nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2021‒04‒12
six papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. Women in the Boardroom: A Bottom-up Approach to the Trickle-down Effect By Anaïs A Périlleux; Ariane Szafarz
  2. Linking performance pressure to employee work engagement: the moderating role of emotional stability By Yasir Mansoor Kundi; Shakir Sardar; Kamal Badar
  3. Work-from-Home Productivity during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from Surveys of Employees and Employers By Morikawa, Masayuki
  4. Loss Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Stochastic Contracts By Ho, Hoa
  5. The impact of financial education of executives on financial practices of medium and large enterprises By Claudia Custodio; Diogo Mendes; Daniel Metzger
  6. Pay Me Later: Savings Constraints and the Demand for Deferred Payments By Lasse Brune; Eric Chyn; Jason T. Kerwin

  1. By: Anaïs A Périlleux; Ariane Szafarz
    Abstract: This paper argues that role modeling can explain the impact of boardroom gender diversity on corporate performance. It theorizes that female workers are boosted by female leadership, gain increased motivation, and achieve greater productivity, thereby making their female directors more effective. We test this bottom-up approach to the trickle-down hypothesis on data hand-collected among local cooperatives providing microcredit in Senegal. All the organizations surveyed are similar and small, which allows us to use a homogenous performance metric. All of them outsource their human resource management to the same third party, which mitigates the risk of endogeneity. The data cover over 100,000 triads composed of: gender dominance on the board, gender of CEO, and gender of credit officer. A better financial performance is achieved when the triad is gender-uniform—be it male or female—confirming the importance of role modeling and suggesting that the performance of female board members depends on the gender composition of the workforce.
    Keywords: Gender; Board; Trickle-Down Effect; CEO; Performance; Leadership
    JEL: M14 J82 M54 J54 O15
    Date: 2021–03–17
  2. By: Yasir Mansoor Kundi (AMU IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Aix-en-Provence - AMU - Aix Marseille Université); Shakir Sardar (AMU IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Aix-en-Provence - AMU - Aix Marseille Université); Kamal Badar (Victoria University of Wellington)
    Abstract: Purpose-The purpose of this paper is to investigate the mediating role of threat and challenge appraisals in the relationship between performance pressure and employees' work engagement, as well as the buffering role of emotional stability, as a personal characteristic, in this process. Design/methodology/approach-Data were collected using a three-wave research design. Hypotheses were examined with a sample of 247 white-collar employees from French organizations. Findings-Performance pressure is appraised as either threat or challenge. Challenge appraisal positively mediated the performance pressure and work engagement relationship, whereas threat appraisal negatively mediated the performance pressure and work engagement relationship. Emotional stability moderated these effects, suggesting performance pressure was appraised as a challenge rather than a threat, which then enhanced employee work engagement. Practical implications-This study has shown that employees with high emotional stability who perceived performance pressure as a challenge achieved stronger employee work engagement. Originality/value-Building on Lazare's theory of stress and Mitchell et al. 's theorization, this research demonstrates mediating and moderating mechanisms driving the role of performance pressure on employee work engagement relationships.
    Keywords: Performance pressure,Threat appraisal,Challenge appraisal,Emotional stability,Work engagement Paper type Research paper
    Date: 2021–02–26
  3. By: Morikawa, Masayuki
    Abstract: Using data from original surveys of employees and employers, this study examines the prevalence, intensity, and productivity of working from home (WFH) practices during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in Japan. The results reveal that the mean WFH productivity relative to working at the usual workplace was about 60–70 percent, and it was lower for employees and firms that started WFH practice only after the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there is a large dispersion of WFH productivity, both by individual and firm characteristics. Highly educated and high-wage employees tended to exhibit a relatively small reduction in WFH productivity. The results obtained from the employee and employer surveys were generally consistent with each other.
    Keywords: COVID-19, productivity, social distancing, working from home
    JEL: D24 I12 J22 J24 M12 M54 R41
    Date: 2021–03
  4. By: Ho, Hoa
    Abstract: I examine whether stochastic contracts benefit the principal in the setting of moral hazard and loss aversion. Incorporating that the agent is expectation-based loss averse and allowing the principal to add noise to performance signals, I find that stochastic contracts reduce the principal's implementation cost in comparison with deterministic contracts. Surprisingly, if performance signals are highly informative about the agent's action, stochastic contracts strictly dominate the optimal deterministic contract for almost any degree of loss aversion. The optimal stochastic contract pays a high wage whenever the principal observes good performance signals, while upon observing bad performance signals it adds a lottery that gives either the high wage or a low wage that serves as a harsh penalty to the agent. In the general case when the agent is both risk and loss averse, I show that if a penalty wage (i.e., a wage level at which the agent feels a substantial disutility) exists, the first best can be approximated closely but not attained. The findings have an important implication for designing contracts for loss-averse agents: the principal should insure the agent against wage uncertainty by employing stochastic contracts that increase the probability of a high wage.
    Keywords: loss aversion; moral hazard; stochastic contracts; reference-dependent preferences
    Date: 2021–03–15
  5. By: Claudia Custodio; Diogo Mendes; Daniel Metzger
    Abstract: This paper studies the impact of a course in finance for executives of medium and large enterprises through a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in Mozambique. Survey data and accounting data provide consistent evidence that managers change firm financial policies in response to finance education. The largest treatment effect is on short-term financial policies related to working capital. Reductions in accounts receivable and inventories generate an increase in cash flows used to finance long-term investments. Those changes also improve the performance of the treated firms. Overall, our results suggest that relatively small and low-cost interventions, such as a standard executive education program in finance, can help firms to mitigate financial constraints and potentially affect economic development.
    JEL: D4 G30 J24 L25 M41 O1
    Date: 2021
  6. By: Lasse Brune; Eric Chyn; Jason T. Kerwin
    Abstract: We study a simple savings scheme that allows workers to defer receipt of part of their wages for three months at zero interest. The scheme significantly increases savings during the deferral period, leading to higher post-disbursement spending on lumpy goods. Two years later, after two additional rounds of the savings scheme, we find that treated workers have made permanent improvements to their homes. The popularity of the scheme implies a lack of good alternative savings options. The results of a follow-up experiment suggest that demand for the scheme is partly due to its ability to address self-control issues.
    JEL: D14 D9 D90 D91 J22 J33 O12 O15
    Date: 2021–03

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