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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
By: | Eldar Dadon (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O.B. 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel); Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2, Université Jean- Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France. IZA, Bonn, Germany); Ro’i Zultan (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O.B. 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel) |
Abstract: | Working for a firm engaged in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) appeals to potential workers by boosting their self-image and sense of purpose. We propose an additional mechanism: CSR signals a firm’s future treatment of workers. Our model links CSR engagement with a firm’s propensity to support workers during unforeseen times of need. Under this assumption, a potential future need of the worker leads to more firms engaging in CSR and to a higher workers’ willingness to accept lower wages. Our experiment manipulates potential future needs across treatments. While the aggregate analysis does not support our theory, exploratory analysis reveals that male workers respond as predicted, whereas female workers do not. Consistently, in a risky environment, male employers increase their CSR engagement, which raises the acceptance rate among male workers. These results do not hold for female employers and workers. |
Keywords: | CSR, signaling, labor market, experiment |
JEL: | C91 D83 D91 J33 J62 M14 |
Date: | 2024 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2415 |
By: | Laetitia Lepetit (Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Prospective Économique (LAPE), Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Économiques, Université de Limoges); Frank Strobel (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham); Laurent Weill (LaRGE Research Center, Université de Strasbourg) |
Abstract: | This study investigates the relationship between bank risk and employee wage compensation using a comprehensive dataset of U.S. commercial banks spanning 1990 to 2022. Our key finding is that higher bank risk is associated with increased wage compensation. We interpret this pattern such that higher risk necessitates higher compensation to mitigate bankruptcy risk for employees. We additionally find that this positive relationship between bank risk and wage compensation is only observed for small banks, in favorable economic conditions and when bank concentration is low. These findings suggest that greater bargaining power of employees relative to banks increases the possibility for employees to demand higher wages in the presence of high bank risk. We also find that the positive relationship between bank risk and wage compensation only occurs when banks operate in states with higher past bank default risk, in line with the view that experience affects economic beliefs and behavior. |
Keywords: | bank, risk, wage determination. |
JEL: | G21 J31 |
Date: | 2024 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lar:wpaper:2024-09 |
By: | Cornago Bonal, Luis; Raffaelli, Francesco (University of Oxford) |
Abstract: | Do political identities influence workers’ willingness to cooperate at work? Do workers prefer copartisans over outpartisans as colleagues even at the expense of competence? This article introduces a novel theory of how political identities per- meate modern workplaces in knowledge economies, where collaboration and non- cognitive skills are crucial. An original survey experiment conducted in the United Kingdom reveals that workers prefer to avoid working closely with outpartisans and favour collaborating with copartisans. While highly competent workers are gener- ally preferred over less competent ones, their favorability declines significantly if they are outpartisans. A new measure of affective polarization at work, which ex- ploits open-ended survey items, suggests that some individuals perceive partisan and Brexit identities to signal relevant information about non-cognitive skills they highly value in colleagues. More broadly, this article contributes to our under- standing of the challenges to workplace cooperation in knowledge economies with significant levels of affective polarization. |
Date: | 2024–10–07 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:j43tn |
By: | Raquel Carrasco; Ismael Gálvez-Iniesta; Belén Jerez |
Abstract: | The triangular employment relationship between outsourced workers, intermediary employers, and user firms has received limited theoretical attention. This paper seeks to address this gap by focusing on temporary agency work. We develop a two-period labor search model in which firms can create jobs directly or through a temporary work agency (TWA). In both instances, match quality depends on unobservable attributes of workers and job vacancies. The agency acts as a matchmaker, providing flexibility by spreading termination risks across firms and certifying assignment quality through worker screening. However, worker poaching by user firms reduces the returns on the agency’s investments in recruitment and screening. This hold-up problem leads to inefficient assignments, prolonged TWA employment spells, and insufficient job creation. As in the data, TWA employment is more relevant for less skilled workers. We also find that these workers are more likely to be trapped in inefficient assignments. The distortions affecting agency workers are more severe when wages in direct-hire jobs are set through Nash bargaining rather than directed search. Although the hold-up problem in our model can be solved with transfers from poaching clients to the agency, such transfers are illegal in most EU countries. The paper concludes by presenting simulations and using Spanish data to validate the theoretical framework. |
Date: | 2024–10 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2024-09 |
By: | Hampel, Tim |
Abstract: | Mistakes at work can lead to learning and personal development or can massively harm one's professional career. How a mistake affects a professional career often depends on how it is perceived by involved individuals (e.g. supervisors). In the present study we investigate two different types of mistakes at work: mistakes in routine and complex work tasks. In two experiments with 192 alumni of a German university we tested whether mistakes in routine tasks are judged differently than mistakes in complex work tasks. Results revealed that mistakes are judged significantly more negative when occurring in a routine work task compared to a complex work task. The results of our study give rise to a dilemma of mistakes at work where on basis of dual process theories mistakes are more likely to happen in routinized tasks while at the same time these mistakes are judged more negatively. We discuss an intervention to resolve the dilemma and suggest avenues for future research alongside the limitations of our study. |
Keywords: | mistakes at work, errors, failures, attitudes towards mistakes, career development |
JEL: | M |
Date: | 2024 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iubhbm:304403 |
By: | Yulia Evsyukova; Felix Rusche; Wladislaw Mill |
Abstract: | We assess the impact of discrimination on Black individuals’ job networks across the U.S. using a two-stage field experiment with 400+ fictitious LinkedIn profiles. In the first stage, we vary race via AI-generated images only and find that Black profiles’ connection requests are 13 percent less likely to be accepted. Based on users’ CVs, we find widespread discrimination across social groups. In the second stage, we exogenously endow Black and White profiles with the same networks and ask connected users for career advice. We find no evidence of direct discrimination in information provision. However, when taking into account differences in the composition and size of networks, Black profiles receive substantially fewer replies. Our findings suggest that gatekeeping is a key driver of Black-White disparities. |
Keywords: | Discrimination, Job Networks, Labor Markets, Field Experiment |
JEL: | J71 J15 C93 J46 D85 |
Date: | 2023–12 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_482v2 |