nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2025–02–17
six papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen


  1. The Gender Pay Gap: Micro Sources and Macro Consequences By Iacopo Morchio; Christian Moser
  2. Better the Devil You Know: Managers’ Networks, Hiring Decisions and Team Performance By Clochard Gwen-Jiro; Carlos Gomez-Gonzalez; Marco Henriques Pereira
  3. Are Male Bosses Bad for Women’s Careers? Evidence from a Multinational Corporation By Moritz Drechsel-Grau; Felix Holub
  4. Employee-Owned Firms and the Careers of Young Workers By Gabriel Burdin; Jose Garcia-Louzao
  5. Diversity and Empowerment in Organizations By Daniel Habermacher; Nicolás Riquelme
  6. Workers' task and employer mobility over the business cycle By Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Summerfield, Fraser; Visschers, Ludo

  1. By: Iacopo Morchio; Christian Moser
    Abstract: Using linked employer-employee data from Brazil, we document a large gender pay gap due to women working at lower-paying employers. To interpret this fact, we develop an equilibrium search model with endogenous firm pay, amenities, and hiring. We provide a constructive proof of identification of all model parameters. The estimated model suggests that amenities are important for both men and women and that compensating differentials explain half of the gender pay gap. Equal-treatment policies partly close gender gaps but are not output- or welfare-improving.
    Keywords: wage inequality, amenities, equilibrium search model, linked employer-employee data, compensating differentials, taste-based discrimination, monopsony power
    JEL: E24 J16 J31 J32
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11617
  2. By: Clochard Gwen-Jiro; Carlos Gomez-Gonzalez; Marco Henriques Pereira
    Abstract: Acquiring skilled workers can be a key comparative advantage for firms. However, this process involves much uncertainty that firms need to navigate. Leveraging managers' social networks can help reduce search frictions, improve match quality, and boost firm performance. In this paper, we investigate the role of managers’ networks on three dimensions of individual and organizational outcomes: hiring, responsibilities, and performance. We do so by leveraging the availability of rich transactional data in professional football (soccer) in Europe. Our data covers both men's and women's football, comprising over 6k coaches, 80k players, and 100k movements between teams. First, we find that managers rely heavily on their networks for hiring decisions, particularly for non-star workers, and network-based recruiting can be done more cheaply than external hiring. Second, managers give their network-hired workers more responsibilities by allowing them more game time, particularly in the first season. Third, we find that increasing the number of network-recruited workers is associated with significantly higher team performance. These patterns hold consistently across both men's and women's football. We discuss the generalizability of our results and implications for managers in other industries.
    Date: 2025–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1275
  3. By: Moritz Drechsel-Grau; Felix Holub
    Abstract: We study whether gender-based favoritism impedes women’s career progression using data from a European multinational corporation. Leveraging manager reassignments, we show that manager gender does not affect gender differences, neither in wage growth nor in promotion rates. Remarkably, this holds across a wide range of countries and departments, i.e., workforces that differ substantially in terms of gender norms, occupations, and gender composition, but are all subject to the same management practices and corporate culture. Analyzing performance and potential ratings, we find that manager gender only matters in low-stakes decisions that do not affect managers’ own career prospects.
    Keywords: gender wage and promotion gap, manager gender, favouritism, performance and potential ratings
    JEL: J30 J16 J71 M14 M51 M54
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11622
  4. By: Gabriel Burdin; Jose Garcia-Louzao
    Abstract: Using detailed administrative data from Spain, we characterize how a first work experience in an employee-owned firm (EOF) versus a conventional firm can affect workers’ careers. We find that workers’ exposure to EOFs at the time of entry reduces daily wages by 8% over the first 15 years in the labor market. The wage penalty appears to be driven by differences in job mobility and wage returns to experience rather than by non-random selection. We show that workers who had their first job in EOFs have a strong attachment to this organizational model and are less likely to experience both voluntary and involuntary job separations over their careers, with quit and layoff rates 8% and 4% lower, respectively. In addition, we quantify lower wage returns to experience in EOFs, although there are no differences in subsequent career progression in terms of promotions. Taken together, the analysis suggests the existence of other job amenities offered by EOFs that may compensate for flatter wage profiles.
    Keywords: employee-owned firms, careers, wages, job mobility
    JEL: J31 J50 J62
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11632
  5. By: Daniel Habermacher (Universidad de Los Andes); Nicolás Riquelme (Universidad de Los Andes)
    Abstract: We study how diversity and participatory decision-making affect organizational performance. Our model involves a manager who can acquire costly information to guide project selection, and a worker responsible for its implementation. We model diversity as heterogeneous beliefs between the organization’s members and participatory decision-making as how much the worker’s perspective influences project choice—related to notions of empowerment and inclusion. Our findings show that higher diversity enhances decision-making and implementation outcomes when the manager can access high-quality information and the worker is sufficiently empowered. When information acquisition is covert, the manager cannot signal her commitment to reducing disagreement, thus eliminating any benefits of increasing diversity. When communication is strategic, the associated credibility loss dilutes the manager’s benefits from acquiring information, but the conflict of interest decreases with information quality. Our results imply that the ‘business case for diversity’ requires complementary organizational processes that foster informational transparency and trust among members.
    Keywords: Diversity, Worker Empowerment, Information Acquisition, Moral Hazard, Firm Performance.
    JEL: D82 D83 L25 M54
    Date: 2025–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:352
  6. By: Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Summerfield, Fraser; Visschers, Ludo
    Abstract: We investigate cyclical changes in workers' task portfolios, highlighting their direction, magnitude, and distribution. Task changes are not only very common but provide information about the skills required across jobs. During recessions, a larger share of employer switches do not involve task changes. When changes occur, they tend to be more substantial. The cyclicality of task changes among employer-to-employer movers contrasts sharply with that of hires from unemployment. We link our findings to the "sullying" and "cleansing" effects of recessions, uncovering a novel cleansing effect associated with employer-to-employer transitions and a sullying effect tied to employer changes through unemployment.
    Keywords: Career Change, Occupational Mobility, Tasks, Business Cycles
    JEL: E32 J24 J62 E24
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:clefwp:310327

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