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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Bertram, Justus; Ruhnke, Carsten S.; Schöndube, Jens Robert |
| Abstract: | As a new work style remote work has become an increasingly important factor for firms and their employees. Employees potentially benefit from a higher flexibility when working remotely. Firms can make use of this non-financial benefit to increase their attractiveness on the job market and to substitute financial wage payments to the employees. However, working remotely offers chances for the employees to engage in unproductive activities at the cost of productive working time. Hence, firms need to trade off the benefits against the costs in order to decide which degree of remote work is optimal. We use an agency model to examine the optimal degree of remote work and its interaction with the optimal incentive rate. Higher uncertainty in the productive outcome or higher risk aversion of the employee leads to both a lower degree of remote work and a lower incentive rate, while the effect of the employee's productivity on the degree of remote work is ambiguous. If pay-performance sensitivity is sufficiently high, an increase in the employee's productivity leads to a decrease in the degree of remote work, whereas it is the other way around for a low pay-performance sensitivity. In addition, we find that the optimal degree of remote work increases in the employee's preferred degree of remote work. While in the first-best solution the optimal degree of remote work is always higher than the preferred degree, in the second-best solution it can be higher or lower. |
| Keywords: | Remote Work, New Work Style, Agency Theory, Multi-Task Problem |
| JEL: | C02 D82 D83 J21 J22 J24 J33 L23 M51 M52 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-718&r=hrm |
| By: | David Powell (RAND Corporation); Jeffrey B. Wenger (RAND Corporation) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a series of stated preference experiments to determine the willingness of hiring and human resource managers to pay for certain job attributes. A cross section of U.S. hiring managers were given experimental vignettes about an existing employee or potential new hire. They were told that the candidate was indifferent to the job attributes, and they should select the job offer that was best for the firm. Job attributes consisted of measures of paid time off, paid leave, flexible work schedules, telecommuting opportunities, mandated weekends, and shift work. For each vignette we randomly generated a wage offer. Vignettes also randomly assigned a gendered pronoun (he/she) to the job candidate, as well as years-of-experience profile (two, 10, and 35 years). We find that firms are willing to pay a significant wage premium to avoid offering workers flexible work schedules, holding total hours worked fixed. Compared to no flexibility, employers were willing to pay 19% more to avoid workers having the choice between fixed schedules, 33% more to avoid “flexibility within limits†and 62% more to avoid “complete flexibility.†There is some evidence that employers are willing to pay more to avoid offering schedule flexibility within limits to workers who have more years of work experience. However, given the sample size restrictions, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the results are the same for all experience profiles. |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mrr:papers:wp453&r=hrm |
| By: | Rickne, Johanna (Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University); Folke, Olle (Department of Political Science, Uppsala University) |
| Abstract: | We study appreciation of one’s work using nationally representative survey data from Sweden linked with employer–employee data. The level of appreciation from colleagues rises sharply with the share of women in the workplace. This strong pattern holds for women and men workers, as well as for subordinates and managers. More appreciation from colleagues is associated with higher levels of job satisfaction and other indicators of worker well-being. These results demonstrate the benefits of workplace gender diversity and inclusion, and suggest new directions for research on gender inequality in the labor market. |
| Keywords: | gender equality; appreciation at work; diversity; work conditions |
| JEL: | J16 J32 |
| Date: | 2023–11–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sofiwp:2023_005&r=hrm |
| By: | Benson, Alan (University of Minnesota); Lepage, Louis-Pierre (Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University) |
| Abstract: | Using administrative records from a large national US retailer, we find managers learn to discriminate “on the job” as they gain experience hiring workers of different races. First, we find that negative and positive experiences with black hires seed the race of future hires, consistent with managers updating their beliefs about the productivity of worker groups. Second, experiences with black workers have a larger impact on future hiring than those with white workers, consistent with greater updating about their productivity. Third, early negative experiences with black workers yield particularly large and persistent declines in a manager’s subsequent black hiring, consistent with negative perceptions being slow to correct. Our results suggest that managers’ perceptions of worker groups evolve from their individual experiences in a way that systematically disadvantages minorities in the hiring process. |
| Keywords: | labor market discrimination; managers; employer learning; belief formation |
| JEL: | D83 J24 J71 M50 |
| Date: | 2023–04–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sofiwp:2023_010&r=hrm |
| By: | Jonas Radbruch; Amelie Schiprowski |
| Abstract: | Interviewing is a decisive stage of most processes that match candidates to firms and organizations. This paper studies how and why a candidate’s interview outcome depends on the other candidates interviewed by the same evaluator. We use large-scale data from high-stakes admission and hiring processes, where candidates are quasi-randomly assigned to evaluators and time slots. We find that the individual assessment decreases as the quality of other candidates assigned to the same evaluator increases. The influence of the previous candidate stands out, leading to a negative autocorrelation in evaluators’ votes of up to 40% and distorting final admission and hiring decisions. Our findings are in line with a contrast effect model where evaluators form a benchmark through associative recall. We assess potential changes in the design of interview processes to mitigate contrasting against the previous candidate. |
| Keywords: | interviews, hiring, contrast effect, memory |
| JEL: | D91 J20 M51 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10957&r=hrm |
| By: | Rachel Scarfe; Daniel Schaefer; Thomas Sulka |
| Abstract: | We examine who bears the costs of mandated workplace pension programs, exploiting the quasi-experimental rollout of automatic enrollment in the UK. Total compensation (take-home pay plus employer contributions) increases, driven by employer contributions, while the amount of take-home pay decreases. These effects differ by employer size, with take-home pay declining to an extent in the largest firms that we can rule out a pass-through to employees of more than 47%, significantly less than in smaller firms. Our findings provide the first evidence that large employers shift the cost of mandated automatic enrollment onto employees. |
| Keywords: | Employer-sponsored retirement savings; Incentive design; Mandated benefits; Staggered difference-in-differences |
| JEL: | D21 H22 J32 J38 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2024-02&r=hrm |
| By: | Francesca Barigozzi (UNIBO - Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna = University of Bologna); Helmuth Cremer (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | We study how workers' concern for coworkers' ability (CfCA) affects competition in the labor market. Two firms offer nonlinear contracts to a unit mass of prospective workers. Firms may differ in their marginal productivity, while workers are heterogeneous in their ability (high or low) and their taste for being employed by any of the two firms. Workers receive a utility premium when employed by the firm hiring most high-ability workers and suffer a utility loss if hired by its competitor. These premiums/losses are endogenously determined. We characterize contracts and workers' sorting into the two firms under complete and private information on workers' ability. We show that CfCA is detrimental to firms, but it benefits high-ability workers, especially when their ability is observable. In addition, CfCA exacerbates the existing distortion in high-ability workers' sorting into the two firms. |
| Keywords: | Concern for coworkers’ quality, Competition, Screening, Sorting |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04454311&r=hrm |