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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Solikin M. Juhro (Bank Indonesia); A. Farid Aulia (Bank Indonesia) |
| Abstract: | Saat ini dunia sedang menghadapi keadaan yang volatil, tidak pasti, kompleks, dan ambigu (VUCA). Tantangan-tantangan baru pun muncul sehingga seorang leader dituntut untuk memiliki kompetensi yang terus berkembang. Transformational leadership merupakan suatu tipe kepemimpinan yang dipandang superior dalam menjawab tantangantantangan tersebut, di mana seorang pemimpin diharapkan untuk senantiasa agile dalam pencapaian tujuan organisasi. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis keterkaitan antara aspek kepemimpinan (melalui asesmen Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire/MLQ), fungsi kognitif (melalui asesmen Wechsler Bellevue), dan pola aktivitas otak/brain mapping (melalui Electroencephalography/EEG). Pada tahap selanjutnya dilakukan pemberian stimulus melalui neurofeedback untuk melatih kontrol terhadap gelombang otak. Dari penelitian ini, dapat disimpulkan bahwa seluruh partisipan yang menjadi sampel penelitian memiliki tipe kepemimpinan transformational leadership dengan subtipe idealized influence (behavior) dan inspirational motivation. Selain itu, adanya stimulasi terhadap otak (neurofeedback) juga memampukan partisipan untuk mengendalikan gelombang otak dalam keadaan sadar. Dengan adanya kemampuan untuk mengendalikan gelombang otak secara sadar, seorang leader dapat bekerja secara optimal. |
| Keywords: | applied neuroscience, leadership style, transformational leadership, human resources management, neurofeedback |
| JEL: | D8 J24 M19 O15 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idn:wpaper:wp22018&r=all |
| By: | Joaquín Gómez Miñambres (Lafayette College); Mark Schneider (University of Alabama) |
| Abstract: | Employment contracts often have a three-tiered structure, offering a base salary, a bonus for high performance and a penalty for poor performance. None of the standard models in contract theory generate such a contract. We show that such coarse contracts are optimal in a model where the agent exhibits two of the most robust deviations from expected utility theory: skewness preference and ambiguity aversion. The analysis identifies conditions where the optimal contract is simple and both carrots and sticks are optimal. Our analysis has implications for performance evaluation, corporate compensation structure, prize-linked savings accounts, and the determinants of intrinsic motivation. |
| Keywords: | Contract theory; Skewness Preference; Ambiguity Aversion; Simple Contracts |
| JEL: | D9 D86 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-02&r=all |
| By: | Magda, Iga (Warsaw School of Economics); Cukrowska-Torzewska, Ewa (University of Warsaw) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the link between the presence of female managers and the size of the firm-level gender pay gap, looking separately at the private and public sector. Using a large linked employer-employee dataset for Poland and a non-parametric and parametric decompositions, we find that higher presence of female managers is associated with more pay advantage towards women in selected types of public sector units: the ones in which remunerations of women and men are already equal, and a large share of the workforce is tertiary-educated. The effects are, however, relatively small in size. In private establishments, lower gender wage inequality is associated with higher shares of female workers, but not female managers. |
| Keywords: | gender wage gap, wage inequalities, public sector, female managers, Ñopo decomposition, Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition |
| JEL: | J16 J31 J45 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12026&r=all |
| By: | Contreras Oscar F.; Giorgio Zanarone |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how organizations manage the social comparisons that arise when their employees' pay and tasks, and hence their status vis-à-vis peers, differ. We show that under a "pay transparency policy", the organization may compress pay and distort the employees' tasks to minimize social comparison costs. We subsequently show that if the organization can credibly commit to informal agreements, it may remove social comparisons by implementing a "pay secrecy" policy. Under such a policy, the organization makes employees "officially equal" by granting them similar formal terms, while optimally differentiating their pay through self-enforcing informal adjustments. |
| Keywords: | Social Comparisons;Organization Design;Informal Contracts;Formal Contracts |
| JEL: | D03 D23 M52 M54 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2018-25&r=all |
| By: | Le Yaouanq, Yves (LMU Munich); Schwardmann, Peter (LMU Munich) |
| Abstract: | How can naivete about present bias persist despite experience? To answer this question, our experiment investigates participants\' ability to learn from their own behavior. Participants decide how much to work on a real effort task on two predetermined dates. In the week preceding each work date, they state their commitment preferences and predictions of future effort. While we find that participants are present biased and initially naive about their bias, our methodology enables us to establish that they are Bayesian in how they learn from their experience at the first work date. A treatment in which we vary the nature of the task at the second date further shows that learning is unencumbered by a change in environment. Our results suggest that persistent naivete cannot be explained by a fundamental inferential bias. At the same time, we find that participants initially underestimate the information that their experience will provide - a bias that may lead to underinvestment in experimentation and a failure to activate self-regulation mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | naivete; present bias; learning.; |
