nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2019‒08‒19
eight papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. Immigrants and Workplace Training: Evidence from Canadian Linked Employer Employee Data By Dostie, Benoit; Javdani, Mohsen
  2. The Impact of High-Performance Work Systems on Employees: A Sectoral Comparison. By Michael White; Alex Bryson
  3. High performance work systems and public sector workplace performance in Britain. By Michael White; Alex Bryson
  4. On Selecting the Right Agent By Geoffroy de Clippel; Kfir Eliaz; Daniel Fershtman; Kareen Rozen
  5. The Consequences of Short-Time Compensation: Evidence from Japan By KATO Takao; KODAMA Naomi
  6. Pay, Employment, and Dynamics of Young Firms By Tania Babina; Wenting Ma; Christian Moser; Paige Ouimet; Rebecca Zarutskie
  7. Confidence and Career Choices: An Experiment By Barron, Kai; Gravert, Christina
  8. Incentive scheme and productivity in microfinance institutions in Benin By ACCLASSATO HOUENSOU, Denis; SENOU, Melain Modeste

  1. By: Dostie, Benoit (HEC Montreal); Javdani, Mohsen (University of British Columbia, Okanagan)
    Abstract: Job training is one of the most important aspects of skill formation and human capital accumulation. In this study we use longitudinal Canadian linked employer-employee data to examine whether white/visible minority immigrants and Canadian-borns experience different opportunities in two well-defined measures of firm-sponsored training: on-the-job training and classroom training. While we find no differences in on-the-job training between different groups, our results suggest that visible minority immigrants are significantly less likely to receive classroom training, and receive fewer and shorter classroom training courses, an experience that is not shared by white immigrants. For male visible minority immigrants, these gaps are entirely driven by their differential sorting into workplaces with less training opportunities. For their female counterparts however, they are mainly driven by differences that emerge within workplaces. We find no evidence that years spent in Canada or education level can appreciably reduce these gaps. Accounting for potential differences in career paths and hierarchical level also fails to explain these differences. We find however that these gaps are only experienced by visible minority immigrants who work in the for-profit sector, with those in the non-profit sector experiencing positive or no gaps in training. Finally, we show that other poor labor market outcomes of visible minority immigrants, including their wages and promotion opportunities, stem in part from these training gaps.
    Keywords: immigrants, wages, firm-sponsored training, linked employer-employee data
    JEL: J24 L22 M53
    Date: 2019–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12511&r=all
  2. By: Michael White (University of Westminster); Alex Bryson (University College London, National Institute of Social and Economic Research and Institute for the Study of Labor)
    Abstract: Using nationally representative linked employer-employee surveys of workplaces with 50 or more employees we find the adoption of High-Performance Work Systems (HPWS) in the private sector is largely positively correlated with employee job attitudes pre-recession. However, high intensity HPWS has partly adverse consequences for private sector employees in the post-recession period. In contrast, there are no indications of public sector employees responding positively or negatively to HPWS and HPWS is not associated with adverse effects post-recession. The sectoral difference in results is interpreted in terms of different employment relationships and different sources of employee motivation.
    Keywords: high performance work systems; public sector; organizational commitment; intrinsic job satisfaction; well-being
    JEL: I31 J45 M5
    Date: 2019–08–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qss:dqsswp:1904&r=all
  3. By: Michael White (University of Westminster); Alex Bryson (University College London, National Institute of Social and Economic Research and Institute for the Study of Labor)
    Abstract: Using nationally representative surveys of workplaces with 50 or more employees we find the adoption of High-Performance Work Systems (HPWS) in the public sector are positively correlated with workplace financial performance and the implementation of workplace organizational change. The associations are stable in 2004 and 2011, despite the intervening recession and cuts in public finance. The results are thus broadly consistent with studies finding similar positive correlations between HPWS and workplace performance in the private sector. There was little heterogeneity in effects across sectors within the public sector, with the exception of health services where the effects of HPWS on workplace change were lower.
