|
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Agnieszka Kasperska (Interdisciplinary Centre for Labour Market and Family Dynamics (LabFam), University of Warsaw); Anna Matysiak (Interdisciplinary Centre for Labour Market and Family Dynamics (LabFam), University of Warsaw); Ewa Cukrowska-Torzewska (Interdisciplinary Centre for Labour Market and Family Dynamics (LabFam), University of Warsaw) |
| Abstract: | This study explores how organizational factors influence managerial decision-making regarding the career advancement of employees working from home. Despite a large body of research on the new modes of working, a gap persists concerning the role of the organizational context in shaping these dynamics. In this article, we investigate whether managers’ promotion and pay decisions depend on the employee's use of remote work and whether these decisions are moderated by the presence of the ideal worker norms (i.e. high work devotion and centrality) and family-friendly policies (childcare-related and flexible work options) in their work environments. We use data from a choice experiment, which included over 1, 000 managers from the United Kingdom. The experiment was run in the second half of 2022, and therefore, this study provides post-pandemic evidence and represents the “new normal” settings. The findings indicate that employees who work fully remotely are less likely to be considered for promotion and a salary increase than on-site workers. This pattern is observed particularly in firms with more demanding organizational cultures, namely those with stronger ideal worker norms and/or fewer family-friendly policies. Importantly, both male and female remote workers experience career penalties, albeit in distinct ways, as both ideal worker norms and family-friendly policies appear important for men, whereas for women, it is primarily the availability of supportive policies that influences outcomes. The findings underscore the significant impact of organizational culture on managerial decision-making, with implications for both theory and practice. |
| Keywords: | experiment, gender, promotion, organizational culture, work from home |
| JEL: | J12 J13 J16 J21 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2025-17 |
| By: | Ellora Derenoncourt; François Gerard; Lorenzo Lagos; Claire Montialoux |
| Abstract: | We study the role of union heterogeneity in shaping wages and inequality among unionized workers. Using linked employer-employee data from Brazil and job moves across multi-firm unions, we estimate over 4, 800 union-specific pay premia. Unions explain 3–4% of earnings variation. While unions raise wages on average, the standard deviation in union effects is large (6–7%). Validating our approach, wages fall in markets with higher vs. lower union premia following a nationwide right-to-work law. Linking premia to detailed data on union attributes, we find that unions with strike activity, collective bargaining agreements, internal competition, and skilled leaders secure higher wages. High-premium unions compress wage gaps by education while the average union exacerbates them. Post right-to-work, however, worker support for high-premium unions falls when between-group bargaining differentials are large. Our findings show that unions are not a monolith—their structure and actions shape their wage effects and, consequently, worker support. |
| JEL: | J31 J51 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34139 |
| By: | Guido Friebel; Matthias Heinz; Mitchell Hoffman; Tobias Kretschmer; Nick Zubanov |
| Abstract: | In a large German bakery chain, many workers report negative perceptions of monitoring via checklists. We survey workers and managers about the value and time costs to all in-store checklists, leading the firm to randomly remove two of the most perceivedly time-consuming and low-value checklists in half of stores. Sales increase and store manager attrition substantially decreases, and this occurs without a rise in measurable workplace problems. Before random assignment, regional managers predict whether the treatment would be effective for each store they oversee. Ex post, beneficial effects of checklist removal are fully concentrated in stores where regional managers predict the treatment will be effective, reflecting substantial heterogeneity in returns that is well-understood by these upper managers. Effects of checklist removal do not appear to come from workers having more time for production, but rather coincide with improvements in employee trust and commitment. Following the RCT, the firm implemented firmwide reductions in monitoring, eliminating a checklist regarded as demeaning, but keeping a checklist that helps coordinate production. |
| JEL: | M50 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34122 |
| By: | Thimo De Schouwer; Elisabeth Gsottbauer; Iris Kesternich; Heiner Schumacher |
| Abstract: | Work meaning can be an important driver of labor supply. Since, by definition, work meaning is associated with benefits for others, it also has an important fairness dimension. In a theoretical model, we show that workers’ willingness to pay for work meaning can be positive or negative, depending on the relative strength of fairness concerns and meaning preferences. To examine the importance of these behavioral motives for labor supply, we conduct a survey experiment with representative samples from the Netherlands and Germany in which we vary within-subject the benefits that a job creates for others. We find that only a minority of workers are actually willing to sacrifice wage for work meaning. The average willingness to pay for work meaning is positive, but substantially lower than the willingness to pay for job flexibility. There is a strong negative relationship between fairness concerns and willingness to pay for work meaning. Thus, individuals who prioritize fairness are less likely to accept lower wages for meaningful work. |
| Keywords: | work meaning, labor supply, fairness preferences |
| JEL: | C83 C90 M52 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12068 |
| By: | Michael Ewens; Xavier Giroud |
