nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2025–06–16
four papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen


  1. Firm Premia and Match Effects in Pay vs. Amenities By Anders Humlum; Mette Rasmussen; Evan K. Rose
  2. Job Sorting and the Labor Market Effects of a Criminal Record By Randi Hjalmarsson; Matthew J. Lindquist; Louis-Pierre Lepage; Conrad Miller
  3. The Effect of Non-Wage Competition on Corporate Profits By Ioannis Branikas; Briana Chang; Harrison Hong; Nan Li
  4. Remote Work, Employee Mix, and Performance By Cevat Giray Aksoy; Nicholas Bloom; Steven J. Davis; Victoria Marino; Cem Ozguzel

  1. By: Anders Humlum; Mette Rasmussen; Evan K. Rose
    Abstract: This paper develops a new approach to measuring non-wage amenities and com-pensating differentials in the labor market. Using a survey of 20, 000 job movers in Denmark, we elicit workers’ reservation wage to return to their previous jobs. Our sample contains a large, connected network of firms, enabling us to estimate firm-wide premia and match effects in amenity values. Overall, higher-paying firms provide slightly worse non-pay amenities. Although they provide better perks and flexibility, they also come with higher layoff risk, faster work pace, and greater stress. On average, moves to jobs offering 10% higher pay involve a 5% reduction in the value of amenities, with 0.7% attributable to firm-wide tradeoffs and the remainder attributable to match effects in pay and preferences. Using a rich search model, we quantify the role of amenities in labor market inequality while accounting for preference heterogeneity and endogenous mobility. Worse amenities at high-paying firms offset more than half of their wage advantage, and the within-worker variance in pay across firms overstates the variance in utility by 50%.
    JEL: J31 J32
    Date: 2025–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33884
  2. By: Randi Hjalmarsson; Matthew J. Lindquist; Louis-Pierre Lepage; Conrad Miller
    Abstract: We examine the effects of a criminal record on labor market outcomes and the mediating role of job sorting using Swedish register data. Prime-age adults with criminal records earn about 30% less than observably similar adults without records and are concentrated in specific employers and occupations. To estimate the causal effect of a criminal record, we use an event study design that compares outcomes for adults charged with an offense for the first time to matched adults who were suspected of a similar offense but not charged. Acquiring a criminal record reduces months employed by 2% and annual earnings by 5%. These negative effects are: twice as large for more serious or subsequent charges, not driven by job displacement or incapacitation, and not mitigated by automatic record expungement, which typically occurs 5 or 10 years after case disposition. We classify firms by their propensity to hire workers with criminal records, holding suspected offense history fixed. A criminal record reduces employment at firms classified as less likely to hire workers with criminal records, increases employment at other firms, and decreases monthly wages across all firm types. Firm propensity to hire workers with criminal records varies substantially---even within industries---and is linked to firm size and managers' prior exposure to people with records. Leveraging manager moves across small firms, we find that when a firm hires a new manager with greater prior exposure to people with criminal records, it hires more people with records, with no detectable effect on productivity.
    JEL: J30 J6 J71 K42 M51
    Date: 2025–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33865
  3. By: Ioannis Branikas; Briana Chang; Harrison Hong; Nan Li
    Abstract: Most S&P 500 corporations disclose that their profits depend on non-wage competition for worker talent via workplace amenities like work-life balance. We quantify this dependence using a labor market matching model with endogenous amenities. When productive (unproductive) firms provide the amenities demanded by workers at a lower cost, firm quality becomes more (less) dispersed relative to worker quality, which results in higher (lower) firm profits due to competition. This cost advantage is identified with data on wages, worker satisfaction, and firm scale. Calibrating our model to Glassdoor surveys, a 1% increase in workers’ non-pecuniary preferences raises firm profits by 0.6%.
    JEL: G0 G3 G39 J3 J31 J33
    Date: 2025–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33870
  4. By: Cevat Giray Aksoy; Nicholas Bloom; Steven J. Davis; Victoria Marino; Cem Ozguzel
    Abstract: We study the shift to fully remote work at a large call center in Turkey, highlighting three findings. First, fully remote work increased the share of women, including married women, rural and smaller-town residents. By accessing groups with traditionally lower labor-force participation the firm was able to increase its share of graduate employees by 14% without raising wages. Second, workforce productivity rose by 10%, reflecting shorter call durations for remote employees. This was facilitated by a quieter home working environment, avoiding the background noise in the office. Third, fully remote employees with initial in-person training saw higher long-run remote productivity and lower attrition rates. This underscores the advantages of initial in-person onboarding for fully remote employees.
    JEL: J0
    Date: 2025–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33851

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