nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2019‒07‒15
seven papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. Physician’s altruism in incentive contracts: Medicare’s quality race By Galina Besstremyannaya; Sergei Golovan
  2. Willing to Pay for Security: A Discrete Choice Experiment to Analyse Labour Supply Preferences By Nikhil Datta
  3. CEO-Board Dynamics By John R. Graham; Hyunseob Kim; Mark T. Leary
  4. Pay and Job Rank Amongst Academic Economists in the UK: Is Gender Relevant? By Mumford, Karen A.; Sechel, Cristina
  5. Institutions as constraints and resources: explaining cross-national divergence in performance management By Doellgast, Virginia; Marsden, David
  6. Are patient-regarding preferences stable? Evidence from a laboratory experiment with physicians and medical students from different countries By Wang, Jian; Iversen, Tor; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Godager, Geir
  7. Firm size, productivity and pay in today's service economy By Giuseppe Berlingieri; Sara Calligaris; Chiara Criscuolo

  1. By: Galina Besstremyannaya (New Economic School, Moscow); Sergei Golovan (New Economic School, Moscow)
    Abstract: The paper analyzes the impact of physicians' altruism and motivation on the outcomes of pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare, where a fixed price contract on quantity is supplemented with a relative performance contract on quality. Our theoretical model forecasts crowding out of most altruistic types. In an empirical application to the Medicare's nationwide natural experiment with a relative performance contract on quality for acute inpatient care since 2013, we observe the proof of this prediction. Namely, the quality dimensions, which are linked to patient's benefit, demonstrate higher deterioration among top-performing hospitals than other incentivized dimensions.
    Keywords: incentives contracts, altruism, dynamic panels, healthcare
    JEL: C22 C23 D21 D22 I18
    Date: 2019–03
  2. By: Nikhil Datta
    Abstract: This paper investigates the extent to which labour supply preferences are responsible for the marked rise in atypical work arrangements in the UK and US. By employing vignettes in a discrete job choice experiment in a representative survey, I estimate the distribution for preferences and willingness-to-pay over various job attributes. The list of attributes includes key distinguishing factors of typical and atypical work arrangements, such as security, work-related benefits, flexibility, autonomy and taxation implications. The results are indicative that the majority of the population prefer characteristics associated with traditional employee-employer relationships, and this preference holds even when analysing just the sub-sample of those in atypical work arrangements. Additionally, preferences across the UK and US are very similar, despite differences in labour market regulations. Rather than suggesting that labour supply preferences have contributed to the increase in atypical work arrangements, I find that the changing nature of work is likely to have significant negative welfare implications for many workers.
    Keywords: atypical work, self-employment, willingness-to-pay, experiment, labour supply preferences
    JEL: J22 J24 J32 J81
    Date: 2019–07
  3. By: John R. Graham; Hyunseob Kim; Mark T. Leary
    Abstract: We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller for example than the strong persistence in board structure that we document. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies document a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched.
    JEL: B26 G3 J3 M12
    Date: 2019–06
  4. By: Mumford, Karen A. (University of York); Sechel, Cristina (University of Sheffield)
    Abstract: This article presents and explores a rich new data source to analyse the determinants of pay and job rank amongst academic Economists in the UK. Characteristics associated with individual productivity and workplace features are found to be important determinants of the relative wage and promotion structure in this sector. However, there is also a substantial unexplained gender pay gap. Men are considerably more likely to work in higher paid job ranks where there are also substantial within-rank gender pay gaps. We show that the nature of the gender pay gap has changed over the last two decades; but its size has not, suggesting a role for suitable policy intervention.
    Keywords: economist, academia, pay-gap, gender
    JEL: A1 A11 A2 I3 J01 J31 J7
    Date: 2019–06
  5. By: Doellgast, Virginia; Marsden, David
    Abstract: This article compares performance management practices in call centres from four telecommunications firms in the UK, France, Denmark, and Germany. Findings show that different combinations of institutional constraints, such as strong job security protections, and participation resources supporting worker voice were influential in shaping choices among HRM policies to motivate and discipline workers. Performance management most closely approached a high involvement model where both constraints and resources were high: where worker representatives were able both to restrict management’s use of sanctions and to establish procedures that improved the perceived fairness of incentives. Findings contribute to debates concerning the role of contextual factors in the design and effectiveness of HRM.
    Keywords: call centres; comparative HRM; performance management; telecommunications; RES-061-25-0444
    JEL: J50
    Date: 2018–09–20
  6. By: Wang, Jian (Department of Health Management and Health Economics); Iversen, Tor (Department of Health Management and Health Economics); Hennig-Schmidt, Heike (Department of Health Management and Health Economics); Godager, Geir (Department of Health Management and Health Economics)
    Abstract: We quantify patient-regarding preferences by fitting a bounded rationality model to data from incentivized laboratory experiments, where Chinese medical doctors, German medical students and Chinese medical students participate. We find a remarkable stability in patient-regarding preferences when comparing subject pools and we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal patient regarding preferences in the three groups. The results suggest that health economic experiments can provide knowledge that reach beyond the student subject pool, and that knowledge on preferences of decision-makers in one cultural context can be of relevance for very different cultural contexts.
    Keywords: Laboratory experiment; Bounded rationality; Payment mechanism; Physician behavior
    JEL: C92 D82 H40 I11 J33
    Date: 2019–04–17
  7. By: Giuseppe Berlingieri; Sara Calligaris; Chiara Criscuolo
    Abstract: The evidence that bigger firms pay higher wages and have higher productivity is based mainly on manufacturing, which is only a small share of today's economy. Giuseppe Berlingieri, Sara Calligaris and Chiara Criscuolo reveal that while the size premia for both wages and productivity are significantly weaker in market services than in manufacturing, the link between wages and productivity is stronger.
    Keywords: productivity, size-premium, wages
    JEL: E2 D2 J3
    Date: 2019–07

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