    Keywords: high performance work systems; public sector; financial performance; organizational change
    JEL: J45 M5
    Date: 2019–08–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qss:dqsswp:1903&r=all
  4. By: Geoffroy de Clippel; Kfir Eliaz; Daniel Fershtman; Kareen Rozen
    Abstract: Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to some task. Profit is stochastically higher when the agent is qualified for the task. The principal cannot observe qualification. Her only decision is which of the two agents to assign, if any, given the public history of selections and profits. She cannot commit to any rule. While she maximizes expected discounted profits, each agent maximizes his expected discounted selection probabilities. We fully characterize when the principal's first-best payoff is attainable in equilibrium, and identify a simple strategy profile achieving this first-best whenever feasible. We propose a new refinement for dynamic mechanisms (without transfers) where the designer is a player, under which we show the principal's next-best, when the first-best is unachievable, is the one-shot Nash. We show how our analysis extends to variations on the game accommodating more agents, caring about one's own performance, cheap talk and losses.
    Keywords: Dynamic allocation, mechanism design without transfers, mechanism design without commitment
    JEL: D82 D86
    Date: 2019–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_116&r=all
  5. By: KATO Takao; KODAMA Naomi
    Abstract: We apply the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) with difference-in-differences methodology to unique data on STC from Japan, a country known for its extensive use of STC, and find the first rigorous evidence on the positive consequence of STC for firm performance measured by ROA and profit margin. Consistent with the observed positive consequences of STC for firm profitability, we further find that STC leads to sales growth without raising labor costs. We then assess the validity of four possible explanations for the positive consequence of STC on firm performance. Compared to the conventional explanations (preserving firm-specific human capital and avoiding the negative morale effect of layoffs), our additional evidence lends more credence to a behavioral explanation--worksharing which STC promotes can introduce what the psychological literature calls "shared adversity" which facilitates supportive interactions among workers in the firm and strengthens commitment of workers to the firm, and thereby enhances goal alignment between workers and the firm as well as between coworkers, resulting in enhanced firm performance.
    Date: 2019–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:19056&r=all
  6. By: Tania Babina; Wenting Ma; Christian Moser; Paige Ouimet; Rebecca Zarutskie
    Abstract: Why do young firms pay less? Using confidential microdata from the US Census Bureau, we find lower earnings among workers at young firms. However, we argue that such measurement is likely subject to worker and firm selection. Exploiting the two-sided panel nature of the data to control for relevant dimensions of worker and firm heterogeneity, we uncover a positive and significant young-firm pay premium. Furthermore, we show that worker selection at firm birth is related to future firm dynamics, including survival and growth. We tie our empirical findings to a simple model of pay, employment, and dynamics of young firms.
    Keywords: Young-Firm Pay Premium, Selection, Worker and Firm Heterogeneity, Firm Dynamics, Startups
    JEL: J30 J31 D22 E24 M13
    Date: 2019–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:19-23&r=all
  7. By: Barron, Kai (WZB Berlin); Gravert, Christina (University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: Confidence is often seen as the key to success. Empirical evidence about how such beliefs about one\'s abilities causally map into actions is, however, sparse. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the causal effect of an increase in confidence about one\'s own ability on two central choices made by workers in the labor market: choosing between jobs with different incentive schemes, and the subsequent choice of how much effort to exert within the job. An exogenous increase in confidence leads to an increase in subjects\' propensity to choose payment schemes that depend heavily on ability. This is detrimental for low ability workers. Policy implications are discussed.
    Keywords: overconfidence; experiment; beliefs; real-effort; career choices;
    JEL: C91 D03 M50 J24
    Date: 2019–07–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:169&r=all
  8. By: ACCLASSATO HOUENSOU, Denis; SENOU, Melain Modeste
    Abstract: This article aims to analyze the productive effects of financial and non-financial incentive in microfinance institutions in Benin. We estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function augmented by the Incentive Scheme on an unbalanced panel of 14 registered MFIs over the period 2007-2017. The findings of this study show that non-financial incentives positively impact the outreach whereas the financial incentives have a negative effect on outreach. They further suggest that a well-designed incentive scheme is a powerful tool to overcome free riding and other asymmetric information problems in a costly monitoring environment.
    Keywords: Financial incentive, Non-Financial Incentive, Productivity, MFI, Benin
    JEL: D21 O31
    Date: 2019–07–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:95379&r=all

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