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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Muñoz, Pablo; Prem, Mounu |
| Abstract: | We study whether differences in management can explain variation in productivity and how more effective managers can be recruited in absence of high-powered incentives. To investigate this, we first extend the canonical teacher value-added model to account for school principals, and we document substantial variation in their ability to improve students' learning. Teachers' survey responses and quasi-experimental designs based on changes in school management validate our measure of principal effectiveness. Then, we leverage the timing of adoption of a civil service reform and show that despite having relatively rigid wages, public schools were able to attract more effective managers after increasing the competitiveness and transparency of their personnel selection process. |
| Date: | 2021–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:7zn2b&r=all |
| By: | Chowdhury, Subhasish; Jeon, Joo Young; Kim, Chulyoung; Kim, Sang-Hyun |
| Abstract: | We investigate gender difference in lying behavior when the opportunity to tell lies is repeated. In specific, we distinguish the situations in which such an opportunity can be planned versus when it comes as a surprise. We use data from an existing study (Chowdhury et al., 2021) and show that when the opportunity to tell a lie comes as a surprise, then on the first occasion, males lie more than females. However, when telling lies can be planned, there is no gender difference in telling a lie. When planning is possible, females tell more lies in the first occasion than when it is not. Males do not show such behavior. On the second and final occasion, males lie more than females only when they either could not plan but had an opportunity to lie before or could plan but did not have to tell a lie before. |
| Keywords: | Dishonesty; Lying; Pre-planning; Gender |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D91 J16 |
| Date: | 2021–01–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:105646&r=all |
| By: | Mamadou Gueye (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nicolas Quérou (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Raphaël Soubeyran (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the potential tension between coordination, which may require discriminating among identical workers, and social comparisons, which may intuitively call for small pay differentials, we analyze the design of optimal rewards in an organization with inequality-averse workers whose tasks are complementary. Inequality aversion surprisingly results in higher monetary incentives and may also yield more inequality among agents. We also show that disadvantageous inequality aversion is of first-order importance compared to advantageous inequality aversion, a result that is consistent with existing evidence. Moreover, the distribution of rewards may be non monotonic, with the most inequality-averse agents lying at both ends of the distribution. Our analysis also sheds light on the crucial role of coordination, as most results would be reversed if the principal could costlessly select her most preferred equilibrium outcome. |
| Keywords: | incentives,coordination,principal,agents,social comparisons |
| Date: | 2021–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-03134262&r=all |
| By: | John (Jianqiu) Bai; Erik Brynjolfsson; Wang Jin; Sebastian Steffen; Chi Wan |
| Abstract: | Digital technologies may make some tasks, jobs and firms more resilient to unanticipated shocks. We extract data from over 200 million U.S. job postings to construct an index for firms' resilience to the Covid-19 pandemic by assessing the work-from-home (WFH) feasibility of their labor demand. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that public firms with high pre-pandemic WFH index values had significantly higher sales, net incomes, and stock returns than their peers during the pandemic. Our results indicate that firms with higher digital resilience, as measured through our pre-pandemic WFH index, performed significantly better in general, and in non-essential industries in particular, where WFH feasibility was necessary to continue operation. The ability to use digital technologies to work remotely also mattered more in non-high-tech industries than in high-tech ones. Lastly, we find evidence that firms with lower pre-pandemic WFH feasibility attempted to catch up to their more resilient competitors via greater software investment. This is consistent with a complementarity between digital technologies and WFH practices. Our study's results are robust to a variety of empirical specifications and provide a first look at how WFH practices improved resilience to a major, unanticipated social and economic shock. |
| JEL: | D23 J21 L0 L25 O0 O33 |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28588&r=all |