|
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Carillo-Tudela, Carlos (University of Essex); Kaas, Leo (Universität Frankfurt am Main); Lochner, Benjamin (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; FAU) |
| Abstract: | "Firms and workers predominately match via job postings, networks of personal contacts or the public employment agency, all of which help to ameliorate labor market frictions. In this paper we investigate the extent to which these search channels have differential effects on labor market outcomes. Using novel linked survey-administrative data we document that (i) low-wage firms and low-wage workers are more likely to match via networks or the public agency, while high-wage firms and high-wage workers succeed more often via job postings; (ii) job postings help firms the most in poaching and attracting high-wage workers and help workers the most in climbing the job ladder. To evaluate the implications of these findings for employment, wages and labor market sorting, we structurally estimate an equilibrium job ladder model featuring two-sided heterogeneity, multiple search channels and endogenous recruitment effort. The estimation reveals that networks are the most cost-effective channel, allowing firms to hire quickly, yet attracting workers of lower average ability. Job postings are the most costly channel, facilitate hiring workers of higher ability, and matter most for worker-firm sorting. Although the public employment agency provides the lowest hiring probability, its removal has sizeable consequences, with aggregate employment declining by at least 1.4 percent and rising bottom wage inequality." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) |
| Keywords: | IAB-Open-Access-Publikation ; Integrierte Erwerbsbiografien ; IAB-Stellenerhebung ; IAB-Haushaltspanel |
| JEL: | E24 J23 J31 J63 J64 |
| Date: | 2023–11–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iab:iabdpa:202310&r=hrm |
| By: | David Arnold; Kevin S. Milligan; Terry Moon; Amirhossein Tavakoli |
| Abstract: | This paper connects changes in employer characteristics through job transitions to employee earnings following mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using firm balance sheet data linked to individual earnings data in Canada and a matched difference-in-differences design, we find that after M&As acquirers expand while targets shrink substantially relative to their matched control groups. Additionally, profit margins decrease for both acquirers and targets in the medium run. Furthermore, workers at target firms suffer losses in earnings, and this decline in earnings is entirely driven by workers who move to other firms after an M&A event. We find that workers leaving target firms after M&As move to larger firms with higher wage premiums, but with much worse match qualities on average. Taken together, it appears that job transitions to employers with poor match qualities primarily explain the post-M&A decline in worker earnings in our setting. |
| JEL: | E21 G34 J31 J42 L25 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31866&r=hrm |
| By: | Masanori Hatada (Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the effect of hiring a monitor to observe an agent's behavior in situations where a principal can use subjective measures of his performance. We assume there is a possibility of collusion between the agent and the monitor, i.e., the agent can promise the monitor a monetary payment and get the monitor to make a false report. We derive the optimal contracts in the principal-agent model and the optimal collusion-proof contracts in the principal-monitor-agent model and compare them. The analysis shows that the optimal collusion-proof contracts with the monitor can reduce the agent's rent and burnt money that occur in the optimal contract without the monitor to zero. Furthermore, we also find that, under the optimal collusion-proof contracts, the amount paid to the monitor is never greater than the above payment reductions. Thus, hiring a monitor benefits the principal despite the possibility of collusion, which implies that monitors play vital roles in contracts with subjective evaluations. |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1099&r=hrm |
| By: | Kamei, Kenju; Tabero, Katy |
| Abstract: | Teams are increasingly popular decision-making and work units in firms. This paper uses a novel real effort experiment to show that (a) some teams in the workplace reduce their members’ private benefits to achieve a group optimum in a social dilemma and (b) such endogenous choices by themselves enhance their work productivity (per work time production) – a phenomenon called the “dividend of democracy.” In the experiment, worker subjects are randomly assigned to a team of three, and they then jointly solve a collaborative real effort task under a revenue-sharing rule in their group with two other teams, while each individual worker can privately and independently shirk by playing a Tetris game. Strikingly, teams exhibit significantly higher productivity (per-work-time production) when they can decide whether to reduce the return from shirking by voting than when the policy implementation is randomly decided from above, irrespective of the policy implementation outcome. This means that democratic culture directly affects behavior. On the other hand, the workers under democracy also increase their shirking, presumably due to enhanced fatigue owing to the stronger productivity. Despite this, democracy does not decrease overall production thanks to the enhanced work productivity. |
| Keywords: | workplace democracy, moral hazard, experiment, free riding, teamwork |
| JEL: | C92 D02 D72 H42 |
| Date: | 2023–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:119269&r=hrm |
| By: | Marco Bertoni (University of Padova, IZA and NETSPAR.); Simone Chinetti (University of Naples Federico II.); Roberto Nisticò (University of Naples Federico II, CSEF and IZA.) |
