024, we analyze how demographic and work-related factors influence WFH preferences. Our findings reveal that women generally express a stronger preference for WFH than men. However, a nuanced picture emerges for female managers, particularly those aged 40 and older, who prefer fewer WFH days compared to non-manager women. Furthermore, we find that higher education, the presence of children, higher incomes, and racial minority groups (specifically Black and Hispanic individuals) are positively associated with a greater desire for WFH. These findings underscore the complex interplay among individual circumstances, the pursuit of work-life balance, leadership approaches, and persistent gender norms within households and workplaces that shape WFH preferences. Understanding these factors is crucial for organizations to design inclusive workplace policies and cultures that benefit both employees and the organization. |
| Keywords: | work from home preferences, remote work, work from home, attitudes toward working from home |
| JEL: | J16 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18089 |
| By: | Garcia-Couto, Santiago; Gomez, Jose Maria Ortiz |
| Abstract: | This paper examines task rotation as a non-monetary incentive to boost workers’ performance. While financial incentives are often effective in enhancing productivity, they may be less feasible in environments such as public administrations, where job security and rigid compensation structures limit their impact. Using a controlled experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of two main treatments and divided into workers and managers. In the baseline treatment, workers received a fixed payment to complete one of two tasks: (i) finding letters or (ii) adding numbers. Managers, who had no assigned tasks, earned their payoff based on the workers' performance. In the Competitive Rotation Treatment (CRT), workers competed for the opportunity to choose their preferred task. The findings show that performance-based task rotation significantly increases productivity and maintains this improvement over time. Additionally, top-performing workers often remained in their tasks, fostering more stable group dynamics. |
| Date: | 2025–09–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:3wjey_v1 |
| By: | Cullen, Julie Berry; Dahl, Gordon B. (University of California, San Diego); De Thorpe, Richard (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the effects of being over- or underqualified for a job using quasi-random assignment of new enlistees to over 130 different jobs in the US Air Force. Being overqualified causes higher attrition, both during technical training and afterward when individuals are working in their assigned jobs. It also results in more behavioral problems, worse performance evaluations, and lower scores on general knowledge tests about the military taken by all workers. On the other hand, overqualification results in better performance relative to others in the same job: job-specific test scores rise both during technical training and while on the job, and these individuals are more likely to be promoted. Combined, these patterns suggest that overqualified individuals are less motivated, but still outperform others in their same job. Underqualification results in a polar opposite set of findings, suggesting these individuals are motivated to put forth more effort, but still struggle to compete when judged relative to others. Consistent with differential incentives, individuals who are overqualified are in jobs which are less valuable in terms of outside earnings potential, while the reverse is true for those who are underqualified. |
| Keywords: | retention, skill acquisition, job mismatch, promotion |
| JEL: | J24 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18098 |
| By: | Schnabel, Claus (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg); Abraham, Martin (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg); Wieser, Luisa (FAU, Erlangen Nuremberg); Niessen, Cornelia (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg); Bergmann, Sara (FAU Erlangen Nuremberg) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the digital gender divide (DGD) in Germany by analyzing gendered patterns of digital technology use in both private and professional contexts, and their consequences for wages. Using data from the GESIS Panel, we construct a Digital Involvement at Work index covering ten technologies to assess both active use and passive exposure. Our results reveal a significant DGD in the workplace: women are consistently less involved with digital technologies at work, even after controlling for education, occupational qualification, and digital affinity. In contrast, private digital use appears more balanced. This suggests that structural constraints—rather than individual preferences—play a key role in shaping the divide. Further, we find that digital involvement is positively associated with individual income, yet it does not close the gender pay gap (GPG). On the contrary, digital involvement yields greater wage returns for men than for women. These findings highlight how gendered patterns of digitalization in the workplace reinforce existing inequalities. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for policy and labor market equity, emphasizing the need for measures that promote equitable digital inclusion. |
| Keywords: | gender, digital involvement, digitalisation, wages, gender pay gap, Germany |
| JEL: | J31 J16 O15 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18097 |
| By: | Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel |
| Abstract: | This paper studies executive pay with fairness concerns: if the CEO's wage falls below a perceived fair share of output, he suffers disutility that is increasing in the discrepancy. Fairness concerns do not always lead to fair wages; instead, the firm threatens the CEO with unfair wages for low output to induce effort. The contract sometimes involves performance-vesting equity: the CEO is paid a constant share of output if it is sufficiently high, and zero otherwise. Even without moral hazard, the contract features pay-for-performance, to address fairness concerns and ensure participation. This rationalizes pay-for-performance even if effort incentives are unnecessary. |
| Keywords: | moral hazard; executive compensation; fairness |
| JEL: | D86 G32 J33 G34 |
| Date: | 2025–09–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:125993 |
| By: | Silliman, Mikko (Aalto University); Willén, Alexander (Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper reconsiders how labor market competition shapes skill development --- integrating the perspectives of both firms and workers. We show that competition serves as a catalyst for learning. It creates outside opportunities which incentivize workers to invest in their own skills, and it imposes innovation pressure that raises the value of training for firms. Using linked Norwegian survey and administrative data together with vignette experiments, we find that workers in more competitive markets accumulate skills faster than workers in concentrated markets—primarily through informal learning—and that these gains are concentrated in higher-order, transferable skills. Firms in competitive environments also invest more in formal training, treating it as a strategic necessity rather than a dispensable cost. Experimental evidence complements these findings by showing that both workers and managers expect greater returns to learning and human capital investments in competitive markets. Together, these results challenge the canonical view of competition as a source of market failure in training and instead highlight its role in facilitating both worker-led and firm-led investments in human capital. |
| Keywords: | human capital, competition, skills |
| JEL: | J24 J31 J42 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18109 |
| By: | Perihan O. Saygin (Department of Applied Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain.); Garrison Pollard (Department of Economics, University of Florida, US.); Thomas Knight (Department of Economics, University of Florida, US.); Mark Rush (Department of Economics, University of Florida, US.) |
| Abstract: | Responses to performance feedback play a critical role in shaping future out comes in educational and professional contexts. This paper examines whether evaluator gender influences the likelihood that individuals contest feedback. Using an experiment conducted in large introductory economics courses, we exploit the random assignment of evaluators with randomly assigned male- or female-sounding names to identify a systematic gender bias: individuals are significantly more likely to contest feedback when it is delivered by an evaluator with a female-sounding name than when similar feedback comes from a male-sounding evaluator. This gender disparity is most pronounced when evaluations are harsh relative to a “fair” assessment, fall short of students’ performance expectations, and are more ambiguous. These findings suggest that women in evaluative positions face disproportionate resistance when delivering negative assessments and have implications for their authority, credibility, and career advancement in both educational and workplace settings. |
| Keywords: | gender, backlash, stereotypes. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea2510 |