| JEL: | D83 D90 |
| Date: | 2019–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:140&r=all |
| By: | Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim |
| Abstract: | We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general characterization of renegotiation-proof states of such a renegotiation. The proposed solution concept provides an effective and easy-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous type space, private values and non-linear contracts. We find that the optimal contracts for the principal are pooling and satisfy a "no-distortionat-the-bottom" property. |
| Keywords: | Principal-Agent models,renegotiation,commitment,Coase-conjecture |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C78 D82 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18054&r=all |
| By: | John T. Addison; Paulino Teixeira |
| Abstract: | Cross-country data are used to establish perceived shortfalls in employee involvement based on the responses of employee representatives in EU establishments with formal workplace employee representation. The desire for greater involvement is smaller where workplace representation is via works councils than union bodies, a finding that also obtains across country clusters. However, the favorable influence of the works council institution, if not information provision, does not carry over to situations in which management is adjudged uncooperative and untrustworthy. Whether the views of these respondents are representative of the workforce and hypothetically of a workforce currently without representation is also considered. |
| Keywords: | formal workplace employee representation, works councils, union agencies, information/consultation/participation deficits, union density, country heterogeneity, industrial relations quality |
| JEL: | J53 J58 J83 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7399&r=all |
| By: | Song, Younghwan (Union College); Gao, Jia (Union College) |
| Abstract: | Using data from the 2010, 2012, and 2013 American Time Use Survey Well-Being Modules, this paper examines how subjective well-being (SWB) varies between working at home and working in the workplace among wage/salary workers. Both OLS and individual fixed-effects models are employed for estimation, and the results are largely consistent. In general, we find that working at home is associated with a lower level of net affect and a higher probability of having unpleasant feelings relative to working in the workplace. We further decompose homeworking into telework and bringing work home and find that the effect of SWB varies by types of homeworking. In comparison with working in the workplace, telework increases stress in both samples of weekdays and weekends/holidays, and it also reduces net affect and increases unpleasantness in the sample of weekends/holidays. In contrast, bringing work home on weekdays results in a lower level of net affect due to less happiness received. The only positive effect of homeworking we discover is that telework reduces tiredness on weekdays. As to the existence of gender difference in the effect of homeworking, our OLS results show that working at home is associated with positive affections for males but negative affections for females. However, fixed-effects models suggest that both males and females feel more stressed when teleworking, indicating the existence of individual heterogeneity. |
| Keywords: | working at home, telework, subjective well-being, time use |
| JEL: | J22 J28 D13 |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11993&r=all |
| By: | Michael Kirchler (University of Innsbruck, Department of Banking and Finance); Florian Lindner (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Utz Weitzel (Utrecht University School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Two aspects of social context are central to the finance industry. First, financial professionals usually make investment decisions on behalf of third parties. Second, social competition, in the form of performance rankings, is pervasive. Therefore, we investigate professionals’ risk-taking behavior under social competition when investing for others. We run online and lab-in-the-field experiments with 965 financial professionals and show that professionals increase their risk taking for others when they lag behind. This effect, however, disappears when professionals’ incentives are flat. Additional survey evidence from 1,349 respondents reveals that professionals’ preferences for high rankings are significantly stronger than the general population’s. |
| Keywords: | Experimental finance, behavioral finance, social competition, rank incentives, financial professionals, delegated decision making, investment game, lab-in-the-field experiment. |
| JEL: | G02 G11 D03 C93 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2018_08&r=all |