| Abstract: | This study leverages the Italian Jobs Act reform as a natural experiment to examine the impact of reduced employment protection on job insecurity and job mobility. The reform significantly lowered protection for open-ended contract workers in large firms hired after March 7, 2015, and introduced a sharp discontinuity in severance pay at 2-year tenure. Treated employees exhibit increased fear of job loss and higher termination rates. The higher job insecurity prompts workers in low-pay sectors and in low-quality firms to actively pursue job mobility, transitioning towards higher-paying positions. Conversely, workers in high-paying sectors respond by intensifying their efforts to secure their existing jobs. Crucially, all effects disappear for workers above the 2-year tenure threshold, when they become entitled to a 50% higher severance pay. These findings emphasize a complex trade-off behind the design of employment protection systems, as addressing early-stage insecurity with tailored social insurance may counteract upward mobility effects. |
| Keywords: | employment protection; job insecurity; job mobility; on-the-job search. |
| JEL: | J22 J28 J41 J65 |
| Date: | 2023–10–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:684&r=hrm |
| By: | Armita Atrian; Saleh Ghobbeh |
| Abstract: | This study delves into the increasingly pertinent issue of technostress in the workplace and its multifaceted impact on job performance. Technostress, emerging from the rapid integration of technology in professional settings, is identified as a significant stressor affecting employees across various industries. The research primarily focuses on the ways in which technostress influences job performance, both negatively and positively, depending on the context and individual coping mechanisms. Through a blend of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, including surveys and in-depth interviews, the study examines the experiences of employees from diverse sectors. It highlights how technostress manifests in different forms: from anxiety and frustration due to constant connectivity to the pressure of adapting to new technologies. The paper also explores the dual role of technology as both a facilitator and a hindrance in the workplace. Significant findings indicate that technostress adversely impacts job performance, leading to decreased productivity, diminished job satisfaction, and increased turnover intentions. However, the study also uncovers that strategic interventions, such as training programs, supportive leadership, and fostering a positive technological culture, can mitigate these negative effects. These interventions not only help in managing technostress but also in harnessing the potential of technology for enhanced job performance. Furthermore, the research proposes a model outlining the relationship between technostress, coping mechanisms, and job performance. This model serves as a framework for organizations to understand and address the challenges posed by technostress. The study concludes with recommendations for future research, particularly in exploring the long-term effects of technostress and the efficacy of various coping strategies. |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2311.07072&r=hrm |
| By: | Mark A. Andor; Lorenz Goette; Michael K. Price; Anna Schulze Tilling; Lukas Tomberg |
| Abstract: | We compare the behavior and welfare effects of two popular interventions for resource conservation. The first intervention is social comparison reports (SC), which primarily provide consumers with information motivating behavioral change. The second intervention is real-time feedback (RTF), which primarily provides consumers with information facilitating behavioral change. In a field experiment with around 1, 000 participants, we directly observe the interventions’ effects on participants’ behavior. Further, we elicit participants’ willingness to pay for receiving the interventions, both before and after having experienced them for one month. We find that SC leads to a reduction in water use per shower by 9.4%, RTF by 28.8%, and the combination (BOTH) by 35.0%. Our willingness to pay results show that all interventions are highly valued by participants and that willingness to pay for RTF and BOTH is significantly higher than for SC. Furthermore, we find that the valuation of the interventions do not change following one-month experience. Our results suggest that while both interventions improve welfare, providing consumers with information facilitating behavioral change achieves a higher impact and a slightly higher welfare increase than providing consumers with information motivating behavioral change. |
| JEL: | C93 D12 Q25 Q55 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31845&r=hrm |
| By: | Rainer Kotschy; Uwe Sunde; Rainer Franz Kotschy |
| Abstract: | Recent evidence shows substantial heterogeneity in time, risk, and social preferences across and within populations; yet little is known about the dynamics of preference heterogeneity across generations. We apply a novel identification strategy based on dyadic differences in preferences using representative data for 80, 000 individuals from 76 countries. Our results document that, among more recent birth cohorts, preferences are more similar across countries and gender gaps in preferences are smaller within countries. This decline in preference heterogeneity across cohorts relates to country-specific differences in preference endowments, population composition, and socioeconomic conditions during formative years, and points at global cultural convergence. |
| Keywords: | patience, willingness to take risks, trust, prosociality, cohort effects |
| JEL: | D01 J10 J11 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10735&r=hrm |