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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Pedro S. Martins |
| Abstract: | As work changes, firm-provided training may become more relevant. However, there is little causal evidence about the effects of training on firms. This paper studies a large training grants programme in Portugal, supported by the European Social Fund, contrasting firms that received the grants and firms that also applied but were unsuccessful. Combining several rich data sets, we compare many potential outcomes of these firms, while following them over several years both before and after the grant decision. Our difference-in-differences models estimate significant positive effects on take up (training hours and expenditure), with limited deadweight; and that such additional training led to increased sales, value added, employment, productivity, and exports (although not profits). These effects tend to be of at least 5% and, in some cases, 10% or more, and are robust in multiple dimensions. |
| Keywords: | productivity, Programme evaluation, Training subsidies |
| JEL: | J24 H43 M53 |
| Date: | 2021–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaac:23-en&r= |
| By: | Lisa Barrow; Amanda McFarland; Cecilia Elena Rouse |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the effect of performance-based scholarship programs for postsecondary students on student time use and effort and whether these effects are different for students we hypothesize may be more or less responsive to incentives. To do so, we administered a time-use survey as part of a randomized experiment in which community college students in New York City were randomly assigned to be eligible for a performance-based scholarship or to a control group that was only eligible for the standard financial aid. This paper contributes to the literature by attempting to get inside the “black box” of how students respond to a monetary incentive to improve their educational attainment. We find that students eligible for a scholarship devoted more time to educational activities, increased the quality of effort toward and engagement with their studies, and allocated less time to leisure. Additional analyses suggest that students who were plausibly more myopic—place less weight on future benefits—were more responsive to the incentives, but we find no evidence that students who are arguably more time constrained were less responsive to the incentives. |
| Keywords: | higher education; educational investment; time use; incentives; financial aid |
| JEL: | I20 J24 |
| Date: | 2020–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedhwp:92779&r= |
| By: | Malmendier, Ulrike M.; Pezone, Vincenzo; Zheng, Hui |
| Abstract: | Traits and biases of CEOs are known to significantly affect corporate outcomes. However, analyzing individual managers in isolation can result in misattribution. Our analysis focuses on the role of CEO and CFO overconfidence in financing decisions. We show that, when considered jointly, the distorted beliefs of the CFO, rather than the CEO, dominate in generating pecking-order financing distortions. CEO overconfidence still matters indirectly for financing as the CEO's (and not CFO's) type determines investors' assessment of default risk and the resulting financing conditions. Moreover, overconfident CEOs tend to hire overconfident CFOs whenever given the opportunity, generating a multiplier effect. |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14929&r= |
| By: | Zoe B. Cullen; Bobak Pakzad-Hurson |
| Abstract: | The public discourse around pay transparency has focused on the direct effect: how workers seek to rectify newly-disclosed pay inequities through renegotiations. The question of how wage-setting and hiring practices of the firm respond in equilibrium has received less attention. To study these outcomes, we build a model of bargaining under incomplete information and test our predictions in the context of the U.S. private sector. Our model predicts that transparency reduces the individual bargaining power of workers, leading to lower average wages. A key insight is that employers credibly refuse to pay high wages to any one worker to avoid costly renegotiations with others under transparency. In situations where workers do not have individual bargaining power, such as under a collective bargaining agreement or in markets with posted wages, greater transparency has a muted impact on average wages. We test these predictions by evaluating the roll-out of U.S. state legislation protecting the right of workers to inquire about the salaries of their coworkers. Consistent with our prediction, the laws lead wages to decline by approximately 2% overall, but declines are progressively smaller in occupations with higher unionization rates. Our model provides a unified framework to analyze a wide range of transparency policies, and reconciles effects of transparency mandates documented in a variety of countries and contexts. |
| JEL: | C78 D82 D83 J31 M52 |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28903&r= |