| Abstract: | We introduce a novel measure of corporate hierarchies for over 2, 500 U.S. public firms. This measure is obtained from online resumes of 16 million employees and a network estimation technique that allows us to identify hierarchical layers. Equipped with this measure, we document several facts about corporate hierarchies. Firms have on average ten hierarchical layers and a pyramidal organizational structure. More hierarchical firms have a more educated workforce, higher internal promotion rates, and longer employee tenure. Their operating performance is higher, but they face higher administrative costs. They are more active acquirers and produce more patents, but not higher-quality patents. They exhibit lower stock return volatility and more stable cash flows. We also examine how companies adjust their hierarchies in response to demand and knowledge shocks. We find that biotech companies increased their number of layers following the Covid-19 pandemic, while companies flattened their hierarchies following the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of existing models of corporate hierarchies. |
| JEL: | D21 D23 G3 J24 L22 M12 M51 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34162 |
| By: | Katharina Lewellen; Gordon M. Phillips; Giorgo Sertsios |
| Abstract: | We provide a comprehensive analysis of the governance structures of nonprofit hospitals and hospital systems. We study both the internal governance mechanisms (boards of directors, incentive contracts) and external mechanisms (market for corporate control, government oversight), with particular focus on the latter. Nonprofit boards are unusually large, include employee directors, exhibit less industry expertise among outside directors, and face weak external oversight. CEO pay and turnover are largely unresponsive to non-financial metrics such as quality or charity provision. The disciplinary role of the market for corporate control is also weaker in the nonprofit sector: nonprofits with poor financial performance are half as likely to be acquired or closed as for-profits, and weak performance on non-financial metrics has no effect on acquisitions or closures. Using time-series and cross-sectional variation in state oversight of nonprofits, we find that oversight strength explains a substantial portion of the gap in takeover rates between for-profits and nonprofits. We conclude that nonprofit governance structures lack the attributes traditionally associated with “good governance.” |
| JEL: | G3 G30 G31 G34 G38 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34132 |
| By: | Muñoz, Pablo; Otero, Cristóbal |
| Abstract: | We study whether the quality of managers can affect public service provision in the context of public health. Using novel data from public hospitals in Chile, we show how the introduction of a competitive recruitment system and better pay for public hospital CEOs reduced hospital mortality by 8%. The effect is not explained by a change in patient composition. We find that the policy changed the pool of CEOs by displacing doctors with no management training in favor of CEOs who had studied management. Productivity improvements were driven by hospitals that recruited higher quality CEOs. |
| Date: | 2025–04–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajt:wcinch:83337 |
| By: | Benjamin G. Hyman; Benjamin Lahey; Karen Ni; Laura Pilossoph |
| Abstract: | We document the extent to which workers in AI-exposed occupations can successfully retrain for AI-intensive work. We assemble a new workforce development dataset spanning over 1.6 million job training participation spells from all US Workforce Investment and Opportunity Act programs from 2012–2023 linked with occupational measures of AI exposure. Using earnings records observed before and after training, we compare high AI exposure trainees to a matched sample of similar workers who only received job search assistance. We find that AI-exposed workers have high earnings returns from training that are only 25% lower than the returns for low AI exposure workers. However, training participants who target AI-intensive occupations face a penalty for doing so, with 29% lower returns than AI-exposed workers pursuing more general training. We estimate that between 25% to 40% of occupations are “AI retrainable” as measured by its workers receiving higher pay for moving to more AI-intensive occupations—a large magnitude given the relatively low-income sample of displaced workers. Positive earnings returns in all groups are driven by the most recent years when labor markets were tightest, suggesting training programs may have stronger signal value when firms reach deeper into the skill market. |
| JEL: | E0 E2 J6 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34174 |
| By: | Georgy Lukyanov; Konstantin Popov; Shubh Lashkery |
| Abstract: | We analyze a dynamic labor market in which a worker with career concerns chooses each period between (i) self-employment that makes output publicly observable and (ii) employment at a firm that pays a flat wage but keeps individual performance hidden from outside observers. Output is binary and the worker is risk averse. The worker values future opportunities through a reputation for talent; firms may be benchmark (myopic) (ignoring the informational content of an application) or equilibrium (updating beliefs from the very act of applying). Three forces shape equilibrium: an insurance - information trade-off, selection by reputation, and inference from application decisions. We show that (i) an absorbing employment region exists in which low-reputation workers strictly prefer the firm's insurance and optimally cease producing public information; (ii) sufficiently strong reputation triggers self-employment in order to generate public signals and preserve future outside options; and (iii) with equilibrium firms, application choices act as signals that shift hiring thresholds and wages even when in-firm performance remains opaque. Comparative statics deliver sharp, testable predictions for the prevalence of self-employment, the cyclicality of switching, and wage dynamics across markets with different degrees of performance transparency. The framework links classic career-concerns models to contemporary environments in which some tasks generate portable, public histories while firm tasks remain unobserved by the outside market (e.g., open-source contributions, freelancing platforms, or sales roles with standardized public metrics). Our results rationalize recent empirical findings on the value of public performance records and illuminate when opacity inside firms dampens or amplifies reputational incentives. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.01265 |