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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Barigozzi, Francesca (University of Bologna); Parasnis, Jaai (Monash University); Tani, Massimiliano (University of New South Wales) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the role of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in choosing a teaching career using data from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia. We find that the opportunity costs of becoming a teacher vary by gender: women enjoy a small wage premium, whilst males suffer a large wage penalty. We also find that non-monetary aspects and job amenities (such as motivation for the job, job security, and work/family life balance) have a different influence on teaching careers by gender, which can influence the sorting of male and female teachers across government and private schools. Notwithstanding evidence of positive selection into teaching in terms of cognitive ability and motivation for the job, the asymmetries in opportunity costs and non-monetary aspects reveal that introducing differentiated contracts tailored to gender preferences may influence teachers' recruitment by gender. However, we caution that such prospective initiatives need to balance the trade-off between attracting talented and motivated individuals into teaching and promoting gender equality, which arises from the data. |
| Keywords: | teacher, incentives, Australia, decomposition |
| JEL: | I21 J16 J24 J31 M52 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15532&r= |
| By: | Villeneuve, Stéphane; Abi Jaber, Eduardo |
| Abstract: | Can a principal still offer optimal dynamic contracts that are linear in end-of-period outcomes when the agent controls a process that exhibits memory? We provide a positive answer by considering a general Gaussian setting where the output dynamics are not necessarily semi-martingales or Markov processes. We introduce a rich class of principal-agent models that encompasses dynamic agency models with memory. From the mathematical point of view, we develop a methodology to deal with the possible non-Markovianity and non-semimartingality of the control problem, which can no longer be directly solved by means of the usual Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Our main contribution is to show that, for one-dimensional models, this setting always allows for optimal linear contracts in end-of-period observable outcomes with a deterministic optimal level of effort. In higher dimension, we show that linear contracts are still optimal when the effort cost function is radial and we quantify the gap betweenlinear contracts and optimal contracts for more general quadratic costs of efforts. |
| Keywords: | Principal-Agent models; Continuous-time control problems |
| Date: | 2022–09–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:127364&r= |
| By: | Jieun Lee |
| Abstract: | After the outbreak of COVID 19, firms appear to monitor Work From Home (WFH) workers more than ever out of anxiety that workers may shirk at home or implement moral hazard at home. Using the Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes (SWAA, Barrero et al., 2021), the evidence of WFH workers' ex post moral hazard as well as its specific aspects are examined. The results show that the ex post moral hazard among the WFH workers is generally found. Interestingly, however, the moral hazard on specific type of productivity, efficiency, is not detected for the workers at firms with WFH friendly policy for long term. Moreover, the advantages & challenges for the WFH culture report that workers with health or disability issues improve their productivity, whereas certain conditions specific to the WFH environment must be met. |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2209.05684&r= |
| By: | Malte Baader; Simon Gaechter; Kyeongtae Lee; Martin Sefton |
| Abstract: | We experimentally examine how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma affects conditional cooperation. In our first study we conduct online experiments in which subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma games with payoffs systematically varied across games. We find that few second movers are conditionally cooperative (i.e., cooperate if and only if the first mover cooperates) in all eight games. Instead, most second-movers change strategies between games. The rate of conditional cooperation is higher when the own gain from defecting is lower and when the loss imposed on the first mover from defecting is higher. This pattern is consistent with both social preference models and stochastic choice models. To explore which model explains our findings we employ a second study to jointly estimate noise and social preference parameters at the individual level. The majority of our subjects place significantly positive weight on others’ payoffs, supporting the underlying role of social preferences in conditional cooperation. |
| Keywords: | sequential prisoner’s dilemma, conditional cooperation, social preferences |
| JEL: | A13 C91 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9924&r= |