nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2021‒09‒06
seven papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. The Role of the Workplace in Ethnic Wage Differentials By John Forth; Nikolaos Theodoropoulos; Alex Bryson
  2. Treatment and Selection Effects of Formal Workplace Mentorship Programs By Jason Sandvik; Richard Saouma; Nathan Seegert; Christopher T. Stanton
  3. Relative Risk Taking and Social Curiosity By Jeremy Celse; Alexandros Karakostas; Daniel John Zizzo
  4. Risk and the Misallocation of Human Capital By German Cubas; Pedro Silos; Vesa Soini
  5. How Higher Education Prepares Workplace Managers: A New Discipline Wanted By Chiara Tagliaro; Alessandra Migliore
  6. The Financial Channel of Wage Rigidity By Benjamin Schoefer
  7. The impact of remuneration on staff motivation (The case of a bank branch) By Khalfallah, Fatma; Necib, Adel; Saghrouni, Olfa

  1. By: John Forth (Bayes Business School, City, University of London, UK); Nikolaos Theodoropoulos (University of Cyprus); Alex Bryson (University College London, UK)
    Abstract: Using matched employer-employee data for Britain, we examine ethnic wage differentials among full-time employees. We find substantial ethnic segregation across workplaces: around three-fifths of workplaces in Britain employ no ethnic minority workers. However, this workplace segregation does not contribute to the aggregate wage gap between ethnic minorities and white employees. Instead, most of the ethnic wage gap exists between observationally equivalent co-workers. Lower pay satisfaction and higher levels of skill mismatch among ethnic minority workers are consistent with discrimination in wage-setting on the part of employers. The use of job evaluation schemes within the workplace is shown to be associated with a smaller ethnic wage gap.
    Keywords: ethnic wage gap; workplace segregation; skill mismatch; pay satisfaction; job evaluation
    JEL: J16 J31 M52 M54
    Date: 2021–09–01
  2. By: Jason Sandvik; Richard Saouma; Nathan Seegert; Christopher T. Stanton
    Abstract: While formal mentorship programs are ubiquitous, less is known about who gains from receiving mentorship. In this paper, we report the outcome of a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) carried out in a US-based inbound sales call center where one branch of the experiment assigned a random subset of new hires to mentors (Broad-Mentoring), whereas a second branch (Selective-Mentoring) gave new hires the opportunity to opt into a mentoring relationship before assigning a random subset to mentors. In the Broad-Mentoring branch, mentored sales agents outperformed non-mentored agents by over 18% in the first six months on the job. Among agents who opt into the program in the Selective-Mentoring branch, those who received mentorship had negligible performance gains. The differences between the two branches indicates that formal mentorship program treatment effects are largest for workers who would otherwise opt out of these programs. Demographic and personality characteristics are relatively weak predictors of selection into the program, suggesting broad-based programs are likely more effective than alternative targeting rules.
    JEL: J24 L23 L84 M5 M53
    Date: 2021–08
  3. By: Jeremy Celse (School of Management ESSCA); Alexandros Karakostas (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia); Daniel John Zizzo (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia)
    Abstract: We present an experiment providing (a) a horse race among different models combining social preferences and risk preferences, and (b) a test of whether agents are socially curious, that is wanting to know about the risk taking of others and the outcomes of their risk taking. We distinguish outcome driven models (that is, models where agents care about the earning outcomes for themselves and others) from action driven models (that is, models where agents care about one’s risk taking actions relative to the actions of others). We embed outcome and action driven competitive preferences, inequality aversion, conformism, and social loss aversion, within a single general theoretical framework. We find that competitive preferences models best explain investment decisions in our setting, with almost 50% of subjects influenced both by their co-participants’ actions and outcomes. About 90% of subjects seek social information when it is free. When it is costly, 30% of subjects seek social information if the information is instrumental for their own investment decision and about 15% seek social information even if it is not. Competitive preferences can help explain social curiosity.
    Keywords: Risk, curiosity, peer effects, social preferences, competitive preferences, social comparison.
