|
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Oriana Bandiera; Michael Carlos Best; Adnan Qadir Khan; Andrea Prat |
| Abstract: | We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives to a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy. |
| JEL: | D02 D04 D2 D23 D73 H1 H11 H57 H83 M42 M48 M52 O1 O12 O2 O23 O38 O53 P16 |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26733&r=all |
| By: | Christian Thoeni; Bruno Deffains; Romain Espinosa |
| Abstract: | We study the manipulation of preferences over redistribution. Previous work showed that preferences over redistribution are malleable by the experience of success or failure in a preceding real-effort task. We manipulate the information subjects receive about the importance of chance relative to effort in determining success. We investigate the effect of this manipulation on (i) subjects’ redistribution choices affecting third parties, and (ii) preferences for redistributive taxation. Our results show that informing the subjects about the relative importance of chance after the real-effort task does not mitigate the self-serving bias in redistribution choices. Only providing full information |
| Keywords: | Redistribution, Self-serving bias, Debiasing, Experiment |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:20.03&r=all |
| By: | Adrian Hillenbrand (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Tobias Werner; Fabian Winter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | Volunteering is a widespread allocation mechanism at the workplace and emerges naturally in open-source software development, the generation of online knowledge platforms, and to some extent in “agile” work environments. Using a field experiment with 8 treatments and close to 2,800 workers on an online labor market, we study the effect of team size on volunteering at the workplace under incomplete information. In stark contrast to the theoretical predictions, we find no effect of team size on volunteering behavior. With the use of our control treatments, we can show that workers react to free-riding incentives provided by the volunteering setting in general, but do not react strategically to the team size. We show that the result is robust to several further factors. |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_04&r=all |
| By: | Nikolaou, Paraskevi |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to outline human resource management strategies in educational institutions and investigate the implications of the systemic approach. The methodology is the combination of primary and secondary research. Primary research is quantitative and refers to a case study on conflict management in an educational organization between the Director and his subordinates. The method of collecting data was the on-site observation from the position of deputy director, since it is an experiential experience. Secondary research is based on content analysis from different case studies, draws data from modern literature, leads to critical analysis of human resource management strategy theories and examines their effectiveness. Conflict in an educational organization is influenced by both structural and personal factors. According to modern theories of management education, conflicts in an educational organization can be both positive and negative and can positively contribute to activating people for greater effort and efficient operation. This research argues that a comprehensive analysis of the environment and complex systems can contribute to the understanding of contemporary issues. It is based on the principles of systemic theory and suggests the imperative need of knowledge of conflict management by education executives. There are bibliographic gaps in the recording and analysis of case studies, dealing with the management and resolution of conflicts between education staff and subordinates. |
| Keywords: | system approach, human resources management, conflict management, structural and personal factors, effective communication |
| JEL: | I21 M12 |
| Date: | 2018–10–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:98628&r=all |
| By: | Engbom, Niklas; Moser, Christian |
| Abstract: | We study the nature of firm pay dynamics using matched employer-employee data from Sweden, including rich, administrative firm financial data. To this end, we propose and estimate a statistical model that extends the seminal framework by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999a, henceforth AKM) to flexibly account for time-varying firm pay policies. We validate our approach by showing that firm-year pay variation is systematically related to firm financial performance. Subsequently, we apply our methodology to assess the role of firm pay dynamics in accounting for a rise in earnings inequality in Sweden, to investigate the properties of the distribution of within-firm pay differences over time, to measure the degree of firm pay mobility, and to quantify the relative contribution of ex-ante versus ex-post heterogeneity towards firm pay differences over the firm life cycle. We conclude that no more than two thirds of firm pay heterogeneity are permanent, with persistent and transitory fluctuations in firm pay constituting the remainder. |
| Keywords: | Wage Determination, Mobility, Worker and Firm Heterogeneity, Two-Way Fixed Effects Model, AKM, Firm Dynamics, Inequality Trends, Income Risk, Insurance within the Firm |
| JEL: | D22 D31 E24 J31 M13 |
| Date: | 2020–02–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:98477&r=all |
| By: | Kapiki, Soultana, Tania; Tsakiridou, Georgia |
| Abstract: | The aim of the present study is to identify the attitudes of the directors of different types of educational units regarding the practices of Total Quality of Human Resources Management (TQHRM) in Greece. The specific objectives of the survey are the exploration and analysis of the following issues: a) The philosophy applied by each director on the unit they manage and the position of the HR in it; b) the directors’ opinion about the TQHRM Practices; and c) the difference in the approach of these practices between the public and private educational unit directors.The data is collected using a questionnaire that was sent electronically to Greek schools of various levels in 2018 and the number of responses is 70, of which 53% are from the private and 47% from the public sector directors. To process responses and draw conclusions, both one-dimensional and multidimensional analysis were performed. The results of this survey show that the HRM practices followed by the directors do not have a clear orientation. This highlights the need for training those who run an educational institution on TQHRM and the understanding of the importance of Human Resources on achieving the goals of an organization. |
| Keywords: | Total Quality Management (TQM), Human Resources Management (HRM), educational units, strategic procedures, quality processes |
| JEL: | I21 I29 M12 |
| Date: | 2018–10–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:98623&r=all |
| By: | Brice Corgnet (University of Lyon); Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham); Roberto Hernan Gonzalez (University of Burgundy) |
| Abstract: | People are generally assumed to shy away from activities generating stochastic rewards, thus requiring extra compensation for handling any additional risk. In contrast with this view, neuroscience research with animals has shown that stochastic rewards may act as a powerful motivator. Applying these ideas to the study of work addiction in humans, and using a new experimental paradigm, we demonstrate how stochastic rewards may lead people to continue working on a repetitive and effortful task even after monetary compensation becomes saliently negligible. In line with our hypotheses, we show that persistence on the work task is especially pronounced when the entropy of stochastic rewards is high, which is also when the work task generates more stress to participants. We discuss the economic and managerial implications of our findings. |
| Keywords: | Incentives; Work Addiction; Occupational Health; Experiments |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2020-03&r=all |