    JEL: C91 D81 D91 G11 G22
    Date: 2021–08–26
  4. By: German Cubas (Department of Economics, University of Houston); Pedro Silos (Department of Economics, Temple University); Vesa Soini (Department of Economics, Hanken School of Economics and Helsinki Graduate School of Economics)
    Abstract: With risk-averse workers and uninsurable earnings shocks, competitive markets allocate too few workers to jobs with high earnings uncertainty. Using an equilibrium Roy model with incomplete markets we show that risky occupations are inefficiently small and hence talent is misallocated. We obtain analytical expressions for the compensation for risk in the labor market, and for the aggregate level of human capital and output. Misallocation is positively related to the correlation between a worker’s abilities in different occupations. Quantitatively we find that market incompleteness can by itself generate permanent output and welfare losses in the order of one percent of GDP.
    Keywords: Misallocation, Human Capital, Occupations, Risk, Incomplete Markets, Frèchet, Roy Model.
    JEL: E21 D91 J31
    Date: 2021–08
  5. By: Chiara Tagliaro; Alessandra Migliore
    Abstract: Nowadays, the professional figure of “workplace manager” is achieving greater relevance due to changes affecting the nature of contemporary ways of working. Managing today’s workplace complexity requires professionals who can satisfy promptly a variety of user needs through an interdisciplinary approach ( World Economic Forum, 2018). Despite the emergent market demand, this profession is relatively young and its job description remains largely undefined in between many fields of knowledge (Appel-Meulenbroek, Clippard, & Pfnür, 2018). We undertook a large investigation of academic classes and professional courses in EU to understand the extent to which structured education programs are supporting the background of the future workplace managers. We compared about 490 academic classes in real estate and 20 professional courses through a desk research, and created a critical framework of the current educational offer. This analysis. Afterwards, data were cross-examined thanks to 10 interviews with workplace professionals. We found that few programs focus on workplace management, therefore educational courses cannot fully meet the market needs, yet. This lack is partially filled with professional courses, but they only consider some aspects of the workplace and miss a fundamental transdisciplinary approach. Consequently, our investigations suggest that education in workplace management should evolve and gain the relevance of an autonomous discipline. This would probably contribute to find a better match between the job market demand and the academic training.
    Keywords: Management; Real Estate Education; Transdisciplinary; Workplace
    JEL: R3
    Date: 2021–01–01
  6. By: Benjamin Schoefer
    Abstract: I propose a financial channel of wage rigidity. In recessions, rather than propping up marginal (new hires’) costs of labor, rigid average wages squeeze cash flows, forcing firms to cut hiring due to financial constraints. Indeed, empirical cash flows and profits would turn acyclical if wages were only moderately more procyclical. I study this channel in a search and matching model with financial constraints and rigid wages among incumbent workers, while new hires’ wages are flexible. Individually, each feature generates no amplification. By contrast, their interaction can account for much of the empirical labor market fluctuations—breaking the neutrality of incumbents’ wages for hiring, and showing that financial amplification of business cycles requires wage rigidity.
    JEL: E2 G3 J01
    Date: 2021–08
  7. By: Khalfallah, Fatma; Necib, Adel; Saghrouni, Olfa
    Abstract: Researchers and managers have created the concept of work motivation to better understand the operation of firms and organizations, as they recognize the need of creating this emotion in order to provide more effort. Managers began to place a greater emphasis on the social climate and the relationship between employees and their workplaces, i.e.the elements that motivate people to be more dedicated to their jobs. They were also interested in the salary practices that will be implemented in the firm in order to boost employee performance. The purpose of this research is to look into the role of salary as a motivator in a finance department. In fact, we conducted a questionnaire study of a sample of employees, concentrating on motivating factors and the value placed on pay (and its components). Pay is the most motivating element, along with other variables such as effective career management, training, recognition by superiors, and better working environment, according to the findings.
    Keywords: Remuneration, Remuneration policy, Remuneration pyramid, Motivation factors and theories
    JEL: M54
    Date: 2021–08–31

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